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The development of the public debate about public affairs and transparency in the political sphere of Switzerland between 2000 and 2019

Master's Thesis

of

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Abstract

The public affairs landscape in Switzerland is a black box because it is weakly regulated by international comparison. Attempts to reform it have been rejected by parliamentarians over the past 20 years, even though the field of public affairs has gained importance because of the strong influences of *Europeanization*, *Professionalization*, *Mediatization* and the *Polarization of Swiss parties*. These regulatory gaps expose the potential for non-transparent actions, which are not in the spirit of a democracy (Bitonti, 2017). Since parliamentarians are not able to regulate themselves, it would be of interest to discover what the next higher authorities, the people, think about transparency in lobbying. This work sets out to investigate the development of the public debate about public affairs and lobbying in the political sphere of Switzerland between 2000 and 2019. The results of the content analysis of Neue Zürcher Zeitung articles show that the debate about more transparency in lobbying has increased. Moreover, voices for more transparency clearly outnumber those who oppose it. The core demands of the proponents are the regulation of lobbying, regulation of party financing and mandatory disclosure of interest connections by parliamentarians. Opponents argue that regulation is not feasible in terms of the militia system and that competition from public affairs officers is not desired. In essence, parliamentarians enjoy certain privileges with the current regulation, which a majority is reluctant to give up. For this reason, it is ultimately up to the people to force regulation of the public affairs landscape and ensure transparency.

Keywords: Public Affairs, Lobbying, Transparency, Democracy, Switzerland, Lobbying Regulation, Militia System, Politics, Parliament

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List of Abbreviations

Art.	Article
BDP	Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei (Conservative Democratic Party of Switzerland)
CHF	Confoederatio Helvetica Franken (Swiss Franc)
CVP	Christlich-Demokratische Volkspartei (Christian Democratic Party)
ect.	Et cetera (and other similar things)
e.g.	exempli gratia (for example)
EEA	European Economic Area
EGsolS	Ensemble à gauche/solidarités (Together on the Left/Solidarity Party)
et al.	et alia (and others)
EU	European Union
EVP	Evangelische Volkspartei (Evangelical People's Party)
FDP	Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)
GLP	Grünliberale Partei (Green Liberal Party)
GPD	Gross Domestic Product
GRECO	Groupe d'États contre la corruption (Group of States against Corruption)
GRN	Geschäftsreglement des Nationalrats (Procedural Rules of the National Council)
GRS	Geschäftsreglement des Ständerats (Procedural Rules of the Council of States)
H1	Hypothesis 1
H2	Hypothesis 2
i.e.	id est (that is to say)
incl.	inclusive
MP	Members of Parliament
NZZ	Neue Zürcher Zeitung (New Zurich Newspaper)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PA	Public Affairs
Para	Paragraph
PDA	Partei der Arbeit (Labor party)
PR	Public Relations
RQ	Research Question

RVOG   Regierungs- und Verwaltungsorganisationsgesetz (Government and Administration Organization Act)

SME   Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises

SPAG   Schweizerische Public Affairs Gesellschaft (Swiss Public Affairs Society)

SP   Sozialdemokratische Partei (Social Democratic Party)

SVP   Schweizerische Volkspartei (Swiss People's Party)

U.K.   United Kingdom

U.S.   United States

VIG   Vernehmlassungsgesetz (Consultation Act)

1 Introduction

The political landscape in Switzerland has changed in recent years. Overarching macro trends such as *Europeanization*, *Professionalization*, *Mediatization* and the increasing *Polarization* of the Swiss political party system are ensuring that the former federation state is becoming more disentangled (Sciarini, Fischer, & Traber, 2015). This leads to a distance between the political, the economic and the social systems, all of which are bridged by public affairs consultants (Hoffmann, Steiner, & Jarren, 2007). As a consequence, public affairs officer try to influence the political process directly. The regulation of the public affairs landscape in Switzerland lags this trend. Unlike other countries, Switzerland does not have a lobbying register (Etter, 2014; OECD, 2014). Also, the country, represented by militia politicians, has no regulation to prohibit national politicians from deliberately exposing themselves to conflicts of interest by exercising a main profession and accepting consulting mandates (Linder, 2012). In addition, Switzerland is the only European country apart from Sweden that does not regulate party finances (Senti, 2011). This constellation has led to several lobbying scandals in recent years (Albrecht, Arezia, & Bühler, 2019). Despite great public outrage, public affairs regulation has remained virtually unchanged in the last 20 years compared to other western countries (Waber, 2001; Schneeberger, 2011; Friedli & Häuptli, 2020). This raises the question of whether lobbying regulation in Switzerland is sufficient. In his work, Alberto Bitonti (2017) proposes four criteria that lobbying regulation in a democracy must meet: accountability, transparency, openness and fairness. These criteria are not met in Switzerland. Switzerland has only two laws regulating lobbying in the Federal Parliament. The Parliament Act Art. 4 regulates the disclosure obligations of parliamentarians regarding their professional mandates. The Parliament law Act Art. 69 regulates access to the Federal Palace for guests of the parliament. Both laws offer room for intransparencies and are insufficiently implemented by parliamentarians (Parma, 2012; Angeli, 2018; Schnurrenberger, 2018). Considering that Switzerland practices direct democracy, it may be surprising that the will of the people approves this regulation gap. Therefore, this work sets itself the goal to examine the development of the public debate about public affairs and transparency in the political sphere

of Switzerland between 2000 and 2019. This work enters uncharted territory. So far, the public affairs literature in Switzerland describes predominantly the Swiss public affairs landscape (Tschäni, 1983; Baeriswyl, 2005; Hoffmann, Steiner & Jarren, 2007; Mattle, 2009; Willener, 2013; Daum, Pöhner & Peer, 2014; Etter, 2014; Schilliger & Seele 2014; Hürlimann, 2015) or it examines specific topics such as the financing of political parties (Gernet, 2011). Only the work of Sabine Etter (2013) deals with the regulation of lobbying in Switzerland but tries to find a suitable lobbying regulation for the Swiss system with the help of expert interviews.

To describe the discourse of transparency and public affairs in Switzerland between 2000 and 2019, a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of articles published by Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ) in the observation period is conducted to understand the actors and arguments in the context of the topic and to analyze the discourse over time. This work starts with a *Literature Review*, in which the main theoretical pillars of this work are presented (→ Chapter 2). In addition, a personal analysis is made to provide the reader with an overview of the *Public Affairs Landscape in Switzerland* (→ Chapter 2.2.3). Subsequently, the *Research Question* and the *Hypotheses* to be answered are presented in a separate chapter (→Chapter 3) before the *Research Method and Study Design* are explained (→ Chapter 4). The *Results* of the investigation are visible in Chapter 5, which are put into context in the *Discussion* (→ Chapter 6). This work closes with the *Conclusion* (→Chapter 7).

2 Literature Review

The literature review tries to offer an overview of the relevant works in the field. It is structured according to three overarching themes. In Chapter 2.1 *Public Affairs*, we present the definition of the *Term Public Affairs* (→ Chapter 2.1.1), the historical development (→ Chapter 2.1.2 *Historic Development of Public Affairs as a Discipline*) and the *Classification of Public Affairs in the Discipline of Corporate Communications* (→ Chapter 2.1.3). In Chapter 2.2 *Public Affairs in Switzerland*, we explain the *Special Features of the Swiss Political System* (→ Chapter 2.2.1) and how *Decision-Making in Switzerland* (→ Chapter 2.2.2) is executed, followed by an overview of the *Public Affairs Landscape in Switzerland* (→ Chapter 2.2.3) and the overarching macro trends that influence the Swiss political system (→ Chapter 2.2.4 *Continuity and Change in the Politics of Switzerland*). Lastly, Chapter 2.3 *Lobbying and Democracy* discusses the *Different Interpretations and ideal Principles of Lobbying in Democracies* (→ Chapter 2.3.1), examines the case of Switzerland under this perspective (→ Chapter 2.3.2 *Regulation of Decision-Making Process in Switzerland*) and analyzes the public debate on lobbying in Switzerland that has taken place so far (→ Chapter 2.3.3 *Lobbying in the Public Debate of Switzerland*).

2.1 Public Affairs

The terms public affairs and lobbying are often used synonymously (Köppl, 2008). Especially in Switzerland, the term public affairs does not seem to be familiar. At present, many business units that execute public affairs activities call them something else. (Hoffmann, Steiner, & Jarren, 2007). This chapter attempts to define the term public affairs (→ Chapter 2.1.1 *Term Public Affairs*), to place it in its historical context which is strongly influenced by the field of lobbying (→ Chapter 2.1.2 *Historic Development of Public Affairs as a Discipline*), and to classify it in the discipline of corporate communication (→ Chapter 2.1.3 *Classification of Public Affairs in the Discipline of Corporate Communication*).

2.1.1 Term Public Affairs

Compared to other scientific disciplines, public affairs is relatively new. The first studies in the field date back to the late 1960s, when the Public Affairs Council was founded in the U.S. by business representatives in the interests of becoming more involved in the community and the political process (Holcomb, 2005). Although public affairs research has meanwhile gained importance in other countries as well (→ Chapter 2.1.2 *Historic Development of Public Affairs as a Discipline*), the discipline has so far failed to produce a universal definition of public affairs as a research object (see below), or to distinguish itself from other scientific fields (Fleisher 2005; Holcomb 2005). As a result, the field of public affairs has become the subject of studies from different disciplines (political science, economics, communication science and sociology) and cannot be clearly assigned to any of them (Irmisch, 2011). In summary, public affairs remains a function "without a clear identity" (Harris & Moss, 2001, p.102) and without its own grand theory (Fleisher, 2005). This is because public affairs differs from country to country, depending on cultural, economic, legal, political, and social circumstances (Fleisher, 2005). The U.S. and the U.K. have a completely different understanding of public affairs and public relations. Historically, the U.S. use of the two fields was almost congruent while the U.K. clearly separated the two (McGrath, 2005). This understanding is still unclear in Switzerland, which is why it is difficult to classify the discipline of public affairs in the field of corporate communications (→ Chapter 2.1.3 *Classification of Public Affairs as a Discipline of Corporate Communications*). Nevertheless, three definitions will be listed here that attempt to do justice to the term public affairs. Since this is a work about the perception of public affairs in Switzerland, relevant authors from Switzerland and other German-speaking countries are listed here:

"Public affairs is the strategic management of decision-making processes at the interface between politics, business and society. Public affairs organizes an organization's external relations, especially with governments, parliaments, authorities, municipalities as well as associations and institutions – and with society itself. Public affairs means representing and communicating corporate, employee and member interests in the political context, directly

through lobbying, i.e. communicating with and advising decision-makers; and indirectly through opinion leaders and the media" (Althaus, 2005a, p.262)[1].

"Public affairs is therefore ... in an all-encompassing sense a field of activity consisting of strategies and techniques for shaping the private and public communication of an actor with politically relevant stakeholders" (Hoffmann, Steiner, Jarren, 2007, p. 63)[2].

"Public affairs is the relationship management of an organization or a company towards its political (non-commercial) environment" (Gallati, 2003 as cited in Spring, 2005, p. 14)[3].

Despite all efforts to clearly define the term, public affairs remains a little-known term in the German-speaking world. Especially among practitioners, it is often used synonymously with the terms government relations, public relations or lobbying. (→ Chapter 2.1.3 *Classification of Public Affairs in the Discipline of Corporate Communications*) (McGrath, 2005; Köppl, 2008). For this reason, the terms lobbying and public affairs are used synonymously in this work despite the clear classification of the terms in the next chapters, which sees lobbying as a subarea of public affairs. The main reason is the empirical analysis on which this work is based, which specifically seeks for the search term lobbying and not for public affairs, as the latter is still less common in Switzerland (→ Chapter 4.3 *Sampling*). Nevertheless, in the coming chapters this work will relate the terms to each other and classify them in theory.

2.1.2 Historic Development of Public Affairs as a Discipline

As we have seen in the previous Chapter 2.1.1 *Term Public Affairs*, public affairs is a relatively young concept, so in this Chapter 2.1.2 *Historic Development of Public Affairs as a Discipline*, we first fall back on the historically familiar concept of lobbying, and we will return to the term public affairs as soon as it appears in the timeline.

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[1] „Public Affairs ist das strategische Management von Entscheidungsprozessen an der Schnittstelle zwischen Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Public Affairs organisiert die externen Beziehungen einer Organisation, vor allem zu Regierungen, Parlamenten, Behörden, Gemeinden sowie Verbänden und Institutionen – und zur Gesellschaft selbst. Public Affairs heisst Vertretung und Vermittlung von Unternehmens-, Mitarbeiter- und Mitglieder-Interessen im politischen Kontext, direkt durch Lobbying, also Kommunikation mit und Beratung von Entscheidungsträgern; und indirekt über Meinungsbildner und Medien". (German original)

[2] Public Affairs ist deshalb … in einem umfassenden Sinn ein Tätigkeitsfeld aus Strategien und Techniken zur Gestaltung der nicht-öffentlichen und öffentlichen Kommunikation eines Akteurs mit politisch relevanten Anspruchsgruppen (German original).

[3] Public Affairs ist die Beziehungspflege einer Organisation oder einer Unternehmung gegenüber ihrem politischen (nichtkommerziellen) Umfeld. (German original).

Politics and lobbying are inextricably linked. Lobbying's influence on politics was described in history by the rhetorician Marcus Tillius Cicero in ancient Rome and Niccolò Machiavelli in the Republic of Florence (Nonon & Clamen, 1991; Buholzer, 1998). For Busch-Janser (2004), the birth of modern lobbying is symbolically linked to the year 1789, when the American Congress was concerned with passing the tariff law and was exposed to multiple interests. Subsequently, political influence in the U.S. flourished during the construction of the railways, with bribery and corruption being widespread (Köppl, 2008; Vondenhoff & Busch-Janser, 2008). The origin of the term lobbying, however, remains unclear. Köppl (2008) suspects a connection with the hotel lobby of the Willar Hotel in Washington D.C., where business representatives met with the U.S. President Ulysses S. Grant at the beginning of the 19th century. For Alberto Bitonti und Phil Harris (2017), the term is associated with Westminster in London, where members of parliament met with visitors and business representatives to discuss their economic interests. What both stories have in common is the fact that the stakeholders met in so-called *lobbies*, the vestibules of the buildings, from which the term unmistakably derives: The Latin *labium* from which the term lobbying derives translates as *vestibule* (Spring, 2005, p.11)

Even though lobbying and therefore public affairs has a long tradition, interest from academia remained absent until the second half of the 20th century. The founding of the Public Affairs Council by Richard Armstrong in 1954 in the U.S. encouraged the first academic work in the field. Jean Boddewyn and Ashok Kapoor published the first studies in the field of international public affairs and government relations research in the 1970s (Fleisher 2005; Holcomb, 2005). From early on, researchers have been occupied with defining the discipline of public affairs, but they have not succeeded in doing so until today (→ Chapter 2.1.1 *Term Public Affairs*). The first conferences in the 1980s, as well as the introduction and establishment of academic journals such as the *Journal of Public Affairs* (U.K.), the *Journal of Political Marketing* (U.S.) and *Business and Politics* (U.K.), and the publication of the first handbooks in the field of public affairs at the turn of the millennium also contributed to further establishing this comparatively young research field (Fleisher, 2005).

The modern understanding of public affairs activities includes other activities in addition to classic lobbying (→ Chapter 2.1.3 *Classification of Public Affairs in the Discipline of Corporate*

Communications). The strategic orientation of these activities emerged in the U.S. after the First World War, from the independent fields of corporate philanthropy, urban and community affairs and public relations, which began to be combined in an entrepreneurial way (Mahon, 2017). In the U.K., this step was taken just before the Second World War, although it took until the 1990s for lobbying to gain some public acceptance (Sousa, 1999). With the emergence of the EU and the formation of the world's largest economic region, the public affairs industry also developed from a diplomatic representative to an active information broker. Today, Brussels undoubtedly forms the center of the public affairs industry measured by the global and economic importance of the EU (Pedler, 2005; Bitonti & Harris, 2017).

Driven by these developments, the public affairs industry has evolved into a multi-billion dollar industry over the last thirty years, especially after the liberalization of state-related businesses and markets (Bitonti & Harris, 2017). In today's companies, the public affairs industry forms the "center of the organization's actions to anticipate, plan and respond in a thoughtful and articulate manner to issues, problems and situations" (Mahon, 2017, p.388). Also, from the political side there is an increasing demand for qualitative information from the sector and proactive participation in the decision-making process (Bitonti & Harris, 2017). This is mainly due to the increased complexity of the business fields, but also to the increased importance of the regulating authority as a decision-maker that needs to be influenced from a business perspective: the government acts as a legislator, regulator, buyer, distributor, initiator or decision-maker, which can lead to competitive advantages for companies depending on the decisions made (Bitonti & Harris, 2017). The expenditure of the leading business enterprises in Brussels is correspondingly high: Google invested between 6.00 – 6.25 million euros in lobbying in 2019 followed by Microsoft (5 – 5.25 million euros), Shell (4.5 – 4.75 million) and Facebook (3.5 – 3.75 million euros)(Brandt, 2019).

As already mentioned, public affairs industries differ in each country, as each has distinct cultural, economic, legal, political and social conditions (Fleisher, 2005). In contrast to the U.S. and the U.K., especially in the rest of Euope the public affairs industries were weak (Thomson & John, 2007). However, the *Professionalization* and regulation of the industry has gained

momentum since the founding of the European Union and is now well represented in most European countries (Bitonti & Harris, 2017).

Switzerland, the country we are focusing on in this work, is not spared from these trends ($\rightarrow$ Chapter 2.2.4 *Continuity and Change in the Politics of Switzerland*). However, the country in the heart of Europe has a tough time with progressive regulations in the public affairs sector ($\rightarrow$ Chapter 2.3.3 *Lobbying in the Public Debate of Switzerland*). Nevertheless, the topic has been present in Switzerland for about a century. Oscar Holer (1926) wrote a treatise in the early 20th century on the traditionally close relationship between the state and professional associations. Hanspeter Kriesi (1980) dealt with political influence and decision-making in his habilitation "*Decision-Making Structures and Decision-Making Processes in Swiss Politics*". Hans Tschäni (1983) published a critical study of the influence of lobbies and associations in Swiss democracy in his book "*Wer regiert die Schweiz?*" (*Who governs Switzerland?*). In light of these publications, research into Swiss lobbying has gradually gained in importance. Compared to other countries, however, the number of studies is still limited. Studies are only conducted by a small number of scholars (Baeriswyl, 2005; Hoffmann, Steiner, & Jarren, 2007; Gernet, 2011; Longchamp, 2011; Daum, Pöhner, & Peer, 2014; Schilliger & Seele, 2014) and at times appear in student bachelor and master theses (Mattle, 2009; Willener, 2013; Etter, 2014; Hürlimann, 2015; Schnurrenberger, 2018).

In general, the activity of lobbying has been present since the existence of politics. The field of public affairs as a strategic management discipline and research topic has developed over the last five decades both in practice and academia and will continue to do so in the future since it can lead to competitive advantages at the political level as we will see in the next chapter ($\rightarrow$ Chapter 2.1.3 *Classification of Public Affairs in the Discipline of Corporate Communications*).

2.1.3 Classification of Public Affairs in the Discipline of Corporate Communication

Phil Harris and Craig S. Fleisher (2017) describe public affairs "as a critical boardroom skill that resides with the Chief Executive and those engaged in multicomplex strategic political management work, particularly those working at and across the international business, government and politics interface" (p.1). This is true in a competitive and globalized world, where corporate communication has a significant influence on whether a company can stand up to the competition or not (Fleisher, 2012; Griffin, 2016). However, the growing importance of public affairs is not yet reflected and barely taught at business, commerce, communication and management schools (Harris & Fleisher, 2017). While Harris and Fleisher (2017) implicitly position public affairs as a macro function, other scholars define public affairs differently. As of yet, there is no common consensus about where to position public affairs in relation to general corporate communication. In the following, the different perspectives will be presented with reference to Switzerland to understand the classification of public affairs in corporate communication. Meckel's (2008) model assigns a superordinate function to public affairs. In the model of Lurati, Mariconda & Jost (2011), public affairs has a subordinate function. We then follow Mattle (2009), who defines public affairs as a subarea of public relations and assigns five clear fields of activity to the public affairs function.

2.1.3.1 Public Affairs on the same level with Public Relations

In Meckel's model (2008), public relations and public affairs are on the same level. Both are subareas of overall communication and are dependent on the major concepts. The cross-sectional areas are relevant in all areas and concern *Investor Relations*, *Public Relations*, *Public Affairs* and *Internal Communication* equally. In general, the subareas must be coordinated with each other so that the company has a consistent presence in both internal and external communications. Meckel's overview shows how interconnected and interdependent the individual areas are (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Meckels (2008) Corporate Communication Model

2.1.3.2 Public Affairs as a subdiscipline of Public Relations

While the relationship between public relations and public affairs is given an equally strong role in Meckel's classification, the authors Lurati, Mariconda and Reinhold (2011) regard corporate communications and public relations synonymously, put them on the same level and classify public affairs accordingly as a subarea (Figure 2). The PR/Corporate Communications model consists of seven equal disciplines of which public affairs represents one. These disciplines determine the actions (organizational and communicational) that the company conducts. The actions in turn are made visible and executed through certain (media) channels. In the area of public affairs, this could mean forming an effective coalition with the government, which is expressed through interpersonal communication.

Disciplines:

Institutional Communication, Issue Communication, Internal Communication, Financial Communication & Investor Relations, Public Affairs, Community Relations, Crisis Communication

Activities («actions»)

Organizational
- New Products and Services
- New Markets
- Strategic Alliances
- Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A)
- Organizational Changes
- Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
- Corporate Governance

Communicational
- Corporate Brand Value and Brand Purpose
- Corporate Visual Identity
- Partnerships, Alliances and Coalitions with Relevant Stakeholders
- Sponsorship
- Philantrophy

Channels («media»)

- Interpresonal Communication
- Organizational Media
- News Media
- Advertising and Promotional Media

Figure 2: Lurati, Mariconda & Reinhold's (2011) Model of Corporate Communications and Public Relations

As the two examples show, the relationship between public relations and public affairs in Switzerland remains unclear. In the literature, Kamps (2007) agrees with Meckel and places public affairs on the same level as public relations. The European Public Relations Confederation (CERP) concluded after a study that public affairs is a subarea of public relations (Köppl, 2007). For Althaus (2005a), on the other hand, the separation is artificial since a company's foreign policy must be managed holistically anyway. The classification difficulties could also emerge from the fact that the term public affairs is still relatively new and, in contrast to the U.S. and U.K., has not yet really established itself in the German-speaking world. In a nationwide survey in Switzerland, the self-designation within the field of activity was 30.7% public affairs. However, alternative names for the same activity were common (23.9% public relations, 17% campaigns, 15.9% lobbying) (Hoffmann, Steiner, & Jarren, 2007). In the meantime, the term public affairs has gained in prominence during the *Professionalization* of the field.

2.1.3.3 Public Affairs in the Swiss context of Corporate Communication

After having conducted a profound analysis, Mattle (2009) concludes by classifying public affairs as a sub-discipline of public relations, which in turn is part of the overall corporate communication. Mattle (2009) lists the disciplines of public affairs as governmental relations, political consulting, issue management, campaigning and lobbying (Figure 3). Mattle follows an international survey by the Public Affairs Council, which analyzes the fields of activity (Köppl 2003; Köppl 2007) and puts them into the particularities of the Swiss public affairs landscape, in which political influence via campaigns and political consultancy play a more significant role than in an international comparison (Farner Consulting, 2008 as cited in Mattle, 2009). The individual fields of activity within Public Affairs will be briefly presented in the following:

Figure 3: The Activities of Public Affairs and its Classification in Corporate Communication (Mattle, 2009)

Government Relations

This area includes positive relationship management with local, regional, national and international government institutions (Wiebusch & Schönborn, 2002). The good relationship (e.g. personal conversations) with members of the government, authorities and relevant organizations is seen as a core element for one's own entrepreneurial success (Köppl, 2007).

Political Consulting

"Political Consulting describes the substantive, conceptual and operational consulting of political representatives as well as corporate services" (Wiebusch & Schönborn 2002, p.25).

This is particularly true in political systems where political parties and politicians are dependent on the expertise of the business community and need support in finding their way, which happens especially in Switzerland. In return, companies benefit from the access to specific relevant information which can result in competitive advantages. Policy advice is traditionally offered by associations, although public relations and public affairs consultancies are taking on an increasingly important role in this field through their representatives (Wiebusch & Schönborn, 2002).

Issue Management

Issue Management comprises, according to Wiebusch & Schönborn (2002), "the active management of societal, social, political and economic issues" (p.26). An *issue* is assessed according to its relevance, its conflict potential, the expectation gap (different demands between stakeholders and the organization) and the level of public interest (Ingenhoff & Röttger, 2007). For this reason, close observation of the economic, political and social environment is necessary, and early detection of an issue (through scanning and monitoring) is crucial for the company, as it becomes difficult to control an issue as the population's interest in it increases (Ingenhoff & Röttger, 2007).

Campaigning

Campaigning attempts to effectively emphasize one's own interests in the political opinion-forming process and to achieve certain goals. It has definite relevance in Switzerland. The goals are company-specific, but serve to arouse interest, enhance credibility or increase approval (Wiebusch & Schönborn, 2002). The focus of a campaign is the citizen who is supposed to vote for the desired party or candidate. In addition to voting and election campaigns, image campaigns, education and information campaigns are also part of the field of campaigning (Althaus, 2005b).

Lobbying

Lobbying is defined by Köppl (2007) as "the influencing of political decisions by persons who are not involved in these decisions" (p.191). By political decisions Köppl (2007) understands this to mean above all the amendment of laws or regulation. Accordingly, the addressees of lobbying are bodies close to the state or political decision-makers, such as trade unions, parties or the administration.

Although we have clearly subordinated lobbying to the subfield of public affairs in this chapter, we use the terms lobbying and public affairs synonymously as mentioned earlier in this work, since the term lobbying appears more frequently in the empirical analysis than the term public affairs (→ Chapter 4.3 *Sampling*).

2.2 Public Affairs in Switzerland

To properly understand the public affairs landscape in Switzerland, it is important to have a thorough understanding of the Swiss political system. In Chapter 2.2.1 *Special Features of the Swiss Political System*, we learn about the four main pillars of Swiss democracy: *Direct Democracy*, *Militia System*, *Federalism* and *Concordance*. This basic knowledge allows us to dive into *Decision-Making in Switzerland* (→ Chapter 2.2.2). We learn about the different decision-making phases and look at the system as a holistic process. Not to be underestimated in its importance for this work is the exploration of the *Public Affairs Landscape in Switzerland* (→ Chapter 2.2.3). Through detailed analysis we will see that this is difficult to fathom due to the lack of regulation. In the closing Chapter 2.2.4 *Continuity and Change in the Politics of Switzerland*, we delve into four macro trends (*Europeanization*, *Professionalization*, *Mediatization*, *Polarization of Political Party System in Switzerland*) that have changed Swiss politics over the past two decades and with it the public affairs landscape.

2.2.1 Special Features of the Swiss Political System

Switzerland sees itself as a "Willensnation" (willing nation) (Linder, 2012, p.57) which came into existence as such in 1848 with the merger of cantons of different languages, denominations, cultures and histories, thus forming an antithesis to European states such as Italy or Germany, which joined together based on a common language and culture and an ethnic unity of the people (Linder & Steffen, 2006). The Swiss political system and its institutions, which are designed for strong participation by the people, and have been described by Deutsch (1976) as a paradigmatic case of political integration, may be understood as co-founders of a Swiss culture that is celebrated in all parts of the country and

has a positive impact on national unity (Linder & Steffen, 2006). Historically, Linder (2012) numbers several reasons that in 1848 favored a nation state modelled on Switzerland: First, the industrialized forces pushed for a common economic area and the cantonal borders were seen as their obstacles. Second, the need for collective security grew as nation states emerged around Switzerland in the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna. Third, the culture of "mutual aid and cooperation in society" (p.35) spread through the cantons and favored the establishment of a nation-state, as there was already a dialogue between the regions beforehand. Fourth, the cantonal democratization at the beginning of the 19th century was a model whose ideas and rights were also introduced at the federal level. Overall, the people's satisfaction with democracy in Switzerland is above average in a country comparison (Linder, 2012; OECD, 2014). In this work the following points of the political system are considered the most important and will therefore be elaborated more profoundly in the following chapters: *Direct Democracy* (→ Chapter 2.2.1.1), the *Militia System* (→ Chapter 2.2.1.2), *Federalism* (→ Chapter 2.2.1.3) and *Concordance* (→ Chapter 2.2.1.4).

2.2.1.1 Direct Democracy

The achievements of direct democracy go back to the 19th century and stem from the strong influences of the French revolutionary period (Kölz, 1992). At first, popular sovereignty prevailed in the cantons. Within the framework of the founding of the Swiss Confederation, it was also used at the federal level from 1848 and gradually supplemented from that point onwards. The people have the highest political legitimacy in Switzerland and have the possibility of reviewing all important political decisions with a referendum or initiating them with an initiative (Linder, 2012). Today, the following popular rights are available to voters at federal level (Linder & Lutz, 2006):

The compulsory (constitutional) referendum is automatically submitted to the people for amendments to the constitution and for the adoption of state treaties or accession to a supranational organization. For example, the Swiss electorate voted on accession to the EEA or the bilateral agreements with the EU.

The optional (legislative) referendum covers generally binding federal decrees, legislative enactments and international treaties. If 50,000 voters or eight cantons submit a referendum

within 100 days, the parliamentary resolution is submitted to a popular vote and only comes into force if a majority of the people and cantons vote in favor.

The resolutive referendum on the right of urgency makes it possible to make decisions immediately and to postpone the sometimes-lengthy approval process in referendum democracy. However, it requires an absolute majority of both chambers and without a sufficient constitutional basis, must be approved by the people and the cantons within one year.

A *popular initiative* is put to the vote when 100,000 citizens demand an overall or partial revision of the constitution. The signatures must be collected within 18 months before the people vote for or against it. Parliament may submit a counterproposal to the electorate at the same time. If both the initiative and the counterproposal are accepted in the vote, the voters decide which article should apply by virtue of an attached contingent question.

The basic federal system is also implemented at cantonal and communal level. In addition, the cantons have other direct-democratic instruments such as the legislative initiative or the financial referendum. Certain instruments such as the cantonal initiative are subject to an optional referendum in some cantons. A special direct-democratic element, the "Landsgemeinde" (physical assembly of all voters of the canton) can still be observed in the Canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden and in the Canton of Glarus. At the communal level, assembly democracy continues to dominate (Linder & Lutz, 2006). The people's right have a direct influence on the Swiss political system. The referendum forces the country's political forces to cooperate and work out a compromise (→ Chapter 2.2.2 *Decision-Making in Switzerland*). This implies the inclusion of all potential forces when taking part in a referendum. Accordingly, the Swiss political system is classified as a "concordance" or "consensus" type of democracy (→ Chapter 2.2.4 *Continuity and Change in the Politics of Switzerland*). The people's rights mean that the population participates in the decision-making process. Empirical findings show that parties regularly use direct democratic instruments to mobilize their base for their concerns (Ladner & Brändle, 1999). Linder (2012) speaks of a direct democratic political system in Switzerland in terms of the people's rights, and of a semi-direct democracy in terms of the decision-making system in which government, parliament and the people work together. This system, in which the people's rights are anchored at the

national level, is "unique" worldwide (p.264). In principle, no subject is excluded from the people's say. The people and parliament therefore converge as decision-making bodies in the national political system, in which the people can be seen as the "institutional opposition" (Linder, 2012, p.267). Their direct instruments, the referendum and the initiative, are seen as a "brake" (referendum) and as an "accelerator" (initiative) (Linder, 2012, p.287).

2.2.1.2 Militia System

The proportion of political volunteers in the political system is high compared to other western countries (Widmer, 2007). This can be explained by the militia system, which penetrates the Swiss political system to its outermost branches. Linder (2012) defines the militia system as "the term used only in Switzerland for the voluntary, part-time and honorary assumption of public duties and offices" (p.82). It is deeply rooted in Swiss society. Niederer (1956) mentions as a historical example the construction and maintenance of water channels in the high valleys (called: Suonen) to which all adult men in a community in the canton of Valais were voluntarily committed. The most visible form of militia today is the military. Every male Swiss citizen is obliged to perform military service or to compensate financially for it if he is prevented from doing so for health reasons (Widmer, 2007).

The militia system is widespread at all levels and can be explained by the pronounced federalism (→ Chapter 2.2.1.3 *Federalism*) in Switzerland (Widmer, 2007). Tasks performed by the militia include all parliamentary mandates from federal to communal level and, at the level of (smaller) communes, executive office and judicial duties, as well as work for the church, schools and associations. They are intended to be voluntary or performed as a sideline activity. In doing so, citizens – like the Valaisans at that time for the maintenance of the Suonen – make their skills from their civilian life and part of their time available for the fulfilment of public functions and tasks. Countless cultural, social and charitable organizations are based on socially or publicly motivated activity without payment. Lamprecht et al. (2011) cite the example of the social integration of foreign youth, through which the contribution of sports clubs should not be underestimated. Without the militia system, the Swiss federal state, the 26 cantonal authorities and the roughly 2,500 municipalities could not function at all (Linder, 2012). Widmer (2007) sees another advantage of the militia system in the transfer of knowledge between society and politics. This is much faster because practitioners bring

their knowledge directly into the political system and are not disconnected from the world of experience. In the militia system, citizens – whether nurses or lawyers, farmers or professors – implement policy together. This may also explain why the identity of the governed and the government is as strong as it is in a democracy based on the militia system (Widmer, 2007). Freitag, Bundi und Witzig (2019) describe the average militia member as a married man aged between 40 and 64 with high social status. Youth and young adults are underrepresented in the militia system. Linder (2012) also speaks of a recruitment problem and emphasizes that nine out of ten local parties have difficulties filling their posts. Geser et al. (2003) observe in their study that while local parties are able to keep their supporters stable, the number of active members is declining. A current example is the SVP's difficulty in finding a new party president. Although the new party president, Marco Chiesa, has been elected in the meantime, it is assumed that he will be compensated for the first time (Triaca, 2020). This would be a novelty and would correspond to the tendency towards *Professionalization* and against the militia organization of Swiss politics (➔ Chapter 2.2.4.2 *Professionalization*). These trends are confirmed by Freitag, Bundi and Witzig (2019). In their study on "Milizarbeit in der Schweiz" (militia work in Switzerland), more than 60 per cent of respondents are in favor of a full-time communal presidency and the reimbursement of benefits in return (tax deduction, recognition as further education). Also, younger members of the militia would like to be paid for their work. What is now demanded in small municipalities is a reality in larger municipalities in the form of a professional administration. Geser (1987) highlights the connection that from a certain size of municipality, a *Professionalization* of the offices takes place to fulfill the required tasks. Linder (2012) also notes that it is mainly people with a high level of education and a good income who volunteer, as unpaid work for the public requires sufficient private income. This makes it difficult for the lower classes to gain access to the militia system. The "use of civilian capabilities of society by the political system" is one of the main advantages of the militia system (Linder 2012, p. 85), and was seen to be cost-effective in an international comparison (➔ Chapter 2.2.1.3 *Federalism*). However, although this frugal government apparatus corresponds to Switzerland's democratic understanding, the system of the unrewarded politician has its price. The strong intertwining of profession and politics provokes "unwanted coalitions of interests" and thus legitimate or less legitimate entanglements of interests (Linder 2012, p.85). Thus, it seems trivial that the mayor, who is

also the owner of a nursery, attaches particular importance to the flowery appearance of his municipality. Instead of direct payment, the system often promotes non-transparent compensation for services. In the case of the gardener, he compensates himself indirectly as commune president through a contract. This lack of transparency can be seen as a cost of the militia system. On the other hand, according to Widmer (2007), politicians in the militia system are "more independent" (p.182), as they are financially secure from their main profession. This prevents them from making particular decisions to stay in office.

2.2.1.3 Federalism

The Swiss Confederation is considered a "prime example of a federalist state" (Widmer 2007, p. 121). It is characterized by extensive autonomy and equal rights for the cantons and the simultaneous obligation to participate and cooperate at the federal level (Häfelin & Haller, 2001). According to Article 3 of the Swiss Federal Constitution, the cantons are "sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the Federal Constitution and exercise all rights not conferred on the Confederation". Thus, the cantons elect their organs independently. Once elected, these organs have free financial resources, are not subject to political control and exercise a significant influence on the decision-making of the canton as a whole (Aubert, 1978; Kriesi, 1998; Linder 2012). For example, church, police and school matters are the sole responsibility of the cantons (Aubert, 1980). Linder (2012, p. 161) distinguishes between vertical and horizontal institutions of federalism. The *vertical institutions* serve to influence the formation of will and the decisions of the Confederation. These include, for example, the Council of States, which represents the cantons in parliament, the majority of the cantons in referendums or mandatory referendums, or the expert commissions and consultation procedures, which guarantee the cantons a strong influence in the legislative process ($\rightarrow$ Chapter 2.2.2 *Decision-Making in Switzerland*). *Horizontal institutions* promote joint coordination and cooperation between the Confederation and the cantons. The most important institutions are the concordats (inter-cantonal agreements), the cantonal directors' and specialist conferences of individual departments, and the conferences of cantonal governments. Federalism breaks through the principle of democracy: in contrast to the National Council, where the seats are distributed proportionally to the inhabitants of the respective cantons, the same weight of votes applies to the Council of States for each

constituent state. This means that the vote of one woman from Uri outvotes 33 women from Zurich (Linder, 2012). This can lead to contradictory results. What a majority of the population accepts can be rejected by a majority of (smaller) cantons, as in the case of the "Konzernverantwortungsinitiative" (corporate responsibility initiative) in November 2020 (Leutenegger, 2021).

In Switzerland, one also speaks of "cooperative federalism" (Linder 2012, p. 179). This means that the various political levels (Confederation, cantons, municipalities) are jointly involved in the solution of various tasks (policy integration) and cooperate in their implementation. One example is spatial planning, which can only be developed by coordinating national, regional and local infrastructure. This leads to systems of mixed financing, the financing and responsibility of which are discussed in advance (Scharpf, 1994). However, corporate federalism still does not mean that the cantons enforce all federal decisions. Linder (2012) emphasizes that due to the decentralized autonomy in Switzerland, the implementation of laws in the cantons is still far from given, or is implemented differently than envisaged in Bern, the capital of Switzerland. One indicator of the degree of federalism is the government ratio. The national government spending in relation to the gross domestic product (GDP) is comparably lower in Switzerland than in other countries. In 2018 the national government of Switzerland spent 31.3 %. France, who has a strong central state spent 55.6% of its GDP in the same time period (Eurostat, 2021; Finanzverwaltung, 2021). Linder (2012) justifies the relatively low state quota compared to other countries with the inhibiting effect of direct democracy (→ Chapter 2.2.2.1 *Direct Democracy*). In Switzerland, a constitutional amendment and thus a possible expansion of the central state would require a high level of approval. The direct democratic instruments of initiatives and referendums also exist at the cantonal level. These rights are even more pronounced than at the federal level (e.g. legislative initiative or financial referendum). In addition, at the cantonal level the executive is also directly elected by the people. Municipalities also enjoy extensive freedoms, similar to the cantons at the federal level (Linder, 2012). The advantages of federalism and the resulting autonomy of cantons and municipalities are counterbalanced by disadvantages such as unequal tax burdens, social benefits or school services (Widmer, 2007). These different regulations are commonly referred to as a Swiss patchwork quilt, since, for example, during

the Corona crisis, the cantons did not harmonize the protection regulations in the schools (SRF, 2020).

2.2.1.4 Concordance

Political conflict resolution through negotiation and pragmatic compromise are considered typical Swiss virtues (Linder & Steffen, 2006). In an international comparison, Switzerland's political system was long considered a classic example of a concordance or consensus democracy based on institutional power-sharing (Lijphart, 1999). This means the inclusion of all major political forces that have veto power through direct democratic instruments such as the referendum (Neidhart, 1970). This makes majority rule more difficult and creates a broad power-sharing through the political participation of minorities, leading to a compromise solution or "all-party government" (Linder 2012, p. 328). In addition to the referendum, federalism (→ Chapter 2.2.1.3 Federalism) and the implementation of proportional representation in 1918, which made it possible to fill all offices and positions of power in the political system proportionately, play a decisive role in a consociational democracy (Linder, 2012). Since, in addition to political forces, business associations also have referendum potential, the business associations were recognized in the constitution in 1947 and are now being granted a hearing in legislation and participation in enforcement. This was created in the expansion of the pre-parliamentary phase, which became a new forum for legislation (→ Chapter 2.2.2 *Decision-Making in Switzerland*). Linder (2012) talks about the involvement of business associations as "economic policy concordance" (p.329). The federal government is an expression of the consensus democracy system in Switzerland. All the major parties are represented in the Federal Council in proportion to their electoral strength (2 FDP, 2 SP, 2 SVP, 1 CVP) and govern on an equal footing as a collegial government, with the intention of arriving at decisions by the executive that meet with majority approval (Klöti, Papadopoulos, & Sager, 2014). However, this distribution only developed over time and with the introduction of the constitutional referendum in 1874, led to the Christian Democratic Party (CVP) opposition causing the Social Democrats (SP) to gradually find seats in the government alongside the Free Democratic Party (FDP) (Linder, 2012). From 1959 onwards, a stable composition of the Federal Council (2 FDP, 2 CVP, 2 SPS, 1 SVP) was established, which lasted almost 50 years and became an expression of Switzerland's political stability. In 2003, this "magic formula", as the

stable composition of the government is often called in the media, was disrupted with the election of Christoph Blocher, and the CVP lost a seat at the expense of the SVP. The current composition (2 FDP, 2 SP, 2 SVP, 1 CVP) has been established since 2015, after Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf held the seat for a splinter party of the SVP, the Conservative Democratic Party of Switzerland (BDP) (Sager, Ingold, & Balthasar, 2017). The adequate representation of the country's regions and languages is not only found in government, but also in public life and in national sports and professional associations (Linder & Steffen 2006). Concordance is explicitly reflected in the political decision-making system, which will be presented in the next chapter (→ Chapter 2.2.2 *Decision-Making in Switzerland*).

2.2.2 Decision-Making in Switzerland

Figure 4: Political Decision-Making Process on Federal Level in Switzerland (after Linder 2012, p.333)

According to Linder (2012) and Fritz Sager, Karin Ingold & Andreas Balthasar (2017), the political decision-making process in Switzerland at the federal level can be divided into four phases: (1) The pre-parliamentary decision-making phase, (2) the parliamentary decision-making phase, (3) the direct-democratic decision-making phase and (4) the implementation and execution phase. For Gabriel (1997), the political decision-making process also begins in a so-called initiative phase, where the various players can launch their initiatives: citizens, parties or interest groups via popular initiatives, the cantons via standing initiatives, the Federal Council via administrative activities, and parliament via parliamentary instruments such as motions, postulates or parliamentary initiatives (Figure 4). The initiative procedure triggers the first phase (pre-parliamentary decision phase).

1. **Pre-parliamentary decision-making phase**

The basis for the revision or the creation of a new law is created by organizing the Federal Council within the administration (Pre-Study of Department). This pre-study will then be further refined in the expert committee convened by the Federal Council. This committee should lead to external expertise being incorporated into the draft legislation and make the first lines of conflict identifiable. The expert report is then received by the Federal Council and submitted for consultation to all organizations (associations, parties and cantons) that are eligible for a referendum (Linder, 2012). Such a process was institutionalized for the first time in 1947 by an amendment to the Constitution (Vatter, 2014) and has been concretized since 2005 in the so-called Consultation Act (Sciarini, 2011). This gives the eligible organizations the opportunity to comment on the bill in writing. After completion of the consultation process, which takes an average of three years (Sciarini, 2014) and evaluation of the results, the Federal Council passes the bill into the parliamentary phase in a dispatch (Draft Federal Council) (Linder, 2012).

2. **Parliamentary decision-making phase**

The drafted bills are usually passed in parliament, with only 7% resulting in a referendum that requires the electorate to make the decision (Linder, 2009). Business is dealt with by both chambers (National Council and Council of States), which are vested with identical powers (motion, parliamentary initiative, postulate). Prior to discussion in the plenum, a parliamentary commission examines the bill, and it is then passed back and forth between the

chambers. If the two chambers do not agree on the wording, there is a procedure to reconcile the differences. If a solution is not found even after several deliberations in the two chambers, a conciliation commission is convened in which representatives of both chambers attempt to reach a compromise. If this attempt also fails, the bill is deemed to have failed (Sager, Ingold & Balthasar, 2017; Linder, 2012).

3. Direct-democratic decision-making phase

A mandatory referendum must be submitted to the people and the cantons in the case of (a) amendments to the Federal Constitution, (b) accession to collective security organizations or supranational communities or (c) urgently declared federal laws that have no constitutional basis (Federal Constitution Art. 140). The optional referendum for federal laws, federal decrees and international treaties can be submitted if eight cantons or 50,000 signatures are collected (→ Chapter 2.2.1.1 *Direct Democracy*). These instruments enable the people in the last instance to question the outcome of the entire decision-making process (Linder 2012). This leads to an anticipation mechanism in the earlier stages of the decision-making process: to minimize the risk of a referendum, the various interest groups work together in the consultation process and in parliament. The referendum forces concordance and political compromise (→ Chapter 2.2.1.4 *Concordance*) (Linder, 2012).

4. Implementation and execution phase

The implementation and execution of the laws is mainly the responsibility of the cantons and communes. This federalist state structure is also referred to as enforcement federalism (Sager & Mavrot, 2015). The wording of the laws remains mostly general in nature. This allows the cantons to adapt the laws to their local circumstances and needs. This potential for differentiated interpretation has both strengths and weaknesses: On the one hand, it promotes the variance of policy programs and generates competition between cantons. Thus, in a later evaluation phase, the successful solution approaches can also be implemented in other cantons. On the other hand, an overly broad interpretation of the law presents the risk that certain cantons do not fully implement the regulations, which could potentially jeopardize the provision of basic services in a comparable manner throughout the country (Sager, Ingold & Balthasar, 2017).

The role of the Federal Council and the administration in the political decision-making process in Switzerland was not mentioned in the explanations. The Federal Council, as shown in figure 4, has a central guiding function (Linder, 2012). Although it does not make any direct decisions, it controls the process with its formal decisions. It comes into force in three situations in particular: First, at the beginning, when the Federal Council launches the decision-making process by having a preliminary draft produced and then giving the green light for the further phases. Second, at the end of the pre-parliamentary phase, when it prepares a Federal Council draft, which is then discussed in the parliamentary phase. And third, in the parliamentary deliberation, when the head of the department responsible represents the position of the Federal Council (Linder, 2012). The administration plays a role especially in the pre-parliamentary process when it organizes the legislative process, assembles the participants of the expert committee and "supports the Federal Council in its coordinating activities" (Linder 2012, p. 336). The political influence of the administration should not be underestimated, as the concentrated competence of the country works there (Daum, Phöner & Peer, 2014). In other words, the position of the administration plays an important role regarding the issue at hand. If the leading forces of the administration do not support the issue, it will be difficult to maintain political pressure (Daum, Phöner & Peer, 2014).

2.2.3 Public Affairs Landscape in Switzerland

The public affairs landscape has changed considerably in recent decades because of the change in the Swiss political system (→ Chapter 2.2.4 *Continuity and Change in the Politics of Switzerland*). Whereas in the 1980s the associations, especially those at the top level had a strong position (Kriesi, 1980), their position has since weakened noticeably. In many associations, there were structural as well as personnel policy changes, as the workload no longer allowed top positions in politics, the military and business to be held at the same time (Hämisegger, 2005). This led to an unbundling of the former association state, and now large companies no longer organize their interests through umbrella organizations alone, but send their own public affairs officer directly to Bern, the capital of Switzerland and the seat of government. It should be mentioned in addition, that the growth of non-governmental organizations and new associations have expanded the public affairs landscape in Switzerland

(Daum, Pöhner, & Peer, 2014; Gernet, 2011). Moreover, the political field has changed remarkably in recent decades, with for example, interest groups debating their concerns more frequently in public rather than in confidential discussions with political decision-makers (→ Chapter 2.2.4.4 *Polarization of Political Party System in Switzerland*). The expansion of the political field, the development and expansion of strategic public affairs activities (→ Chapter 2.1.3 *Classification of Public Affairs in the Discipline of Corporate Communications*), the strong increase in intermediary groups and the rise in importance of lobbying at the international level have all led to a noticeable rise in the importance of public affairs activities in Switzerland (Rhinow, 2001, as cited in Spring, 2005). Another reason for the increase in the importance of public affairs could be that the connection between concordance constraints and referendums encourages a demand for public affairs services to coordinate public and non-public communication strategies (Hoffmann, Steiner, & Jarren, 2007).

Regulation of the public affairs landscape is below average in an international comparison (→ Chapter 2.3 *Lobbying in Democracies*). Only two regulations in the Parliament Act concern public affairs activities. First, public affairs officers are potentially granted access to the Federal Palace via one of the two guest cards allotted to each parliamentarian. Parliamentary law Art. 69 para. 2 regulates this and stipulates that guests, including their function (without having to declare their interests) are entered in a publicly accessible register. However, in an investigation the NZZ found discrepancies (→ Chapter 2.2.3.1 *The Guests of the Parliamentarians in Switzerland*). Second, parliamentary law Art. 11, regulates the obligations of parliamentarians to disclose their interests (National Councilors and Councilors of States). This law is particularly important as several authors describe the parliamentarian in Switzerland as the most influential lobbyist (Baeriswyl, 2005; Hoffmann, Steiner, & Jarren, 2007). Upon taking office and at the beginning of each year, each council member shall inform the office of the National Council or the Council of States in writing of their (a.) professional activities, (b.) other activities in management and supervisory bodies, (c.) advisory or expert activities for federal agencies, (d.) management and advisory positions in all interest groups and (e.) participation in commissions and other bodies of the Confederation. The parliamentarian must also indicate whether the mandate is honorary or paid. However, observers have noted intransparencies, complain that not all mandates are correctly declared and that every second parliamentarian shows inconsistencies (Parma, 2012; Schnurrenberger,

2018; Angeli, 2018). A comparison of the databases confirms this finding. Consulting the webpage Lobbywatch, Laurent Wehrli (55 ties to interests), Martina Munz (48) and Claudia Friedl (46) have the most connections to organizations. In the Federal Assembly's official list (Bundesversammlung, 2021), the parliamentarians mentioned declare significantly fewer mandates. Laurent Wehrli declares 29 of his 55 mandates (52.7% disclosure rate), Martina Munz discloses 7 of her 48 ties (14.5%) and Claudia Friedl represents 10 mandates in the official federal database, revealing only 21.8% of her actual mandates. These big differences can be explained by the fact that the Council Office – the controlling body of the register – can only impose limited sanctions (Schnurrenberger, 2018). These regulations are regularly discussed in parliament but have hardly changed in recent years (→ Chapter 2.3.3 *Lobbying in the Public Debate of Switzerland*). The public affairs landscape becomes even more confusing and intransparent when the daily passes are taken into consideration, of which each parliamentarian may issue two per day without the guests having to declare their function and vested interests (Nicolussi, 2014b). The Swiss Public Affairs Society (SPAG) demand to establish a public register for public affairs officers has failed for years, even though the association's members already publish this on the SPAG's homepage. This lack of a register – which is standard in other countries and would legitimize the public affairs profession – is one factor slowing down the *Professionalization* of the public affairs profession in Switzerland (Hoffmann, Steiner, & Jarren, 2007).

The "black box" of Switzerland's public affairs landscape cannot be captured directly due to the lack of transparency. In the following, three analyses will be presented that attempt to overcome the transparency gap in Switzerland. The analysis by Ronny Nicolussi (editor of the NZZ) analyses the holders of the federal house badges (→ Chapter 2.2.3.1 *The Guests of the Parliamentarians in Switzerland*). We will see that most of the guests work for a PR or consulting company, so we take a closer look at the employers and their clients to gain more insights (→ Chapter 2.2.3.2 *The Employer and Clients of Public Affairs Officers in Switzerland*). And finally, Lobbywatch data promises to bring more transparency to parliamentarians' ties to interests (→ Chapter 2.3.3 *The Interest Connections of Parliamentarians in Switzerland*) to offer a more transparent orientation to the public affairs landscape in Switzerland. All data in combination with existing literature will be used to describe the public affairs landscape in Switzerland (→ Chapter 2.2.3.4 *Public Affairs Landscape in Switzerland is a Black Box*).

2.2.3.1 The Guests of the Parliamentarians in Switzerland

In the evaluation of "The true interests of lobbyists", Ronny Nicolussi (2014a) analyses the interest links of badge holders to the Federal Parliament. Note that each member of parliament can award two badges. With the help of the commercial register, 327 persons are identified as lobbyists, having a total of 572 entries in the commercial register. The official data in the official register of the parliament and those in the commercial register differ considerably (Figure 5). According to the data, most lobbyists work for a *consulting or PR* firm (54). These professional lobbyists represent the interests of their clients, which again opens up a separate analysis (→ Chapter 2.2.3.2 *The Employer and Clients of Public Affairs Officers in Switzerland*). Only about half (30) of the people from the *PR sector* disclose their background. In addition to professional lobbyists, the dominant interests are *Construction & Real Estate* (43), *Business Associations* (37), *Industry & Energy* (37), as well as *Environment* (35) and *Aid Agencies, NPOs and Social* (35). *Political* (34), *Health, Care & Pharma* (34), *Culture, Media & Telecommunications* (32) and *Others* (30) are also widely represented. *Education & Research* (28), *Pensions* (27), *Insurance* (25) *Transport and Logistics* (24), *Agriculture* (23) and *Trade Unions* (22) make up the middle of the field. *Sports & Tourism* (20), *Finance* (19) and *Retail & Catering* (13) bring up the rear, although these sectors also (officially) have representations in the double digits. The discrepancy between declared and actual represented links of connections is remarkable. While an equal number of connections in the political sphere (parties, social affairs) and in trade unions is disclosed, only one connection out of an actual 27 is declared in *Pension Fund* (3.8% disclosure rate). *Education & Research* (14.2%), *Finance* (31.5%), *Industry & Energy* (32.4%) and *Construction & Real Estate* (34.9%) are also among the sectors that tend to be non-transparent and do not declare all actual connections of interest.

Figure 5: Number of Lobbyists for each Industrial Sector officially declared in the Register (black) and actual Number (blue) after investigative Research of Nicolussi (2014a)

2.2.3.2 The Employer and Clients of Public Affairs Officers in Switzerland

In the analysis by Ronny Nicolussi (2014a) (→ Chapter 2.2.3.1 *The Guests of the Parliamentarians in Switzerland*), professional lobbyists form the largest group with 54 access badges to the Federal Parliament. The question arises to whom and for what does this group lobby in the Federal Parliament? This cannot be deduced from the analysis. A possible answer is provided by my own observation of the SPAG membership register. Since 1999, public affairs officers have been organized in this industry association, whose purpose is to sensitize the authorities and the public to the meaning and value of political, economic and cultural lobbying and its importance in the democratic decision-making process (SPAG, 2020). To positively influence the professional activities of its members, the association advocates for a simplification of access to parliament and authorities and at the same time demands the professional and ethical reliability of its members in return. For years, SPAG's core concern has been a public register like the one for media professionals to gain independent access to the parliament building (→ Chapter 2.3.3 *Lobbying in the Public Debate of Switzerland*). The members of SPAG undertake to disclose their interests when they become members, as would be the case with the public register. As a result, the database of registered public affairs

officers is available for free analysis on the SPAG homepage (SPAG, 2021). Each member declares their employer, their clients and other interests. This information was collected and evaluated for all 250 members (as of 7th of January 2021). The categories for classifying the work sectors were taken from the work of Laura Kristina Schilliger and Peter Seele (2014). To reflect a complete picture of the industries represented, certain categories have been added (e.g. Communication Agency).

First, the employers of the public affairs officers are analyzed (Figure 6). Most public affairs officers (54) work for Associations/Interest Groups and represent the interests of umbrella organizations directly (e.g. Swiss hotel association, association of Swiss cantonal banks, Swico). Only large companies in the field of *Chemical* (17), *Energy* (18) or *Health Care companies* (17) or financial institutions (14) are able to provide their own public affairs officers. The representation of public affairs officers in the telecommunication sector is striking. As many as 6 representatives of Swisscom can be found in the directory. In addition, the authorities (politics) are directly represented by public affairs officers in six cases. Also impressive is the high number of *Communication Agencies* (53). Together with political and law agencies, management consultants account for 69 entries. Thus, according to the SPAG public directory, more than one in four public affairs officers (27.6%) are employed by an agency. This finding tends to correspond to that of the evaluation of badge holders (→ Chapter 2.2.3.1 *The Guests of the Parliamentarian in Switzerland*). Furthermore, several small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) provide the 23 remaining public affairs officers in the directory. In terms of strength ratios, this observation also corresponds to that of Lobbywatch (→ Chapter 2.3.3.3 *The Interest Connection of Parliamentarians in Switzerland*).

Figure 6: Employers of Public Affairs Officers in Switzerland (SPAG, 2020)

The data on employers, as mentioned, shows similarities to Nicolussi's analysis. The majority of lobbyists work on behalf of an agency.

Since the members of SPAG declare their interests, the clients of the professional lobbyists can also be identified (Figure 7). A total of 514 principals (2.06 per public affairs officer) are listed in the directory. However, the distribution varies greatly. Lorenz Furrer and Andreas Hugi, the two heads of the public affairs agency furrerhugi, have 73 clients, which already covers a large slice of the client pie (16.5%). Others only have individual mandates. Around half of the clients (47% of all mandates) are *Interest Groups* or *Associations* (242) – with *Health Care* (41), *Trade* (22), *Nature* (22), *Chemicals* (19), *Construction* (13), *Digital* (11) and *Energy* (10) forming the largest interest groups. Every sixth mandate (86) is held by smaller companies (*SME and Others*) from the *Construction Industry* (13 mandates), the *Social Sector* (9), *Insurance Companies* (6) or *Tourism Companies* (5). The largest "sector" – *Associations* and *SMEs* excluded – represented by public affairs officers is *Political Authorities* (43 mandates), followed by *Health Care* (35), *Chemicals* (23), *Energy* (22), *Telecommunication* (10) and *Conglomerates* (10). A few more mandates are in the areas of *Transportation* (8), *Finance* (7) and *Education* (6).

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
Figure 7: Clients of Public Affairs Officers (SPAG, 2020)

The SPAG membership directory comprises 250 persons. However, depending on the source, the number of lobbyists in Switzerland is estimated to be between 300 to 1400 persons (Gallati, 2005; Daum, Pöhner, & Peer, 2014). Therefore, it can be assumed that voluntary membership of the industry association SPAG falls short. If one considers that in Switzerland parliamentarians themselves are the largest representatives of interests (Baeriswyl, 2005; Hoffmann, Steiner, & Jarren, 2007), a closer analysis of their vested interests cannot be neglected.

2.2.3.3 The Interest Connections of Parliamentarians in Switzerland

Lobbywatch (2020) is a non-commercial association that researches the interest connections of parliamentarians and publishes them on its homepage. The connections to companies, associations and institutions can be accessed on the homepage according to individual criteria. Lobbywatch thus offers a valuable tool for effectively shedding light on the public affairs landscape in Switzerland. Of primary interest for this work are the lobby groups and their links to parliamentarians.

Lobbywatch lists a total of 8155 organizations that have a connection to the Swiss parliament. To maintain an overview, these are grouped into 139 lobby groups, which (according to the

authors) represent common interests. In addition, these lobby groups are grouped into 14 industries. A first analysis is devoted to the industries (Figure 8). Then the strongest lobby groups are identified (Figure 9). Finally, the parties and their connections to the lobbies are examined (Figure 10, Figure 11).

The economic industry represents the largest interest group in the Swiss lobbying landscape (see Figure 8). Almost every third organization (30.3%) which maintains a connection to parliament is of an *economic* nature. The second largest industry is the state-political/state-economic (*Politics*) sector with 993 connections to parliament. The *Health* industry has 730 connections, the *Social Security* industry 724. Industries such as *Culture* (476), *Education* (410), *Agriculture* (400), *Transport* (362), *Environment* (342), *Energy* (332) and *Sport* (293) each have a moderate representation. *Foreign Policy* (254), *Communication* (239) and *Security* (150) are the smallest industries represented in the Federal Parliament.

Figure 8: Number of links to Swiss Parliament per Industry (Lobbywatch, 2020)

The industries are made up of countless organizations. The business sector has 37 organizations, while the education sector has only three. However, the three education organizations have 410 more connections to parliamentarians (136.7 connections on average) and therefore more ties on average than the business organizations (66.9 connections on average). Therefore, a more differentiated analysis of the strongest lobby groups is necessary (Figure 9). There it becomes apparent that the *Parties* have the strongest influence in parliament. This is in line with Baeriswyl's (2005) statement that parliamentarians are the biggest lobbyists. Almost equally strong is the *Common Good/Society* lobby group with 364

connections. These include organizations such as Pro Senectute, Benevol Switzerland or associations such as the Solidarity Network in Zurich. This is followed by *Real Estate* (273 connections), *Education/Science* (253) and the *PR/Consulting* lobby group (221). *Tourism/Gastronomy* (214), *Mass Sports* (184), *SMEs/Employer* (150), *Agriculture* in general (148) and *Cantons/Regions* (140) are also among the 10 most influential lobby groups.

Figure 9: The strongest Lobbies in Swiss Parliament (Lobbywatch, 2020)

It is remarkable that the economic industry – by far the strongest (see Figure 8) – only accounts for four of the ten strongest lobbies (*Real Estate*, *Consulting/PR*, *Tourism/Gastronomy*, *SMEs/Employers*) (Figure 9). The education industry (*Education/Science*), social security (*Common Good/Society*), sports (*Popular Sports*) and agriculture (*Agriculture* in general) seem to have a higher inner concentration and accordingly have strong lobbies in parliament.

These links to parliament are relatively evenly distributed across all parties (Figure 10). The average parliamentarian has 11.4 links to organizations. However, the range extends from zero mandates (Ada Marra (SP) and Stefania Prezioso Batou (EGsolS) each declare no mandates according to the Federal Assembly's official list (Bundesversammlung, 2021), but according to Lobbywatch have four and three connections to organizations respectively) to politicians with a range of interest connections (Laurent Wehrli (FDP) has 55 interest connections according to Lobbywatch). On average, FDP politicians have the most mandates (13.71 connections), followed by the BDP (12.33), the SP (12.23) and the CVP (11.71). The SVP

is below average with 10.34 mandates per parliamentarian. The GLP (9.50), the Green Party (8.88) and the other parties (7.25) also have fewer mandates than the average.

Figure 10: Average Link to Interest Group per Member of Parliament of each Party

What would the parliament look like if it had been elected by the lobby organizations and their groups? The answer is almost the same (Figure 11). The FDP and the SP bring slightly more mandates into parliament and would accordingly be overrepresented (FDP 20.04% mandates vs. 16.67% parliamentarians: SP 20.9% vs. 19.51% parliamentarians). The SVP (21.79% vs. 23.98%) and the Green Party (10.43% vs. 13.41%) would lose somewhat. However, it may be noted that the parliament would only change by a few seats. The evaluation confirms the statement that the parliament would tend to become more liberal, since the FDP would gain more than 3.5% becoming almost as strong as the SVP, which would lose more than 2%. The discrepancy with the Green Party, which loses over 3%, is also noteable. The population can be classified as greener than the lobby organizations that influence the federal government.

Percent of Interest Groups linked to Party vs Result of Election in 2019

Party	Links Interest Groups	Election 2019 in %
SP	20.90	19.51
GPS	10.43	13.41
GLP	5.40	6.5
CVP	15.84	15.44
BDP	1.32	1.22
FDP	20.04	16.67
SVP	21.79	23.98
Others	4.28	3.27

Figure 11: Percentage of Interest Groups linked to Party (black) vs. Result of Election in 2019 (blue)

2.2.3.4 Public Affairs Landscape in Switzerland is a Black Box

Despite the analysis, the public affairs landscape in Switzerland remains unclear. Thanks to Nicolussi (2014a), the data provided by Lobbywatch (2020) and the data from the official register of SPAG (2020) it was possible to identify the industries behind the access badges and their connections to the Federal Parliament, and the connections of parliamentarians to lobby groups. Due to the lack of an official public affairs register, the analysis had to rely on the work of investigative journalists. If no such register is introduced for public affairs officers, the landscape will remain vague. Although authors critically discuss the importance of the lobby i.e. a hall or other area not used for the official assembly (Bruderer, 2005; Gallati, 2005) there are theoretically other venues for lobbying. Furthermore, the revealed connections say nothing about their effectiveness. A personal badge indicates a close relationship between the holder and the parliamentarian. How strong the reciprocal relationship is, however, cannot be stated in general terms. In SPAG's register of members, 250 public affairs officers disclose their interests. Observers, however, assume that there are up to 1400 lobbyists in Bern (Daum, Pöhner, & Peer, 2014). Therefore, the results of this analysis only apply to a small subset. The analysis of Lobbywatch's data, while rich, is purely descriptive. Again, no assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of an industry can be made, but only a deduction from its sheer size and the number of connections to parliament. The public affairs landscape in Switzerland remains until today a landscape with back doors.

Despite the criticism, the fact that the results of the three completed analyses tie in with earlier research gives cause for optimism. The authors Jochen Hoffmann, Adrian Steiner und Otfried Jarren (2007) conducted a comprehensive study of public affairs consultants in Switzerland. They examined 643 agencies and offices which they associated with public affairs activities. They describe a landscape of mostly young agencies (56.1% are younger than 10 years), which at that time had a "low degree of specialization" in public affairs (Hoffmann, Steiner, Jarren 2007, p. 97). The authors identify health, economic and financial, transport/construction, environmental and energy policies as the agencies' most important fields of activity. This finding is consistent with the research in this work. What is remarkable is that in 2007, the year the study was published, public administration was the largest client, ahead of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and associations. This order was reversed 13 years later (→ Chapter 2.2.3.2 *The Employer and Clients of Public Affairs Officer in Switzerland*). Apparently, the associations choose the path via the agencies more often than before, which can be interpreted as a symptom of the unbundling of the association state (Daum, Pöhner, & Peer, 2014).

Claude Longchamp (2011) conducted another analysis of the public affairs landscape on behalf of the Burson-Marsteller public affairs agency. In his survey, business associations (most frequent lobbying organization) and political parties (second most frequent lobbying organization) also occupy strong positions, just as in this analysis. Respondents also indicated which lobbying sector operates most successfully. The pharmaceutical, energy and chemical industries, agriculture and the financial sectors are considered the most successful. These sectors are also the most frequent employers or clients in the analysis of the SPAG members. Only agriculture finds other ways to be effective. Apparently, this lobby operates more directly via the parliament (9th strongest lobby in the Lobbywatch analysis) and is strongly "overrepresented" in the parliament (Markwalder, 2005, p. 165).

The background of the Public Affairs Officer should also be briefly highlighted. A considerable degree of understanding of the political framework, the parliament, the economy and the media in Switzerland is required (SPAG, 2021). Therefore, an advanced education is needed to understand these complex systems. This assumption is confirmed by two studies. According to Hoffmann, Steiner and Jarren (2007), the typical public affairs consultant is male, 49 years

old and has studied economics, history, communication or law and brings with him several years of experience from the private sector, journalism and politics or associations. According to Schilliger and Seele (2014), 95% of respondents have a master's degree.

The public affairs landscape in Switzerland may be difficult to describe, but it is as subject to the influences of various macro trends as Swiss politics. We will look at these in the next chapter (→ Chapter 2.2.4. *Continuity and Change in the Politics of Switzerland*).

2.2.4 Continuity and Change in the Politics of Switzerland

Swiss politics has been transformed by several influences in recent decades. For example, Daum, Pöhner & Teuwsen (2014) write that the political elite no longer has the last say, but that a "quiet revolution" (p.9) has redefined the balance of power. To this end, the authors list the consequences of the EEA vote (*European question*), the interaction between politics and the media (*Mediatization*), the *Polarization* of the Political Party System in Switzerland (Populism) and the *Professionalization* of politics in the last thirty years, which conflicts with the militia system. The statements made in this book are also supported by a scientific perspective. Vatter (2008) observes a change in Swiss democracy from an extreme example of consensus democracy in the sense of Arend Lijphart (1999) to a normal case of consensus democracy but remains one of the most federalist countries worldwide (Sciarini, 2015a). Vatter (2008) highlights political-institutional changes, such as the decreasing number of parties, a slightly increased decentralization of the party landscape and the deregulation of the state-association relationship, which have led to a shift of Switzerland on the democracy map and thus confirms statements that identify a higher conflict potential in the political decision-making process in Switzerland (Daum, Pöhner, & Peer, 2014; Fischer, 2015; Fischer & Traber, 2015). In the following, four trends will be examined that have had and continue to have a lasting influence on the Swiss political landscape over the past thirty years: *Europeanization* (→ Chapter 2.2.4.1), *Professionalization* (→ Chapter 2.2.4.2), *Mediatization* (→ Chapter 2.2.4.3) and *Polarization of the Political Party System in Switzerland* (→ Chapter 2.2.4.4).

2.2.4.1 Europeanization

Democracy is understood as a society that governs itself. However, this idea reaches its limits if one assumes a society that interacts with other nations and is thus bound to its decisions up to the borders of its own territory (Held, 2006). The Europeanization of Switzerland calls into question the basic assumption of democracy in one's own country, since Switzerland, as a small state surrounded by the European Union, interacts with the latter and must share in its decisions. The *Europeanization* of Switzerland leads to economic, political, social and cultural relations and to dependencies beyond national borders (Kübler & Kriesi, 2017). The European question has divided the country into pro-Europeans and anti-Europeans since the vote on the EEA in 1992 (→ Chapter 2.2.4.4 *Polarization of Political Party System in Switzerland*). The *Europeanization* of Switzerland cannot be stopped despite the rejection of the treaty. Since the Free Trade Agreement in 1972, the Bilateral Agreements I (1999) and the Bilateral Agreements II (2004) came into place. These create the basis for close cooperation and openness in political areas with European neighbors and were approved by the Swiss electorate (EDA, 2015). These agreements have the most direct influence on the European integration of Swiss politics (Sciarini, Fischer, & Nicolet, 2004; Sciarini, 2015a; Daum, Pöhner & Peer, 2014). Outside the bilateral agreements, Switzerland can decide independently whether to adopt EU law or not (autonomous implementation). In the case of minor changes, the Federal Council decides; in the case of more far-reaching changes, the parliament decides (EDA, 2015). This means that between 1996 and 2005, Switzerland has enforced the same number of laws relating to EU law as Austria, a member state of the European Union (Arbia, 2008) and around 40% of law revisions comply with EU laws (Jenni, 2014). Switzerland going alone – despite not joining the EU – remains an illusion. Switzerland is not subordinate to the European Union in the legal sense. However, its geographical location and the economic importance of the European market (inevitably) lead to European integration (Fischer, Sciarini, & Traber, 2015). This has an impact on the balance of power in domestic politics since European politics – in contrast to domestic politics – does not allow for the inclusion of all domestic political forces. The groups included in the European policy cycle – the executive and the administrative authorities – participate in the negotiations on behalf of the whole country (Fischer, 2015). These try to represent the country's interests by forming a majority for the businesses domestically (Fischer & Sciarini, 2013). This leads to domestic tensions between a

European-friendly left-of-center majority and a right-wing conservative minority that is opposed to opening up to the EU and to the EU consolidating itself domestically (→ Chapter 2.2.4.4 *Polarization of Political Party System in Switzerland*) (Brunner & Sciarini, 2002; Kriesi et al., 2006; Kriesi et al., 2008). The decline of corporatist policy making is an impressive result of this change (Sciarini, 2015b). The importance of the pre-parliamentary phase, where overarching majorities are usually found for business, is thus decreasing and shifting to the parliamentary arena, which is gaining in importance thanks to *Europeanization* and greater influence on European business (Sciarini, 2015b). Consequently, extra-parliamentary forces becoming less influential, as they are not directly admitted to the political process (Fischer, 2015; Fischer, Sciarini, & Traber, 2015). Thus, associations and companies are effectively excluded from the political process. This leads to a *Professionalization* of political communication by outside parties to make their voices heard. This explains memberships in multinational associations or the hiring of a lobbyist as a stopgap to bring corporate interests directly into parliament (→ Chapter 2.2.4.2 *Professionalization*) (Sciarini, 2015c; Baeriswyl, 2005).

2.2.4.2 Professionalization

The activities of campaign consultants, lobbyists and public affairs service providers are an expression of *Professionalization*. This is due to the increased demands on the media (→ Chapter 2.2.4.3 *Mediatization*) as well as the response of associations and companies to make themselves heard in the important but difficult-to-access arena of the parliamentary phase, (→ Chapter 2.2.4.1 *Europeanization*) and finally the politicians themselves, to relieve themselves of the ever-increasing workload and complexity of political problems (Hoffmann, Steiner, & Jarren, 2007). These service providers are viewed very critically by the public. On the one hand, there are fears of inappropriate influence on the decision-making process through the mediation of particular interests, which is detrimental to the democratic idea. On the other hand, supporters emphasize that external service providers support the decision-making process by making economic competences available to politics, feeding relevant interests from society into the political system and promoting mobilization, which again ensures the functionality of decision-making processes (→ Chapter 2.3 *Lobbying in Democracies*) (Hoffmann, Steiner, & Jarren, 2007). For Scammel (1997) the terms

Professionalization and externalization can be used synonymously. Hoffmann, Steiner & Jarren (2007) find numerous examples of externalization in election campaign communication, political public relations and lobbying. From externalization and *Professionalization* follows commercialization, as professional consultants adopt the economic market logic and try to optimize the result through marketing techniques (survey data, target group orientation, alignment with mass media selection and presentation logic). These changes in political communication are either seen as a consequence of global modernization processes, which have progressed to different degrees in different countries (Swanson & Mancini, 1996), or they are interpreted from a critical perspective as an adaptation to dominant cultural techniques of the U.S. (Ritzer, 1998). For example, the lobbying culture in the U.S. differs from that in Brussels and that in Switzerland and is at a different stage of development (→ Chapter 2.1.2 *Historic Development of Public Affairs as a Discipline*). In the literature about lobbying, the thesis of a transition from corporatism to lobbyism is discussed, as the organizational landscape is becoming increasingly pluralized and the dominance of corporatist interest representation is visibly being called into question (Alemann, 2000; Winter, 2003). This would inevitably make lobbying more important, both for companies, which do not have direct access to the decision-making center, and interest groups, which must adapt to the situation of increased lobbying competition (Hoffmann, Steiner, & Jarren, 2007).

2.2.4.3 Mediatization

The third identified driver of change in Swiss politics is *Mediatization*. This process refers to the growing influence of the media and their logics of action on the structures, processes, actors and content of politics, as well as the consequences of this influence (Imhof, 2006; Donges, 2008). In recent years, the media have largely performed an independent mediating function in the intermediary system (Figure 12) (Donges & Jarren, 2010). The reasons for this change are that the ties from citizens to organizations such as political parties, associations or citizens' initiatives have declined, while the mass media are receiving increasing attention and recognition. As a result, the mass media are becoming more relevant in both vertical and horizontal communication and the actors in the intermediary system must increasingly deal

with the media-specific mediation logics if they want to convey their content (Donges & Jarren, 2010).

Figure 12: Traditional Model (left) vs. Mediatized Model (right) of the Intermediate System (Donges & Jarren, 2010)

The Swiss media system is characterized by its small size and the multilingualism of the country's regions, which limits the markets for recipients, advertising, information and results with dependence on, and influence from the presence of, foreign media (Bonfadelli & Meier, 1994). Due to these factors, the early development of the press and the generation of high market shares, the Swiss media benefit greatly from media regulation or state support because of their high social importance. Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini (2005) classify these characteristics between media and politics in Switzerland as a Democratic Corporatist Model. The main driver of *Mediatization* is the media logic, a concept introduced by Altheide and Snow (1979), which focuses on the news production and reporting of the media and their selection, organization and information. Thus, audience and advertising market factors are decisive for the production of media content (Siegert, Meier, & Trappel, 2010). Kübler and Kriesi (2017) distinguish between two criteria that play a role in news production: First, *professional standards* which means the observant and critical journalist who reports on political events. Second, *commercial criteria* which stands for the battle for consumer attention through dramatization, spectacle and personalization. This leads to a multidimensional function of the media. They observe and report on other actors, but at the same time they are themselves an interest group that protects its own interests and is active in several markets (Johnson, 2011). Therefore, the quality of a democracy in a mass media society is also dependent on the infrastructure of the mass media itself, as it exerts effective

influence on political institutions, political actors and their citizens (Kriesi et al., 2013). After a study of Müller (2014), media plays a key role in the communicative exchange with the political system, both in terms of the diversity of reporting and the penetration of citizens with political information. Moreover, reporting has a positive effect on political transparency. A long-term study by Strömbäck and Esser (2009) found strong empirical evidence for a *Mediatization* process in Switzerland. Landerer (2015) also shows that parliamentarians have integrated media logics into their audience-oriented behavior and strategies. In recent years, for example, more parliamentary motions have been launched that are effectively presented in the media, even though their chances of success remain relatively low (Daum, Pöhner, & Peer, 2014). This leads to a "presentation policy" that is decoupled from the "decision-making policy" (Hoffmann, Steiner & Jarren, 2007, p.37), which makes cooperation between the councils more difficult and additionally contributes to the transformation and *Polarization* of politics in Switzerland (→ Chapter 2.2.4.4 *Polarization of Political Party System in Switzerland*). This complicates the process of reaching a compromise in Switzerland, as even the pre-parliamentary phase, which in the past was characterized by secrecy and negotiations behind closed doors and was little illuminated by media coverage, is now becoming public. This development makes it more difficult for the polarized parties to make concessions behind closed doors and then justify them in public (Häusermann, Mach, & Papadopoulos, 2004; Fischer & Sciarini, 2015). This tendency is increasingly forcing the parties into the position of permanent campaigning, so that the slogans are also continued away from the election campaign to raise the profile in the media coverage (Mombelli, 2007).

2.2.4.4 Polarization of Political Party System in Switzerland

Until the 1990s, the Swiss party system was traditionally divided along four social lines: The urban-rural divide, the confessional-secular fault line, the political-cultural divide of language, and the divide of wage labor and capital (Linder & Steffen, 2006). The vote on the EEA on 6th December 1992, however, divided the country on a new question: opening up to foreign countries or separating (Daum, Pöhner, & Peer, 2014). The SVP owes its electoral successes and rise to the strongest party thanks to a consistent thematization of the problems of those who have lost out to *Europeanization* and globalization (Kriesi et al. 2005). This led to the development of the "tripolar power system" in the Swiss party system, in which the SVP

successfully refused to compromise on its core issues (Linder 2012, p. 92). This can be seen in parliamentary votes, where the SVP often dares to go it alone (Fischer & Traber, 2015). This political behavior makes it difficult to form coalitions, especially in the pre-parliamentary phase of the decision-making process, which is why many deals no longer come to parliament with broad support (→ Chapter 2.2.4.1 *Europeanization*; → Chapter 2.2.4.3 *Mediatization*). In addition, the SVP's campaign style in recent decades has drawn heavily on instruments from American election campaigns (→ Chapter 2.2.4.2 *Professionalization*). Examples are the federal popular "Ausschaffungsinitative" (For the deportation of criminal foreigners) or the re-election of Christoph Blocher (SVP) to the Federal Council, which were both dramatized and emotionalized (Weinmann, 2008). Kübler and Kriesi (2017) explain this manifestation of Swiss populism as a consequence of the two megatrends of *Europeanization* and *Mediatization*. *Europeanization* leads to an increase in mutual dependencies between foreign institutions and one's own country, while *Mediatization* leads to increased pressure and additional demands from the public, which they only learn about through the media. This leads to a double alienation of politicians from their voters. Mair (2009) describes this development as a disease of western democracies, as these trends fuel the potential for an anti-elitist discourse that finds its breeding ground in (far-right) populism. However, this kind of populist politics is reaching its limits in Switzerland. After the election victories, the SVP, as the largest party, remained underrepresented in the government, but preferred to remain in government with one member rather than going into opposition. Ultimately, the concordance requirement of the people's rights keeps the governing parties together, as can be seen from the fact that the parties argue about the number of seats in the Federal Council, but rarely about the fundamental desirability of concordance (→ Chapter 2.2.1.4 *Concordance*) (Linder, 2012).

2.3 Lobbying in Democracies

This chapter aims to derive the meaning and methods of looking at lobbying in democracy. First, we derive the understanding of lobbying historically and theoretically (→ Chapter 2.3.1 *Different Interpretations and ideal Principles of Lobbying in Democracies*). With these results in mind, we analyze the existing lobbying regulations in Switzerland (→ Chapter 2.3.2

Regulation of Decision-Making Process in Switzerland). Finally, an overview of the public debate on lobbying in Switzerland is given (→ Chapter 2.3.3 *Lobbying in the Public Debate of Switzerland*). We deliberately prefer the term lobbying in this chapter instead of public affairs, as this term is historically more present in the public debate (→ Chapter 4.3 *Sampling*).

2.3.1 Different Interpretations and ideal Principles of Lobbying in Democracies

We explore this chapter by examining the history of democracy (→ Chapter 2.3.1.1 *History of Democracy*), illuminating the different understandings of lobbying in democracies (→ Chapter 2.3.1.2 *Different Interpretations of Lobbying in Democracies*), and based on this, deriving four principles that lobbying regulation in modern democracies should ideally exhibit (→ Chapter 2.3.1.3 *Four ideal Principles of Lobbying in Democracies*).

2.3.1.1 History of Democracy

The history of democracy is often dated back to the year 508/07 B.C. (Bleicken, 1995) when the ancient democratic institution of Athens in Greece was formed. For the first time citizens (with exclusion of women, children and slaves) had freedom of speech and the possibility to vote equally, which was realized in a people's assembly (Ottmann, 2001). However, some scholars represent the thesis, that the original idea and practice of democracy dates back even further. Documentation of a sovereignty of the people was found in Mesopotamia dating back to 3000 BC. Similar findings were discovered in central Asia and India (Keane, 2009; Isakhan, 2012). The Greek origin of the word democracy is undisputed: It consists of the two words *demos* (people) and *kratos* (dominion) and together essentially means "people's rule" (Rinderle, 2015, p. 11). Although democracy can look back on a long history, its march has only begun in recent history. When the U.S. declared its independence from England, the country (after the victorious war against England) drafted the first democratic constitution of modern times in 1787 (Schwanitz, 2002). With the constitutional revision of 1848, Switzerland became the second country to adopt a democratic constitution (EDA, 2021). After the Second World War, the idea of democracy conquered large parts of the world. Today, the website Freedomhouse (2021) lists 84 states as free. With the transition from kings and aristocrats at

the head of a state to democracies, the way in which influence and power were contested in society also changed.

2.3.1.2 Different Interpretations of Lobbying in Democracies

The writings of Niccolò Machiavelli had a lasting influence on the modern understanding of politics. In "Il Principe" (1513), Machiavelli separates politics from morality and revolutionizes "with his empirical view of political reality" (Salzborn, 2012, p. 25) the previously valid analysis of rule and simplifies politics as the sum of "situational actions" (Salzborn, 2012, p. 25). Among these, the activity of lobbying can indirectly be read out, which for Machiavelli seems to be a sobering part of political operations. This neutral analysis by Machiavelli contrasts with the reality of modern democracies, where lobbying is valued differently and often splits into two views (Bitonti 2017; Hoffmann, Steiner & Jarren 2007):

(1) Critical view: Lobbying is not democratically legitimized since certain individuals or interest groups gain a disproportionate hearing through a non-institutionalized channel.

(2) Legitimized view: Lobbying and the interaction with members of the decision-making process is associated with a democratic right and interpreted as an additional resource and link between decision-makers and citizens (Bitonti, 2017; Hoffmann, Steiner & Jarren 2007).

In the following, according to Bitonti (2017), five idealized political philosophies are presented: the *Formal*, the *Substantive*, the *Realistic*, the *Aggregative*, the *Procedural*. Each of them represents a different understanding of the public interest and thus different interpretations for the role of the lobbyist in a democracy:

Formal perspective

In this concept, the public interest reflects everything that the government or a government representative decides and assumes that the government embodies the public interest. Lobbying is clearly critical of this concept, as it assumes that the governing party already knows what the right decision is and would therefore find the influencing lobbying function disruptive.

Substantive perspective

This concept presupposes that someone or something knows or embodies the true public interest. In its most extreme forms, it takes on dictatorial features (Bitonti, 2017) and leads to visions of how a society should be (Popper, 1945, as cited in Bitonti, 2017). This substantive concept is very negatively opposed to lobbying, as there are no alternative opinions besides the already clear public interest.

Realist perspective

In this perspective, the public interest is unknown. It would even be "cynical" to claim to know the public interest (Bitonti 2017, p.23), since it can only be a certain version that is in competition with other opinions (Dahl and Lindblom, 1953, as cited in Bitonti, 2017). The words public interest would thus only be used for rhetorical purposes. Advocates of this concept prefer a scientific approach in which value statements are set aside (Weber, 1922, as cited in Bitonti, 2017). Lobbying in this perspective is understood as a tool without a specific value judgement.

Aggregative perspective

The aggregative understanding of the public interest is based on aggregation – the coexistence of different opinions and views of public interest. This perspective holds it for positive that a pluralistic market of opposing opinions exist. The public interest is thus produced by the rules of politics itself and is positively in favor of lobbying, which is seen as a positive and legitimate tool to represent interests in an open society.

Procedural perspective

This concept borrows from the model of deliberative democracy (Bohman and Regh, 1997; Dryzek 2014, as cited in Bitonti, 2017) and the ideal discursive space (Habermas, 1984, as cited in Bitonti, 2017), in which the public interest is a result of rational analysis of the pros and cons of the respective decisions. Only decisions that have gone through such a process can be legitimized as (in the) public interest. Lobbying in such a context is perceived as very disruptive and therefore negative.

Of the five philosophical perspectives on how the public interest should be, three are against lobbying (*Substantive*, *Procedural* and *Formal*), one is neutral (the *Realist*), and one is positive

towards lobbying (the *Aggregative*). These perspectives may be ideal-typical, but they have all played a role in the formation of today's constitutional states in Europe and can still be found to some extent in the constitutions there (Bitonti, 2017).

2.3.1.3 Four ideal Principles of Lobbying Regulation

Different political philosophies lead to different lobbying regulation in the various states. Bitonti (2017) derives – based on these five philosophical perspectives – four generally valid principles which, when applied to lobby regulation in a modern democracy and enforced increase the trust of the population in the authorities as well as the quality of the decisions taken:

Accountability

Government officials and public decision-makers should be able to account for their decisions and the decision-making process.

Transparency

This principle supports the *Accountability* principle and allows decisions and the decision-making process to be traced. In addition, transparency guarantees equitable access to public goods, supports equal rules and allows them to be monitored.

Openness

This principle calls for openness of all communication channels so that all parties involved in decision-making can talk to and have access to each other.

Fairness

This is the author's term for the way in which the process of decision-making is designed. With this principle, all stakeholders should have equal opportunities to participate in a process without privileges and paternalism.

These four quality characteristics are implemented differently by democracies. The U.S., the birthplace of modern lobbying, has had a transparency law with registration and disclosure requirements for lobbyists since 1946 (Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act). Since the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, lobbyists – including agency lobbyists, corporate lobbyists and interest groups – have been obliged to report their activities on a quarterly basis (Althaus, Geffken, &

Rawe, 2005). In the EU, the involvement of interest representatives in the decision-making process is explicitly provided for, as the authority lacks an administrative link to the member states. Since 1992, a Code of Conduct has laid down the guidelines for lobbyists in Brussels (Köppl, 2003). Since a lobbying scandal in 2011 (an undercover journalist successfully bribed three members of parliament), a new transparency register has been in force which, in addition to information about the lobbying organization, must also disclose information about its activities, policy areas and financial expenditures. The transparency register is kept on a voluntary basis and is a prerequisite for access to the European Parliament (Dialer & Richter, 2013). Austria has had the "Lobbying and Interest Representation Transparency Act" since 2013, which was politically demanded after several lobbying scandals. In addition to the obligation of the code of conduct, the law stipulates disclosure and registration obligations, which they must communicate to the client (Lansky & Ollinger, 2013). And Germany has had a voluntary lobbying register since 1972, the purpose of which is to involve interest groups in decision-making (Sickinger, 2013). The majority of OECD countries, including Switzerland, have not enacted a lobbying register (OECD, 2014).

2.3.2 Regulation of Decision-Making Process in Switzerland

To compare and contextualize lobbying regulation in Switzerland, we first need to get an overview of the existing rules. Switzerland has several special institutional features, such as small statehood, economic-political concordance, the high importance of the direct democratic process and the institutional and cultural relevance of the principle of non-execution (militia system), and thus differs from other countries in the way in which it is shaped (→ Chapter 2.2.1 *Special Features of Swiss Political System*).

In theory, Switzerland's political system is open to all citizens or any organization to initiate a legislative process. This can be done via the direct democratic instruments (initiative/referendum) which are part of the initiative phase in the decision-making process, or via participation in a consultation, in which constitutional amendments are discussed (pre-parliamentary phase) (→ Chapter 2.2.2 *Decision-Making in Switzerland*). The Federal Act on the Consultation Procedure (*Vernehmlassungsgesetz* VIG) regulates the participation in which any person or organization may take part or submit a statement (VIG Art. 4 para. 1). The

cantonal government, the political parties of the Federal Assembly, the umbrella organizations of the communes, cities, mountain regions, economic interest groups, interested extra-parliamentary commissions and other circles are automatically invited to submit comments (VIG Art. 4 Para. 2). All records, documents, minutes and statements are accessible to the public (VIG Art. 9). Thus, one could argue that these laws at the consultation level correspond to an idealized lobbying regulation according to Bitonti (2017), as they are equally accessible to all (open, fair) and at the same time documented (accountability, transparency). In the parliamentary phase, personal access is restricted. Members of the parliament (National Councilors and Council of States) discuss the draft legislation prepared in the pre-parliamentary phase. The meetings as well as the votes of both councils are open to the public (Parliamentary law Art. 4) (GRS Art. 44, GRN Art. 57). Members of the commissions can be accessed online through the national parliament's website, including their interests (RVOG Art. 57f), but historical data is only available on request (Schnurrenberger, 2018). In addition, the decision-making process of the commissions is subject to confidentiality in order to simplify coalition finding (Bundesversammlung, 2021). Only the president of the commission or the commissioner informs the public about the main results of the deliberations (GRS Art. 15, GRN Art. 20). These regulations possibly lead to a transparency deficit and reduced accountability for the decisions made among politicians. Problematic, however, are the following regulations, which give lobbyists non-transparent and unaccountable access to the decision-making system. As we have already seen in Chapter 2.2.3 *Public Affairs Landscape in Switzerland* Parliamentary law Art. 69 Para. 2 and Parliamentary law Art. 11 provide lobbyists with opportunities to influence the legislative process without public observation. The Parliamentary law Art. 69 Para. 2 allows politicians to give each of two selected guests an access card to the Federal Palace. Although the names are available in a public register, their intentions remain unclear, and the unrestricted access to the Federal Palace allows the guest to expand their sphere of influence over the politician. As we saw in the evaluation in Chapter 2.2.3.1 *The Guests of the Parliamentarians in Switzerland*, most guests are lobbyists. The Parliamentary law Art. 11 obliges parliamentarians to disclose their vested interests, but without having to make the existing money flows transparent. This could lead to parliamentarians being paid by organizations for their votes without the public realizing it. In addition, the findings from our study (→ Chapter 2.2.3 *Public Affairs Landscape in Switzerland*)

suggest that parliamentarians do not declare all their mandates (Parma, 2012; Angeli, 2018; Schnurrenberger, 2018). In addition, Switzerland also lacks regulation of political parties, through which economic actors could potentially exert influence (Gernet, 2011). This weak regulation of Switzerland's public affairs landscape does not meet any of the four criteria Bitonti (2017) demands for modern democracies. Access to the parliamentary decision-making process is neither open, fair, transparent, nor accountable.

2.3.3 Lobbying in the Public Debate of Switzerland

The deficit in public affairs regulation in Switzerland is reflected in various lobbying scandals in the past 20 years (Figure 13).

Overview Lobbying Scandals Switzerland			
Number	Date (year)	Scandal	Details
1	2000	Swisscom scandal	Swisscom invites 50 parliamentarians to a noble restaurant and offers a scooter as a give-away. Afterwards, the parliament votes in favor of Swisscom.
2	2001	Peter Hess scandal	Peter Hess (CVP) declares only 10 of 48 mandates, because the actual regulation only requires disclosure of "relevant" mandates.
3	2009	Farner scandal	The initiative against war material exports is spied on by a Farner employee during committee meetings.
4	2011	Segmüller scandal	Pius Segmüller (CVP) is paid to adapt a regulation for a gun safety system in favor of Armatix and to establish political connections between parliamentarians and Armatix.
5	2014	Group Mutuel scandal	A number of parliamentarians are receiving voting recommendations directly from the Group Mutuel insurance company and are getting paid for it.
6	2015	Markwalder scandal	Christa Markwalder (FDP) submits an interpellation which is formulated by a Kazakh party and a lobbying agency Burson Marsteller.
7	2015	Cassis scandal	Ignazio Cassis' (FDP) high salary (CHF 180'000) as president of a health insurance association is criticized. Cassis defends it with the argument of the militia system that private income is private.
8	2015	Maudet scandal	Pierre Maudet (FDP) is invited by a Geneva businessperson to Abu Dhabi to attend a Formula 1 race with an overnight stay in a luxury hotel.
9	2017	Locarno scandal	Parliamentarians are invited to the Locarno Film Festival by companies with close ties to the federal government.
10	2019	Dittli scandal	Josef Dittli (FDP) immediately changes his opinion about a stricter tobacco laws after he changes employers.

Figure 13: Overview Lobbying Scandals Switzerland (Albrecht, Arezia, & Bühler, 2019)

Politicians play a central role in the lobbying scandals listed. They accept gifts, get paid for mandates or submit initiatives on behalf of third parties. The quote "I am not a lobbyist and I

have nothing to hide" from Peter Hess (CVP), who was involved in a lobbying scandal in 2001 because he declared only 10 of his 48 mandates, sums up the problem. First, it is questionable why he even compares himself to a lobbyist. Hess is an elected parliamentarian, not a lobbyist. Moreover, he does have something to hide, namely his 48 mandates, which he has not declared. The correct statement should therefore be: "I am a politician and I have something to hide". In his original statement, however, Hess implies that a lobbyist has something to hide. In doing so, he accuses all lobbyists of working dishonestly. In Switzerland apparently, lobbyists are inherently non-transparent or have "something to hide" and therefore suffer from a poor image. From a study conducted by Longchamp (2011), it emerges that the opinion about lobbying in Switzerland is divided. 53% of all participants of the study (relevant stakeholders with touchpoints to lobbying) have a positive image of lobbying. At the same time, lobbyists have a significantly better image of themselves than people who are being lobbied. Jochen Hoffmann, Adrian Steiner and Otfried Jarren (2007) examined the self-image of public affairs officers in Switzerland: The ethical standards of public affairs officers are extremely high. 96% commit themselves to "truthfulness towards clients, target groups, the media, the public and refrain from false reports" – i.e. they do not hide anything. However, only 80.6% provide clarity about mandates and connections of interest. When it comes to attitudes towards the public and politics, the public affairs officer gets tangled up in an apparent contradiction. While 76.3% acknowledge that it is important for a democracy to deal with conflicts in public, the vast majority (92.6%) prefers to remain in the background and not seek public attention. This discretion should not be equated with intransparency but is the result of a trust relationship with a client, which is at most mentioned discreetly to third parties to protect the client's confidential information. The professional public affairs officer is thus transparent towards clients and discreet towards third parties (Hoffmann, Steiner & Jarren, 2007, p.234). To accuse a lobbyist of having something to hide is therefore wrong. A lobbyist withholds information about his client out of discretion. Lobby regulation should therefore start with those who are being lobbied and not with the lobbyists themselves (Bitonti & Harris, 2017).

In the observation period from 2000 to 2019, 22 motions are formulated calling for more transparency in parliamentary lobbying (Figure 14). All the proposals are rejected in their original form (Curia Vista, 2020).

Overview Parliamentary Initiatives about Lobbying and Transparency in Switzerland			
Number	Date (year)	Parliamentarian	Details
1	2001	Hans Rudolf Gysin (FDP)	Interpellation about duty to disclosure of mandates, interest links and salaries for members of the federal commissions.
2	2001	Cécile Bühlmann (Green Party)	Transparency about compensation in non-parliamentary commissions.
3	2006	Roger Nordmann (SP)	Transparency in financing political parties, lobby organizations and elections as well as voting campaigns (Parliamentary Initiative).
4	2009	Lukas Reimann (SVP)	Motion about initiating a register for public affairs officers (incl. mandates, method and addresses).
5	2009	Edith Graf-Litscher (SP)	Parliamentary Initiative to set up a register for public affairs officers and disclosure of mandates.
6	2011	Lukas Reimann (SVP)/Alexander J. Baumann (SVP)	Transparency rules (register) also for former parliamentarians who lobby at the federal parliament (Motion).
7	2011	Didier Berberat (SP)	Accreditation of lobbyists (Parliamentary Initiatives).
8	2012	Thomas Minder (Independent)	Only one badge (instead of two) for parliamentarians without provision to hand it out to a lobbyist (only for family members).
9	2012	Andrea Caroni (FDP)	Accreditation system for lobbyists incl. duty to disclose mandates and commitment for rules of conduct.
10	2014	Didier Berberat (SP)	Register for Lobbyists incl. disclosure of mandates and employers.
11	2014	Marianne Streiff-Feller (EVP)	More transparency in the disclosure of Council members' ties to interests.
12	2015	Andrea Caroni (FDP)	Parliamentary initiative to also register function and not only employer in the parliamentary register.
13	2015	Lukas Reimann (SVP)	Motion for creating a lobbying register incl. disclosure of mandates and employer.
14	2015	Didier Berberat (SP)	Register for Lobbyists incl. disclosure of mandates and employer.
15	2015	Peter Keller (SVP)	Voluntary declaration of paid and unpaid activities of parliamentarians.
16	2015	Nadine Masshardt (SP)	Parliamentarians should pay their own travel expenses when travelling on official business.
17	2015	Nadine Masshardt (SP)	More transparency for party donations. Individual donations from CHF 5'000 and total donations from CHF 10'000 must be declared.
18	2015	Baltasar Glättli (Green Party)	Transparent register for the daily badges, of which each parliamentarian can issue two per day.
19	2018	Yvette Estermann (SVP)	Regulate and reduce lobbyism at Federal Parliament.
20	2018	Nadine Masshardt (SP)	Intransparent lobbying of representatives of cantons.
21	2019	Andrea Caroni (FDP)	Legislative footprint on decision-making process of political decision-makers.
22	2019	Regula Ritz (Green Party)	Legislative footprint to strengthen trust in administration and parliament.

Figure 14: Overview Parliamentary Initiatives about Lobbying and Transparency in Switzerland

In total, only three small laws changed between 2000 and 2019. During the lobbying scandal surrounding the then president of the National Council, Peter Hess (see above), the article in the law on the disclosure of parliamentarians' interests came to public attention (Fontana, 2001). After the scandal, Parliament decided that not only "important" mandates, but all mandates had to be reported to the Council Office (Waber, 2001). In December 2011, the parliament gave in to public pressure to publish the two badge holders per parliamentarian including function online on a webpage (Schneeberger, 2011). In December 2019, the National Council and the Council of States agreed that, in addition to the mandates, it must be stated whether they are honorary or paid (Friedli & Häuptli, 2020). In the meantime, SPAG (2021) itself organizes and publishes the interest ties of its members in a public register on their website. Nevertheless, a big question mark remains as to whether parliament will ever make the two laws at issue transparent, the guest passes (Parliamentary law Art. 69 Para. 2) and the disclosure obligations of vested interests (Parliamentary law Art.11).

In addition to the weak regulation of parliamentarians, there is also a transparency gap in party financing. Switzerland is the only country apart from Sweden that has no regulation of party finances, which is strongly criticized by international observers such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) (Senti, 2011; Senti, 2012). In autumn 2007, the SP demanded the disclosure of party finances, but this was rejected by a bourgeois majority (Gerny, 2007). However, this time the initiators – in contrast to the lobbying regulation – are getting support from the people. The launch of the transparency initiative in autumn 2017 requires parties to disclose their accounts and the origin of large donations over CHF 10'000 to the Federal Chancellery. Individuals and committees that use more than CHF 100'000 in a campaign are also obliged to declare large donations (Transparenzinitiative, 2021). According to surveys, the initiative enjoys a two-thirds majority of support among the population. In addition, the recently won referenda in the cantons of Schwyz and Fribourg might indicate a trend towards more transparency. The cantons of Geneva, Ticino and Neuchâtel already have such a regulation (Gerny, 2018). In March 2021, the National Council agreed on a counterproposal in which parties would have to disclose individual donations of CHF 15'000 or more and a campaign budget of CHF 50'000. This must now be confirmed by the Council of States (Rhyn, 2021).

The development of the debate on party financing shows that the people resort to initiatives when parliament cannot solve the problem itself. An initiative to replace the guest charter regulation for parliamentarians with a public affairs officer register and to free lobbyists from the dependency of the National Assembly and the Council of States is not (yet) in sight. And there is no effective sanction for parliamentarians who fail to declare their interests correctly (→ Chapter 2.2.3 *Public Affairs Landscape Switzerland*). Nevertheless, the issue seems to have attracted attention and led to numerous parliamentary initiatives. However, the parliamentary initiatives remained almost ineffective. Therefore, it is interesting what the people, the politically next higher authority, think about the issue. This work aims to examine the development of the public debate about public affairs and transparency in the political sphere of Switzerland between 2000 and 2019.

3 Research Question and Hypotheses

The research interest derived in the previous chapters can be formulated into an overarching research question. This chapter will also present the two hypotheses and sub-hypotheses posed to answer the research question.

Research Question: How did the public debate in Switzerland about lobbying and transparency evolve from 2000 to 2019?

This research question is examined with a content analysis of 128 NZZ articles. It is split into two hypotheses and three sub-hypotheses each with the intent to capture both the quantitative (H1) and qualitative elements (H2) of the question (→ Chapter 4.1 *Methodology*). The period between 2000 and 2019 is chosen intentionally. As we will see in the content analysis sample, the topic is only reported from the year 2000 onwards (→ Chapter 4.3 *Sampling*).

3.1 Quantitative Hypothesis

As we have established in our review of the problem, transparency in lobbying has become a topic of discussion itself, primarily through scandals (→ Chapter 2.3.3 *Lobbying in the Public Debate of Switzerland*). As a result, the topic has also found its way into media coverage through several parliamentary initiatives. Therefore, we agree with Schnurrenberger (2018), who assumes a growing interest in the debate, as the parliamentary phase is gaining in importance due to several overarching trends (→ Chapter 2.2.4 *Continuity and Change in the Politics of Switzerland*) and therefore transparency demands are becoming more frequent in this arena. This leads to the first hypothesis (H1), which assumes a growing number of serious reports about lobbying and transparency.

Hypothesis 1: Between 2000 and 2019, serious reports about lobbying and transparency has augmented

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The hypothesis focuses on the quantitative, formal characteristics of the research question. Building on the derivation of the first hypothesis, sub-hypothesis H1.1 assumes that the discourse on lobbying and transparency has intensified, in other words that the time periods between reporting have become shorter and the topic is becoming more present in the public sphere through reporting.

H1.1 Reporting on lobbying and transparency has increased between 2000 and 2019

An indication of how seriously a newspaper reports on an issue can be derived from the section in which the article appears and who authored it. The authors Meier and Schanne (1996) speak of "editorial attention patterns" (p.217) in which the event is recorded and presented. It is assumed that the topic becomes more important with increasing duration and is accordingly noticed by the increasing length of the text or by its publication in a more important section.

H1.2 Reporting on lobbying and transparency is published in different rubrics depending on the phase.

Another indication of the seriousness of an article is whether it was written by an employed journalist or the subject matter was taken over from a news agency. Lichtsteiner (2005) assumes in his work that the article's importance can be ascertained my examining the amount of editorial resources used.

H1.3 Media coverage of lobbying and transparency mainly takes place through internal editorial work.

The three sub-hypotheses are intended to help answer the first hypothesis (H1), which is of a purely descriptive nature. To describe the discourse, an investigation with qualitative instruments is required (→ Chapter 3.2 *Qualitative Hypothesis*).

3.2 Qualitative Hypothesis

To describe the discourse about lobbying and transparency qualitative elements must be investigated to explore the overarching research question. Here, like Schnurrenberger (2018), we assume that the demands for more transparency in lobbying have increased. First, several lobbying scandals have led to increased attention towards lobbying regulation and support advocates in their efforts to introduce transparent regulation. Second, parliamentarians from almost all bigger parties launch parliamentary initiatives and keep the discussion in parliament ongoing. Third, transparent party funding, which is also under increased scrutiny, is a topical discussion right now and the subject of a popular initiative. Fourth, people in favor of the status quo (no transparency) would presumably see no reason to raise the issue in a public debate, as they would be satisfied with the current state as it is. Therefore, an increase in the reports favoring more transparency (in lobbying) is expected and over proportional in relation to reports with negative statements (i.e. reports opposed to more transparency).

H2 Between 2000 and 2019, the demands for more transparency in lobbying have increased.

To make Hypothesis 2 measurable, it is divided into three sub-hypotheses (like Hypothesis 1). Schnurrenberger's (2018) analysis of past and current political calls for transparency in parliament suggests that resistance in parliament to increasing transparency is constant. Parliament repeatedly voted against stricter transparency rules, most recently in 2019 (→ Chapter 2.3.3 *Lobbying in the Public Debate of Switzerland*). Therefore, it can be assumed that the arguments of both supporters and opponents remain the same.

H2.1 The pro and contra arguments of the actors have not changed between 2000 and 2019.

Building on the argumentation for H2, we assume that during the discourse several parties and organizations have always voiced their support for more transparency as they want to gain attention for the topic. In doing so, we build on the argumentation of Schnurrenberger (2018), who in his work "Lobbying in der Kommission für Wirtschaft und Abgaben des Nationalrats" (Lobbying in the Committee for Economic Affairs and Taxation of the National Council) calls for a "widespread demand for more transparency in the militia parliament" (p.21).

H2.2 Between 2000 and 2019, more proponents have spoken out in favor of more transparency in lobbying than opponents defending the status-quo.

Hilmar Gernet (2011) suggests that large corporations would have to disclose their donations to political parties, as their investors "want to know what is happening with their money" (p.200). This could also lead to companies and other extra-parliamentary organizations becoming involved in the discourse regarding transparency provisions in parliament. Since it is mainly organizations that are interested in a change from the status quo that speak out (since the others are satisfied with the current system), it is mainly the supporters of transparency efforts in parliament who are likely to voice their opinions.

H2.3 Between 2000 and 2019, economic actors express their support for transparent regulations.

The investigation of the research question thanks to the two hypotheses and six sub-hypotheses is explained in detail in Chapter 4 *Research Method and Study Design*.

4 Research Method and Study Design

In this chapter, the research method and study design are explained. After a general chapter about the *Methodology* ($\rightarrow$ Chapter 4.1), the *Study Design* ($\rightarrow$ Chapter 4.2), the *Sampling* ($\rightarrow$ Chapter 4.3), the *Codebook* ($\rightarrow$ Chapter 4.4) and the *Data Analysis* ($\rightarrow$ Chapter 4.5) are presented.

4.1 Methodology

Perhaps no issue in social sciences evokes more differences of opinion than research methodology (Mayring 2014). Since the field of public affairs lacks a clear definition and a distinct demarcation from other research fields ($\rightarrow$ Chapter 2.1.1 *Term Public Affairs*), there also exists a variation of possibilities in the methodology. Craig S. Fleisher (2005) defines several research design choices and data-gathering possibilities in public affairs research methods which are both quantitative and qualitative. For the research question of this study ($\rightarrow$ Chapter 3 *Research Question and Hypotheses*) a content analysis was chosen by gathering information about lobbying and transparency from the news articles of a leading newspaper in the German part of Switzerland (Neue Zürcher Zeitung).

Content analysis is a frequently used method in social sciences and used across disciplines in literary studies, psychological research and communication studies (Schnell, Hill, & Esser, 2011). The primary areas of application are in the "study of political communication, in the analysis of mass media and in the analysis of sociological fields" (Friedrichs 1973, p. 317). Content analysis is therefore defined diversely. For Guido Stempel (1981) content analysis describes "a formal system for doing something that we all do informally rather frequently, drawing conclusions from observation of content" (p.119). Robert Weber (1990) defines content analysis as a method which uses a "set of procedures to make valid inferences from text" (p.9). Klaus Krippendorff (1980) added reliability and validity to his definition: "content analysis is a research technique for making replicative and valid inferences from data to their

context" (p.21). Content analysis and the view on how it is to be executed correctly changed over time. Mayring (2014) differentiates between three phases in the development of content-analytical techniques and approaches. In a *preliminary phase* content analysis developed into a standard instrument to analyze publishing and newspaper articles, where newspapers were analyzed for the first time. In the beginning of the 20th century mass media such as newspapers and radio stations were becoming increasingly important. In the so-called *consolidation phase* analyzing them was part of the attempt to get a sense of the public opinion. Governments and commercial contractors started using the method for domestic intelligence purposes or commercial reasons. In a third step called *fine developments and interdisciplinary expansion* not only the summarizing of verbal material (description) was important, but also the conclusion (inference) to be drawn from the "material on the circumstances of its origin and effects" (Mayring 2014, p. 19). Nowadays, Mayring (2014) describes the situation as "discontent" (p.20) since several scholars question the effectiveness of classical content analysis. For Holger Rust (1980, as cited in Mayring, 2014) the construction of a text is the basis of the quantitative method and must therefore be considered so that the analysis meets a qualitative standard. "Qualitative analysis therefore pursues a twofold strategy: it forces the object of analysis to reveal its structure in a de-totalizing approach which enquires into the relationship between individual aspects and general appearance but does this with the aim of achieving a conscious re-totalization, so as not to lose sight of the overall social core content of every statement" (Rust 1980, p. 21, as cited in Mayring 2014, p. 21).

This also applies to this work. Therefore, we choose a mixed-method approach to content analysis after Mayring (2014), which includes both quantitative and qualitative elements. Thus, formal aspects of the articles are also included in the analysis, which are relevant for the contextual description and temporal classification of the first hypothesis. The qualitative evaluation of the statements of political actors and their classification is decisive for the second hypothesis (→ Chapter 3 *Research Question and Hypotheses*). The recombination of temporal (quantitative) and context/statements (qualitative) elements should allow us in the end to evaluate the overall discourse of the debate about lobbying and transparency in Switzerland. In the following, the step-by-step procedure will be explained using a graphic (→ Chapter 4.2 *Study Design*).

4.2 Study Design

The present content analysis is structured after a quantitative and a qualitative analysis to answer the two main hypotheses (Figure 15). In a first step, each of the sub-hypotheses will be answered independently. The first hypothesis (H1: *Between 2000 and 2019, serious reports about lobbying and transparency has augmented*) focuses on formal and quantitative elements of the content analysis as does each sub-hypothesis (increasing reporting (H1.1), different rubrics (H1.2), internal editorial work (H1.3)). The second hypothesis (H2: *Between 2000 and 2019, the demands for more transparency in lobbying have increased*) is succeeded by three sub-hypotheses (actors (H2.1), arguments (H2.2) and arguments of economic actors (H2.3)) which demand a qualitative analysis. The two main hypotheses H1 and H2 in combination will answer the main research question (RQ: *How did the public debate in Switzerland about lobbying and transparency evolve from 2000 to 2019?*).

Figure 15: Study Design

4.3 Sampling

To explore the discourse on transparency and lobbying in Switzerland, newspaper coverage is used, as this is the simplest and most reliable method of examining the discussion. The medium chosen is the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), which holds the top position in the annual analysis of media quality in Switzerland (fög, 2020). The convenience sample was created with the help of Swissdox. Swissdox AG has been archiving almost all Swiss print media since the 1990s and allows access to this media via a research tool. The words "transparency" (German: Transparenz) and "lobb*" were chosen as search terms. According to the Duden (2021), the search term "lobb*" includes all German words that are associated with the root word "lobbying" (*Lobby, Lobbyarbeit, lobbyieren, Lobbying, Lobbyismus, LobbyisIn*). The peculiarity of the word "lobbying" further simplifies the search, as it is not used in any other context. As a countercheck, the sample was counter confirmed via NZZ Archiv, which makes all articles since 1780 available on the homepage in digital form, to guarantee the completeness of the sample.

The choice to use the word "lobbying" instead of "public affairs", which after all is part of the title of this work, was made for strategic reasons during the search for articles. Thus, a total of over 120,000 database results were published on the topic of "lobbying", while "public affairs" had only 234 articles. Since lobbying is seen as a core function of public affairs ($\rightarrow$ Chapter 2.1.3 *Classification of Public Affairs in the Discipline of Corporate Communication*), this justifies the decision to examine the word "lobbying" in the context of "transparency" to increase the chance of a useful result.

The present empirical study concentrates on a period from January 1, 2000 to the cut-off date of December 31, 2019. Thanks to access to the NZZ archive, all articles dating back to 1780 are available. The first article mentioning both "lobbying" and "transparency" in the same article appears in January 1996. However, since the first relevant article on the subject does not appear until March 3, 2000, the older articles are not included in the sample. Therefore, this work carries the period from 2000 to 2019 in the title. In total 128 articles could be obtained for the analysis.

4.4 Codebook

The unit of analysis comprises 128 news articles by NZZ, wherein each of the words "lobb*" and "transparency" appear at least once. The codebook is divided in three parts after Rössler (2010):

- Formal Category
- Content Category
- Evaluating Category

The Formal Category contains descriptive information like date (ordinal), page of article (ordinal), title (nominal), subtitle (nominal), length (in number of words; ratio) and author (nominal). The categories of the rubric (nominal) are derived from the homepage of NZZ since there is an overview over all categories. Missing and changed rubric titles were added during the test phase of the codebook and discussed with the co-coders (e.g. *Inland* (domestic) as the former rubric title for *Schweiz* (Switzerland)). For the article type the category system of Lichtsteiner (2005) was used, which generally classifies articles into five nominal, distinguishable categories.

(1) Agency Message. A very brief, short message with an agency abbreviation
(2) Report / Leading Article. A longer article on the subject with additional information
(3) Comments/Glossary/Reader's Letter. Opinion expressed by the author of the article or readers
(4) Interview. Questioning or discussion between two or more participants
(5) Reportage/Feature. Long and detailed report with firsthand experiences of the author and reports from eyewitnesses

The *Content Category* contains four basic variables about the actor (→ Annex *Codebook*). However, since several actors can occur per newspaper article, these four variables are determined for each actor. A maximum of seven persons occurred in an article and were classified. In addition to the name of the actor (nominal), the organization (nominal) that the actor represents was determined. Normally, this information is also in the newspaper article. Otherwise, the organization was researched on the internet. If the person was affiliated with more than one organization, the organization was chosen that the person was presumed to

be speaking for in the report. This organization was then classified. Based on the classification of the intermediary system by Donges and Jarren (2010), a distinction is made between *Party*, *Association*, *Social Movement*, *Citizen*, *Government* and *Mass Media*. As a result of the pre-test of the codebook the variable was expanded by seven expressions (*Foundations*, *Clubs*, *Corporations* under public law (e.g. churches), *Business* enterprises, *Academic Organizations* and *PR Agencies/Lobbyists* and *Others*). The fourth variable contains the (ordinal) information about the status of the actor. We follow Franziska Oehmer (2012), who defines the following characteristics: *local* (towns, cities), *regional* (cantons, regions e.g. central Switzerland), *national* (Switzerland), *international with swiss relation* (federal council), *international without direct swiss relation* (EU Parliament). The last two categories emerged from a general international category and were developed with the co-coders. Since the Federal Council as a representative body is not part of the national context, it was decided to create an international category with a Swiss context and a category without a Swiss context to better differentiate the actors.

Lastly, the *Evaluating Category* is collected. This is a statement of each actor relevant to the research topic. The length of the statement varies from one sentence (coding unit) to one paragraph (context unit), which is taken up and copied into the codebook. In total up to five statements per actor are collected, which are transferred unchanged into the codebook and then summarized directly into a sentence (summary data analysis). Each sentence is then classified according to its valence (neutral, positive, negative).

At the end of the process, the coder summarizes the content of the article in one sentence and flags the article if he considers the topic relevant. Out of 128 articles, 94 were identified as relevant for the analysis. A complete overview of the codebook is offered in the annex (→Annex *Codebook*).

Different numbers of variables were collected for the individual articles. The eight *formal categories* remain the same for all articles. In the *content* and *evaluating categories*, however, remarkable differences were found per article, depending on how many actors and how many arguments could be identified. A maximum of eleven different actors had their say in an article on the topic under investigation. This resulted in a maximum of 77 variables recorded for one article (eleven times four *content variables* plus eleven times three *evaluating variables*).

After Krippendorff (2014), a content analysis should meet the requirement of reproducibility. To ensure this, the codebook was pre-tested. In addition, two co-encoders were engaged, who coded a total of 25 articles each. Due to the high qualitative content of the study a meeting was held after three and six articles to discuss potential problems with the codebook and to adjust it if necessary. To check the intercoder reliability, Holsti's reliability coefficient (r_H) was calculated after eleven articles. This was found to be $r_H=0.82$. According to Raupp & Vogelsang (2009), a value of 0.8 can be considered as good. A complete overview of the reliability coefficients per variable is given in the *Codebook* ($\rightarrow$ Annex). The intracoder reliability (coefficient of agreement $r_ü$) according to Raupp & Vogelsang (2009) was also determined by double-coding 10 articles. The result was a $r_ü=0.889$, indicating that the articles were coded very consistently.

4.5 Data Analysis

The data analysis took place between July 3 and August 11, 2020. The sample comprises a total of 128 articles, 94 of which were classified as relevant to the topic and the research question. The material in its original form is in German and was also further treated in German during its analysis before finally being translated in English for this work. MS Excel was chosen as the analysis tool, as this software was also available to the co-coders and proved sufficient for both quantitative and qualitative analysis. The qualitative analysis focuses on the statements of the actors. To analyze this information after coding, the material is further processed in five steps along the lines of Mayring (2014) (Figure 16):

Figure 16: Analyzing Qualitative Arguments of Actors about Lobbying and Transparency

(1) Summarizing. This step was already done during the collection of the data (→ Annex *Codebook*). The coders summarized the argument and paraphrased it if it was longer than one sentence. In case the summary was unclear during the data analysis, it was reconstructed using the full quote in the codebook.

(2) Based on the one sentence summary statements an inductive category is created for each statement. In most cases the category name is one or a few words long, consisting of part of the sentence. This reduces the analysis material to a single word and makes it more comparable.

(3) This keyword(s), which has now been identified for each code, is now brought back into the context. The narrow context analysis bases this keyword(s) on text, i.e. from where the word originates.

(4) Broad context analysis goes – compared to narrow text analysis – in the other direction. It adds information and reasoning from outside the original text to explain the keyword(s). These context analyses help to better understand the inferred keywords.

(5) Now the individual structured keywords are inductively summarized into themes. All information gathered from previous steps help to interpret and summarize the keywords correctly. Since the keywords are arguments or facts on the topic of lobbying and transparency in Switzerland, the keywords are first sorted according to their valence (positive, negative, neutral) before the keywords are combined into

superordinate themes. To summarize the material, several (up to three) cycles of analysis were conducted until the arguments were condensed and summarized into a clear number of themes (1st order code, 2nd order code and 3rd order code).

The process is illustrated by the example of the theme "Regulation" (Figure 17). First, an argument is transformed into a first inductive category (1st order code). From these five inductive categories, two can be combined ("More transparency in administration" is combined to the joint category "Administration"). This results in a total of four themes (2nd order code) which are then combined into the higher-level 3rd order code "Regulation".

Figure 17: The Creation of the Final Theme Regulation

5 Results

This chapter presents the results of the data analysis. The sub-chapters are oriented according to the structure of the research hypotheses and the corresponding sub-hypotheses (→ Chapter 3 *Research Question and Hypotheses*). First, the results of H1 (*Between 2000 and 2019, serious reports about lobbying and transparency has augmented*) and their sub-hypotheses H1.1-H1.3 are presented, starting directly with H1.1. In the second part of the chapter, H2 (*Between 2000 and 2019, the demands for more transparency in lobbying have increased*) and the corresponding sub-hypotheses H2.1-H2.3 are discussed, whereby the results of the sub-hypotheses are also presented here.

5.1 Between 2000 and 2019, serious Reports about Lobbying and Transparency has augmented

Hypothesis H1 examines the question of whether reporting has increased over time between 2000 and 2019. To answer this question, the hypothesis was split into three sub-hypotheses. These are presented in the following three sub-chapters. Sub-hypothesis H1.1 examines the reporting on lobbying and transparency over time and divides the reporting into different phases (→ Chapter 5.1.1 *Reporting on Lobbying and Transparency has increased between 2000 and 2019*). Sub-hypothesis H1.2 analyses the development of reporting regarding publication in rubrics and page numbers (→ Chapter 5.1.2 *Reporting on Lobbying and Transparency is published in different Rubrics depending on the Phase*). The third and last sub-hypothesis H1.3 deals with whether the articles were produced through internal journalistic work or whether (news) agency reports were preferred (→ Chapter 5.1.3 *Media coverage of Lobbying and Transparency mainly takes place through internal editorial work*). At the end of the chapter, we decide if hypothesis H1 is accepted or rejected (→ Chapter 5.1.4 *Summary and Answering Hypothesis 1*).

5.1.1 Reporting on Lobbying and Transparency has increased between 2000 and 2019

The analysis of whether reporting on lobbying and transparency has increased over the last two decades (2000-2019) is in the first phase purely descriptive. In the initial analysis, the articles were sorted by year (Figure 18). At first glance, it is noticeable that most of the published articles fall into the second half of the observation period. Of the total of 94 articles, 79 (84.04%) fall into the period between 2010 and 2019. Only 15 articles (15.95%) were published in the period between 2000 and 2009. The increase in coverage is not linear, however, but jumps in 2011, culminating in 24 articles published in 2015. Subsequently, interest levels off in the following years, only to rise again in 2018 and 2019. On average, 4.7 articles are produced per year. In the first half of the observation period, only the year 2001 exceeds this value. In the second half, there are six calendar years in which the number of published articles is above the average.

Figure 18: Number of relevant Articles about Lobbying and Transparency between 2000 and 2019

To be able to analyze the reporting more precisely, it is advisable to include an alternative parameter, as articles can differ from one another. Therefore, we examine the years in terms of published arguments, since it is assumed that important and controversial articles have a higher number of actors and consequently a higher number of arguments on the topic (Figure 19). An argument is a relevant statement by an actor on the topic of lobbying and transparency

(→ Chapter 5.2.1 *The pro and contra Arguments of the Actors have not changed between 2000 and 2019*).

Figure 19: Number of Arguments by Year between 2000 and 2019

The resulting Figure 19 does not differ significantly at first glance from Figure 18 (number of relevant articles about *lobbying* and *transparency* between 2000 and 2019). In this figure, as in the previous analysis, the year 2001 stands out (mainly because of the scandal around Peter Hess) in the first half of the reporting period (33 arguments in year 2001). And just as with the articles, there are significantly more arguments published between 2011 and 2019 (85.3% of all arguments) than in the period between 2000 and 2009 (14.7%).

If we analyze the average number of arguments per article and year, an interesting trend emerges (Figure 20). On average, the intensity of the argumentation (number of arguments per article) increases with each wave of reporting. The first wave (2000-2002) peaked in 2002 with 6 arguments per article. The small wave of 2006 and 2007 reaches a peak of 3.5 arguments. And the third wave, which starts around 2010, does not increase linearly, but steadily over the years – except for 2014, 2015 and 2017. In summary we can observe a tendency towards an increase in intensity of the argumentation in each year during the discourse, which peaks in 2017 with an average of 8 arguments per article.

Figure 20: Intensity of Argumentation (Number of Arguments per Article) by Year between 2000 and 2019

A comparison with an earlier period (e.g. with the 1990s) is not possible because the first relevant article with the search words lobbying and transparency, which either deals with party financing, the regulation of lobbyists in the Federal Parliament or the disclosure obligations of parliamentarians, did not appear until March 3, 2000. Consequently, no articles on this topic appeared at all in earlier periods. The first article is not a journalistic contribution or a sensational event, but an academic guest article by Daniel Dettling of the Justus Liebig University of Giessen and Arndt Schmehl of the University of Potsdam, who address the increased transparency requirements for the administration. This topic is then taken up by an in-house journalist from the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (René Zeller) and becomes a question for Switzerland's own administration. This article thus triggers the first small "reporting wave" (one or more articles about the same topic).

Overall, sub-hypothesis H1.1. is accepted. Over time, more articles are published on the topic of lobbying and transparency (Figure 17, Figure 18) and there is a tendency to register more arguments per article (Figure 19), indicating that reporting has not only increased but also gained in intensity and relevance in the period from 2000 to 2019 (Figure 20).

5.1.2 Reporting on Lobbying and Transparency is published in different Rubrics depending on the Phase

The NZZ publishes articles on lobbying and transparency mainly in five sections (Figure 21). The articles appear most frequently in the *Switzerland/Domestic* section (55%). The second most frequent section in which the articles are published is the section *Opinion / Letters to the NZZ*. This is because many articles are classified as opinion pieces (→ Chapter 5.1.3 *Media coverage of Lobbying and Transparency mainly takes place through internal editorial work*). Very rarely do articles find their way into other sections, such as the *Front Page* (5%), *Zurich* (4%) or *Economy* (2%). 3% of the articles could not be assigned to any rubric.

Figure 21: Articles about Lobbying and Transparency per Rubric

Hypothesis H1.2 assumes that the articles are published in more important sections in the course of the discourse. The most important section is the front page, which bears the most controversial topics to attract the buyers attention. In total, the topic lobbying and transparency made it onto the front page of the Neue Zürcher Zeitung five times[4]. Another important section, because it is close to the readers, is the *Opinion/Letters to NZZ* in which the in-house journalists express their opinion and readers are invited to comment on certain

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[4] The topic appeared five times on the front page: May 12, 2015; May 13, 2015; July 8, 2015; June 17, 2019; December 17, 2019

topics. Only a topic that is moving public opinion and is perceived as relevant would be published in this section.

Figure 22: Articles published in specific Rubrics over Time

The other sections *Switzerland/Domestic*, *Economy* and *Zurich* are generic collection cups for topics that occur every day and are published accordingly in these sections. Normally, an article about lobbying and transparency is published in the *Switzerland/Domestic* section. If the article has a regional reference to Zurich, it falls into the category *Zurich* or if it has an economic reference, it falls into the category *Economy*. For three articles, the category is unknown. What stands out when looking at Figure 22 is that the articles on lobbying and transparency only appear in the important rubrics *Opinion/Letters to NZZ* and *Front page* from the second half of the observation period (i.e. from 2010). Earlier, only the generic headings *Switzerland/Domestic*, *Economy* and *Zurich* were used without giving additional weight to the topic. This leads to the assumption that from the second half of the observation period on, more important headings were used to give more weight to the topic.

This statement is supported by the assumption that an important topic is published with a low page number (Figure 23, p.85). Since the number of pages is also related to the category (front page has page number 1), this result is not surprising. Nevertheless, this figure allows us to show even more clearly to what extent the topic has worked its way forward over time. In the first phase of reporting on lobbying and transparency (2000-2002), the reports were published on average on page 22 (21.81). In 2006 and 2007 (2nd phase), the topic found its place on page 13 (13.33) on average. However, this figure should be taken with caution, as only three articles were published during this period, significantly fewer than in the other phases. In the years

Figure 23: Page Number of Articles about Lobbying and Transparency published between 2000 and 2019

2010 to 2014 (3rd phase), the NZZ published reports on lobbying and transparency on page 18 (18.09). Between 2015 and 2017 (4th phase), the topic could be found on page 14 (13.85). In 2018 and 2019 (5th phase), NZZ published the reports on page 11 on average (10.69). This confirms what had been indicated in the previous studies: The topic of lobbying and transparency is published increasingly in front sections of the newspaper as the discourse progresses.

Although the topic is obviously published further to the front and in more relevant sections over time, the reports on lobbying and transparency – measured in words – do not get significantly longer (Figure 24). The front-runner is the year 2002, in which only one large article is published on the events of the spring session. Otherwise, no new trend can be identified. The number of words neither increases nor decreases significantly during the observation period.

Figure 24: Average Words per Article for each Year

Overall, sub-hypothesis H1.2 can be accepted. As time goes on, the important sections in the NZZ, *Opinion/Letters* for example, are used more often (especially from 2010) and the first cover stories are also published. Overall, the average number of pages decreases as time goes on. The length of the articles remains unchanged over the entire observation period, with one exception.

This confirms what had been indicated in the previous studies: The topic of lobbying and transparency is published increasingly in front sections of the newspaper as the discourse progresses.

5.1.3 Media coverage of Lobbying and Transparency mainly takes place through internal editorial work

The third sub-hypothesis deals with whether the articles were created by the journalists own contributions or whether they were agency reports. Overall, only four out of 94 articles (4%) were taken from agency reports. 90 articles (96%) were produced by the NZZ itself (Figure 25). Most often, NZZ journalists reported on the subject in a report (55%) which is a longer article on the subject with additional information (Lichtsteiner, 2005). The second most frequent articles are found in comment columns. A distinction can be made between a guest commentary (11), a reader commentary (2) or a commentary by an NZZ journalist (25).

Figure 25: Article Type chosen for Articles about Lobbying and Transparency

The relatively high number of journalists' own comments (25 out of 94 articles) indicates that the authors have dealt with the topic very closely. A total of seven journalists who followed the topic during the observation period stand out. René Zeller published a total of 13 articles on the topic in 2001 and between 2011 and 2016. Martin Senti wrote 5 articles on lobbying and transparency in Switzerland between 2011 and 2015. Markus Häfliger published 11 articles between 2012 and 2015. Ronny Nicolussi published an analysis of parliamentarians'

ties to interests in the Federal Parliament in 2014. Simon Hehli (5 articles) between 2015 and 2017, Heidi Gmür (3 articles) in 2016 and Lukas Mäder (7 articles) in 2019 belong to the younger generation of journalists who report on the topic.

Overall, it can be concluded that the NZZ follows the topic almost exclusively and with few exceptions relies on in-house production. In addition to its own journalists, who follow the topic very closely (especially more recently), there is a selection of very qualified guest commentators. These include former top politicians (Kaspar Villiger), high-ranking scientific representatives from the field (Roland Holder, Ulrich Matter, Thomas Gees, Fritz Sager, Rahel Willener), nationally known lobbyists (Thomas Borer, Christian Betscher, Dominique Reber, Hugo Schittenhelm and Victor Schmid) and qualified representatives from the business world (Stefan Kilchenmann, Kuno Hämisegger). Such commentators lend additional diversity to the reporting of the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, and as a consequence real world knowledge is also incorporated into the publication. Hypothesis H1.3. is accepted for this reason.

5.1.4 Summary and answering Hypothesis 1

The hypothesis H1, *between 2000 and 2019, serious reports about lobbying and transparency has augmented*, is accepted with the positive result of the three examined sub-hypotheses H1.1, H1.2 and H1.3.

In H1.1*, reporting on lobbying and transparency has increased between 2000 and 2019*, indicates that the number of articles has not only accumulated in recent years, but also that the intensity of argumentation in the articles has increased.

In H1.2, *reporting on lobbying and transparency is published in different rubrics depending on the phase*, shows that the articles with ongoing discourse are published in more important rubrics (*Opinion/Letters to NZZ*) and that the topic has recently appeared five times on the front page of the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ).

And H1.3, *media coverage of lobbying and transparency mainly takes place through internal editorial work*, confirms the assumption that the articles are mainly (96%) productions of NZZ journalists. The topic of lobbying and transparency has thus been treated with increasing importance by the NZZ since 2000.

5.2 Between 2000 and 2019, the demands for more Transparency in Lobbying have increased

Hypothesis H2 elaborates the question whether the pressure for more transparency in lobbying has increased in Switzerland between 2000 and 2019. To answer this question, we will analyze two aspects of the question in detail: Sub-hypothesis H2.1 deals with the evolution of the argumentation between proponents and opponents of the transparency debate in the field of lobbying (→ Chapter 5.2.1 *The pro and contra Arguments of the Actors have not changed between 2000 and 2019*). Sub-hypothesis H2.2 exports the findings of the previous chapter and analyzes the *actors* and their arguments that have spoken out on this topic (→ Chapter 5.2.2 *Between 2000 and 2019, more Proponents have spoken out in favor of more Transparency in Lobbying than Opponents defending the status-quo*). A closer look is given to the economic actors (sub-hypothesis H2.3), who are examined in a separate chapter (→ Chapter 5.2.3 *Between 2000 and 2019, Economic Actors express their support for transparent Regulations*). The chapter concludes with a summary of the results of each hypothesis (→ Chapter 5.2.4 *Summary and Answering Hypothesis 2*).

5.2.1 The pro and contra Arguments of the Actors have not changed between 2000 and 2019

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the public debate on lobbying and transparency has intensified during the discourse (→ Chapter 5.1.1 *Reporting on Lobbying and Transparency has increased between 2000 and 2019*) and has been published in more important rubrics from the second half of the observation period (→ Chapter 5.1.2 *Reporting on Lobbying and Transparency is published in different Rubrics depending on the Phase*). What we also already know is that the longer the discourse lasts, the more arguments per article are published (Figure 19). Therefore, it is not surprising that 226 (83.01%) out of the total 272 positive and negative arguments were published between 2010 and 2019 (Figure 26). Especially in 2014 (44), 2015 (49) and 2019 (37) the topic was discussed intensively. It is remarkable that in most years, reports proclaiming the positive facets of transparency predominated (66.1%). In only two years (2002, 2006) do negative

arguments defending the status quo retain the upper hand. Since transparency advocates were able to obtain only small change in regulation during the observation period (→ Chapter 2.3.3 *Lobbying in the Public Debate of Switzerland*), it is assumed that the discussion on lobbying and transparency will remain the same between 2000-2019.

Figure 26: Positive vs. Negative Arguments in the Discourse of Lobbying and Transparency between 2000 and 2019

To be able to analyze the argumentation, the statements of all actors were reduced, made explicit and structured. After a three-stage thematic analysis (→ Chapter 4.5 *Data Analysis*), a total of eleven pro arguments for more transparency (→ Chapter 5.2.1.1 *Pro Arguments Transparency Regulation*) and ten contra arguments (→ Chapter 5.2.1.2 *Contra Arguments Transparency Regulation*) resulted, which are based on statements of the content analysis[5]. In addition, five neutral arguments about transparency will also be considered (→ Chapter 5.2.1.3 *Neutral Arguments Transparency Regulation*). Subsequently, the positive and negative arguments will be analyzed over time and put into context (→ Chapter 5.2.1.4 *The development of arguments about lobbying and transparency between 2000 and 2019*).

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[5] Some statements are direct citations of politicians or other actors and might sound less academic in this context

5.2.1.1 Pro Arguments Transparency Regulation

All positive statements on the topic of lobbying and transparency can be reduced to 11 core arguments that lobbying in Switzerland should be regulated more transparently (Figure 27). These arguments are presented in small chapters and embedded in the research context.

Pro Arguments Transparency (182 Arguments)
Lobbying Register (68)
Member of Parliament are not Transparent (41)
Party Funding (16)
Perception of Transparency (15)
Image Lobbyist (13)
Risk of Corruption (10)
Democracy (7)
International Pressure (6)
Left-Wing Parties (2)
Role of Media (2)
Transparent Administration (2)

Figure 27: Pro Arguments Transparency

Lobbying Register (68 Arguments)

The biggest argument for more transparency in lobbying comes with the demand for a central lobbying register to gain access to the Federal Palace. Lobbyists should be able to formally accredit themselves and must disclose their employers and the mandates they pay. This system should also provide possibilities to sanction lobbyists who make mistakes[6]. Thanks to Andrea Caroni (FDP) and Didier Berberat (SP), who both have launched several parliamentary initiatives since 2011, the topic is widely and openly discussed in parliament. Furthermore, the professional association of lobbyists SPAG realized its own lobbying register with its members in 2014 and thus tries to set an example for parliamentarians[7]. Independent lobbyists also speak out in favor of a regulated access system to the Federal House of Representatives[8]. In her master's thesis, Sabine Etter proposes a federal house accreditation system for lobbyists that would be similar to the one used for media representatives. A distinction would be made between permanent accreditation and daily passes. A prerequisite for accreditation would be

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[6] "In a parliamentary initiative, Andrea Caroni (FDP), a member of the National Council from the Canton Appenzell Ausserrhoden, is demanding that lobbyists should be formally accredited in the future. Anyone who wants to gain access to the parliament building should have to disclose their respective employers or paid mandates. Caroni also calls for sanctions to be imposed" (English translation from German original NZZ 29.5.2013).

[7] "The board of the lobbyists' organization makes no secret of the fact that it would like to make recommendations to the authorities on the accreditation of lobbyists. Expulsion from the lobbyists' association could subsequently lead to a withdrawal of the Federal House accreditation. The SPAG has not yet sought active contact with the authorities on this issue, as association president Müller says on request. "We do not want to pressure parliamentarians, but rather to give them time to assess the effect of the new rules and the impact of the new code of conduct" (English translation from German original NZZ 17.6.2019).

[8] "Schmid 100% behind Berberat's proposal" (English translation from German original NZZ 2.7.2016).

the obligation to comply with a code of conduct and the disclosure of employers and mandates, which would be published on the Internet. In this way, all actors representing specific interests should have access to the Federal Parliament. Excluded from accreditation would be members of the Council, personal staff and guests, as well as representatives of the federal administration and cantons. The inclusion of law firms could as well be examined. The conclusion of Sabine Etter's study: The majority favors both a central accreditation system and the disclosure of mandates as well as a code of conduct[9].

Member of Parliament are not Transparent (41)

During the discussion, parliamentarians have repeatedly dealt with the reproach of not being transparent themselves. The main issue here is the mandates that parliamentarians hold on the side. The point of contention is what influence compensation, costs or other financial services have on the voting behavior of the parliamentarian. A total of 41 arguments claim that it is important for the voter to know how a parliamentarian is economically connected in Bern, criticize the existing intransparencies and demand full disclosure[10]. Full disclosure means that, in addition to professional activities, tasks in management and supervisory bodies, advisory or expert activities for federal agencies, management and advisory activities for interest groups, as well as participation in commissions and bodies of the Confederation, and travel activities at the Confederation's expense must also be declared to be judged as credible by the people[11]. But this credo is being knowingly circumvented. On the one hand, there is an obvious transparency gap in disclosure, as not all parliamentarians declare their mandates (→ Chapter 2.2.3.3 *The Interest Connections of Parliamentarians in Switzerland*). On the other hand, existing intransparencies (such as the badge bazaar) are deliberately

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[9] "Study author Sabine Etter makes the following suggestions: Following the system for media professionals, a graduated accreditation system for stakeholders could be created. Those who deal with federal politics "to the extent of at least 60 percent" could apply for permanent accreditation for the duration of a legislative term. Those who represent interests within the scope of business dealt with in the session would only be accredited for one session. (…) The conclusion: the majority of respondents favor both a central accreditation system and disclosure of mandates as well as a code of conduct" (English translation from German original NZZ 22.4.2001).

[10]"However, this right goes hand in hand with the voters' right to know with whom the person representing them in Bern has economic ties, which boards of directors and foundations they sit on, and which interest groups they advise. The fact that this claim is not guaranteed today is shown by the example of Peter Hess, who is not likely to be a lone sinner under the dome of the Federal Parliament when it comes to "selective" disclosure of economic ties" (English translation from German original NZZ 14.2.2001).

[11] "Ulrich Schlüer (., Zurich) moves that, in addition to the professional activities, the activities in management and supervisory bodies, advisory or expert activities for federal experts, activities for federal agencies, management and advisory activities for interest groups and participation in commissions and bodies of the Confederation. Travel at the expense of the Confederation is also declared. It is a question of the credibility of the parliament: if foreign travel is considered so important, one should also stand by them" (English translation from German original NZZ 3.10.2001).

maintained to distract from the subject matter[12]. Lukas Reimann calls on his colleagues in a motion to disclose their ties to interests to ensure that parliamentarians represent their constituents, not money[13]. Particularly after the lobbying scandal around Peter Hess, like motions were submitted by Cécile Bühlmann (Green Party) and later by Peter Keller (SVP), Nadine Masshardt (SP), Andrea Caroni (FDP) and Regula Ritz (Green Party) (→ Chapter 2.3.3. *Lobbying in the Public Debate of Switzerland*). The most frequent counterargument was the militia system (→ Chapter 5.2.1.2 *Contra Arguments Transparency Regulation*).

Party Funding (16)

The topic of party funding appears relatively late in the discussion. In a total of 16 arguments, an alternative financing model is discussed, which should make the opinion-forming money flows to parties transparent[14]. These range from an obligation to disclose party finances, finance and initiative committees[15] to a financing model of blind funds[16] to state party financing[17]. Companies are also being asked to play their cards close to their chests. And some, such as Raiffeisen, Credit Suisse and Mobiliar, are responding to this request with publicity[18]. The discussion about party financing has gained additional momentum in recent years thanks to two cantonal referendum successes in Schwyz and Fribourg and will be put before the nation in the next few years (see perception of transparency below).

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[12] "Unfortunately, the interplay between lobbyists and parliamentarians does not work well. The recurring attempts to free the access of lobbyists to the Federal House from the existing field and forest mode have so far, all failed due to the resistance of parliament. The requirement for greater transparency is thus actively being thwarted – not to the disadvantage of the militia parliament. After all, the Parliament took itself to task years ago with the register of vested interests. But here, too, there is room for improvement: As long as, for example, parliamentary security commissions are made up of parliamentarians who are remunerated by defense companies, there is no real transparency. The credibility of the parliament is damaged by such "concealed mandate holders" (English translation from German original NZZ 3.10.2001).

[13] "It's time to speak plainly about the entanglement and encrustation of Swiss politics," writes SVP National Councilor Lukas Reimann. Many politicians no longer represent the interests of the country and its people, but those of their financial backers. So Reimann demands: "Colleagues, disclose your vested interests" (English translation from German original NZZ 23.2.2011).

[14] "Among the objectives of a possible transparency regulation, only the information argument remains legitimate from a liberal point of view: When choosing between competing persons, positions and programs, money flows are also of interest in the opinion-forming process" (English translation from German original NZZ 24.3.2012).

[15] "For Anne Schwöbel of Transparency International Switzerland, this does not go far enough. Parties as well as referendum and initiative committees should also disclose their financial backers. "A free formation of will is only possible for the voter if she knows how strongly a politician or political groups are intertwined with individual interest representatives" (English translation from German original NZZ 23.2.2011).

[16] "Martina Caroni, a professor at the University of Lucerne, is disturbed by the focus of the discussion on disclosure requirements. Instead, she calls for alternative financing models to be discussed. For example, blind funds. "They accept donations and forward them to the candidates or parties concerned – without disclosing the identity of the donors and the amount of the donations" (English translation from German original NZZ 9.3.2011).

[17] "The SP wants to make parties completely dependent on the financial drip of the state" (English translation from German original NZZ 9.9.2014).

[18] "Large companies such as Mobiliar, Raiffeisen and, more recently, CS want to play their cards close to their chests in the future – not at least because international bodies such as the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) equate undeclared political financing per se with corruption" (English translation from German original NZZ 24.3.2012).

Perception of Transparency (15)

Transparency is perceived as a trend. Parliamentarian Andrea Caroni (FDP) was quoted as follows in 2015: "I have the feeling that the political majorities are shifting"[19]. The lobbying scandals surrounding Peter Hess (CVP) and Christa Markwalder (FDP) triggered political initiatives that have accumulated over the years ($\rightarrow$ Chapter 2.3.3 *Lobbying in the Public Debate of Switzerland*). It is also noticeable that a young generation of politicians is striving for more transparency[20]. It is worth noting that in a survey conducted by "Meinungsforschungsinstitut" CBC Schweiz (Opinion Research Institute CBC Switzerland) in 2007, the people wanted more transparency[21] when 64% of voters called for disclosure of party finances. In 2017, this figure rose in a similar survey by Univox to 87%[22]. In addition, it is assumed that the emerging debate on the national transparency initiative – which has celebrated successes in the German-speaking Swiss cantons of Fribourg, Schwyz and Schaffhausen in recent years – will give additional momentum to transparency concerns[23].

Image Lobbyist (13)

The image of lobbyist in Switzerland is controversial. Especially in the case of lobbying scandals (for example Markwalder-scandal $\rightarrow$ Chapter 2.3.3 *Lobbying in the Public Debate of Switzerland*) lobbyists are often used as scapegoats who must adjust their behavior towards parliamentarians[24]. For this reason, SPAG, on behalf of all lobbyists, has been calling for clear lobbying regulations for several years now ($\rightarrow$ Chapter 5.2.2 *Between 2000 and 2019, more Proponents have spoken out in favor of more Transparency in Lobbying than Opponents defending the status-quo*). As early as 2001, at its founding meeting, SPAG introduced

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[19] "I feel like the political majorities are shifting" (English translation from German original NZZ 13.5.2015).

[20] "It is striking, however, that there is a difference between the generations among the commoners. Younger politicians apparently have less trouble with transparency. SVP National Councilor Lukas Reimann (32) has been fighting for a long time for the disclosure of supplementary income, while Christian Wasserfallen (34), a member of the Free Democratic Party, lists all his income on his website" (English translation from German original NZZ 08.07.2015).

[21] "The majority of the Swiss believe that political parties should disclose their campaign donations. This is shown by a survey. Overall, 64 percent were in favor. Twenty-six percent were against disclosure. No answer was given by 10 percent of respondents" (English translation from German original NZZ 22.10.2007).

[22] "In surveys, the Swiss regularly call for more transparency in party financing. A Univox survey in 2007 showed a yes vote of 87 percent. In 2016, three quarters of respondents to the Vimentis political platform expressed a desire for more transparency" (English translation from German original NZZ 10.10.2017).

[23] "But in the longer term, there will be a reform. Several lobbyists are also convinced of this – regardless of whether they support an accreditation system or not. The transparency initiative will fuel the debate on lobbying, believes one long-time lobbyist. Although this popular initiative is about party funding. "Since it's about a cultural change, it needs a generational change in parliament," says one lobbyist who is skeptical of the call for ever more transparency" (English translation from German original NZZ 17.6.2019).

[24] "Anyone who wants to lobby successfully must take the needs of parliamentarians into account, according to Geiser. These expect competence, high-quality information and transparency from a good lobbyist. The last point is also an aftermath of the Markwalder affair, Geiser said" (English translation from German original NZZ 12.11.2015).

transparency rules and a code of conduct for its members[25]. This self-regulation has been strengthened over time, with a publicly viewable register posted on their website, in which all lobbyists disclose their principals and employers[26]. SPAG recommends that parliamentarians adopt similar regulation in the Federal Parliament in the form of an accreditation system[27], which is already in use for journalists. Clear rules, such as the mentioned lobbying register (see above), could help to lead the profession out of the dirty corner [28] and to improve the image of the lobbyist. Lobbying has become an indispensable part of today's political decision-making process in Switzerland[29].

Risk of Corruption (10)

Under current regulation, party financing, the militia system and the badge bazaar offer risks for corruption. For example, Transparency International (like GRECO and OSCE) expresses concern about the lack of regulation of party financing and calls an undeclared donation a bribe[30]. A lobbyist explains to the NZZ the problem of access to the federal palace. "If you want access to the federal palace, you become a supplicant. You must rely on the goodwill of the parliamentarian. This creates dependencies – and increases the danger of corruption. Concrete quid pro quos are rare and offers of a financial nature are only rumors. But the appearance of dirty business remains"[31]. And politicians' mandates are not without controversy either. For example, there have been several lobbying scandals involving politicians who apparently allowed themselves to be paid for votes (→ Chapter 2.3.3.

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[25] "This requires that the lobbyists themselves first create more transparency. The SPAG code of conduct, which was adopted at the founding meeting, states that lobbying activities must be carried out openly and be easily recognizable as such. A five-member Professional Ethics Committee, chaired by former Council of States member René Rhinow, monitors compliance with the code of conduct". (English translation from German original NZZ 17.2.2001).

[26] "The aim of this self-regulation is to promote acceptance and recognition of lobbying activities among the general public and vis-à-vis politicians and the administration. In order to achieve this, lobbyists who wish to become and remain members of the SPAG must disclose all interests that have an influence on the democratic process" (English translation from German original NZZ 11.3.2014).

[27] "The board of the lobbyists' organization makes no secret of the fact that it would like to make recommendations to the authorities on the accreditation of lobbyists. Expulsion from the lobbyists' association could subsequently lead to a withdrawal of the Federal House accreditation. The SPAG has not yet sought active contact with authorities on this issue, as association president Müller says on request. "We do not want to (pressure or influence?)parliamentarians, but rather to give them time to assess the effect of the new rules and the impact of the new code of conduct" (English translation from German original NZZ 17.6.2019).

[28]"Lobbyists want to get out of the closet" (English translation from German original NZZ 11.3.2014).

[29] "Lobbying has become an indispensable part of today's political decision-making process in Switzerland. Clear rules can help to bring the image of lobbying out of the shadow of dubiousness and to adapt its perception to its actual political importance" (English translation from German original NZZ 22.5.2013).

[30] "For Transparency International, undeclared party donations are by definition a form of bribery" (English translation from German original NZZ 30.4.2011).

[31] "Anyone who wants access to the Federal Palace becomes a supplicant. "You have to rely on the goodwill of parliamentarian", says a former lobbyist. This creates dependencies – and increases the risk of corruption. Concrete quid pro quos are rare and offers of a financial nature are only rumors. But the appearance of dirty deals remains" (English translation from German original NZZ 17.6.2019).

Lobbying in the Public Debate of Switzerland). For this reason, Lukas Reimann (SVP) called on his colleagues in the Council to disclose their vested interests in a motion in 2011[32].

Democracy (7)

"Lobbying is part of democracy. But please: according to transparent and objective rules, not according to discretion and arbitrariness. Anything else is not worthy of Switzerland's democratic tradition." This is what Thomas Borer, a former diplomat and one of the country's best-known lobbyists, says in a guest commentary in the NZZ[33]. The democracy argument is also used after the two lobbying scandals around Peter Hess (2001) and Christa Markwalder (2015). In a guest commentary, political scientist Georg Lutz declares that "the complete lack of transparency is harmful to democracy"[34]. He compares Switzerland with the U.S. and speculates that the per capita flow of money is likely to be comparable. However, even if transparency is seen as a self-evident part of a democracy, a demarcation cannot be drawn between what is public and what is non-public, i.e. private. For this reason, this argument is all too often invalidated by the argument for privacy (→ Chapter 5.2.1.2 *Contra Arguments Transparency Regulation*). For this reason, a citizen in the spirit of democracy demands clear rules for disclosure obligations[35].

International Pressure (6)

Switzerland is regularly criticized by international organizations for its non-transparent regulation. GRECO, which reprimands Switzerland in three articles, is leading the way. Until 2015, a so-called non-compliance procedure was underway in which the Federal Council was supposed to report to GRECO on further steps to regulate party financing in Switzerland[36].

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[32] "It's time to speak plainly about the entanglement and encrustation of Swiss politics," writes SVP National Councilor Lukas Reimann. Many politicians no longer represent the interests of the country and its people, but those of their financial backers. So Reimann demands: "Colleagues, disclose your vested interests" (English translation from German original NZZ 23.2.2011).

[33] "Lobbying is part of democracy. But please: according to transparent and objective rules, not according to discretion and arbitrariness. Anything else is not worthy of Switzerland's democratic tradition" (English translation from German original NZZ 2.3.2018).

[34] "Harmful to democracy, on the other hand, is the complete lack of transparency about the flow of money in politics. The funds that flow into Swiss politics are considerable. If one were to add up the money spent on all election and voting campaigns and on lobbying as well as mandates that parliamentarians receive by virtue of their office, then the per capita expenditure on politics would probably be comparable to the sums that flow into politics in the U.S." (English translation from German original NZZ 15.12.2010).

[35] "The "case" of Peter Hess shows clearly enough that a comprehensive duty of disclosure for parliamentarians is necessary. This is not about protecting personal rights, but about transparency in the political process" (English translation from German original NZZ 27.2.2001).

[36] "At the federal level, the issue of party financing is currently being imposed on from outside, by GRECO (Group of States against Corruption). GRECO is urging Switzerland to regulate the financing of political parties. At the moment, a so-called non-compliance procedure. By the end of March 2015, the Federal Council must inform GRECO on how to proceed" (English translation from German original NZZ 9.9.2014).

Also, OSCE comes forward with criticism about the same topic[37]. And Transparency International Switzerland demands a legislative footprint for every transaction, so that it becomes comprehensible who has influenced the law and where. In general, in the case of Switzerland, where party financing and lobbying are not regulated, it remains difficult to understand which party influenced which decision-making process. Thomas Borer points out in a guest commentary that the conditions for participation in the political process in other countries are subject to strict regulations[38].

Left-Wing Parties (2)

As the analysis of the actors (→ Chapter 5.2.2 *Between 2000 and 2019, more Proponents have spoken out in favor of more Transparency in Lobbying than Opponents defending the status-quo*) makes clear, it is mainly left-wing parties and organizations that are in favor of more transparency. The divide between opponents (→ Chapter 5.2.1.2 *Contra Arguments Transparency Regulation*) and supporters runs to the left of center. The Green Liberals are voting unanimously in favor of a transparency bill[39] and the orientation of the Green Party and the SP is also clear[40]. This confirms a trend that was not so clear at first glance. After all, the initiators of parliamentary initiatives include many civil and right-wing politicians. Andrea Caroni (FDP) and Lukas Reimann (SVP) are examples of those who, along with Didier Berberat (SP), launch the most initiatives.

Role of Media (2)

René Zeller and Markus Häfliger, two journalists who have been dealing with the topic for years (→ Chapter 5.1.3 *Media coverage of Lobbying and Transparency mainly takes place through internal editorial work*) twice expressed what role they (and thus the NZZ) intend to

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[37] "The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has also made the following statements about party financing on several occasions" (English translation from German original NZZ 17.12.2019).

[38] "Such a public list would also be useful for Switzerland. The conditions for participation must be subject to strict requirements. For example, lobbyists must comply with clear regulations that require them, among other things, to disclose the motivation for the contract or the client. Those who can prove their identity in this way should be granted access authorization by the parliamentary services in the future. A similar practice is in place in France, where lobbyists are only granted access on a daily basis. Germany, on the other hand, achieves a numerical count of lobbyists by limiting the number of members represented per association or lobbying firm. Lobbyists who violate the rules, e.g. do not properly publish their mandates, must be warned and be banned in the event of a repeat offence" (English translation from German original NZZ 2.3.2018).

[39] "The Greens, the SP and the Green Liberals, on the other hand, voted unanimously in favor of the bill" (English translation from German original NZZ 3.12.2019).

[40] "In view of the approaching ballot, however, the ranks are closing. At a joint session, SP, the Greens and the trade union federation called for the canton of Aargau to take a pioneering role in transparency throughout Switzerland" (English translation from German original NZZ 9.9.2014).

take in the discourse. Zeller criticizes that the parliament is incapable of imposing rules on itself[41]. Häfliger appeals to the watchdog function of the media, saying that media must remain vigilant and point out abuses[42]. The fact that the media are in favor of the transparent regulation of lobbying could also have led to a tendency for reporting to be transparency-friendly. In 66.9% of reports (if we exclude the neutral arguments), the argument is for, not against a more transparent lobbying landscape in Switzerland.

Transparent Administration (2)

This chapter is distinct from the regulation of lobbying, as it deals with transparency in the Swiss administration. In 2000, the then Vice Chancellor Achille Casanova (CVP) announced that transparent access to official documents could be seen as a confidence-building measure ("Making politics more transparent would serve democracy")[43]. This argumentation only occurs in the year 2000 and can be ignored for the overall discourse on lobbying and transparency. The statements of the Vice Chancellor are particularly interesting because his argumentation "Transparency serves democracy" is not heard again by any authority in the further course of the discourse. The Federal Council opposes transparency demands from parliament and the international community in several examples (→ Chapter 5.2.1.2 *Contra Arguments Transparency Regulation*).

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[41] "The question of who grants the lobbyists access is secondary. The real problem is the lack of transparency. Today, employees of lobbying agencies are allowed into the Federal Parliament without it being open whose interests they represent. Once inside, they move around the anterooms to power without a code of conduct. The fact that the Council of States does not want to introduce rules here is an anachronism in the age of transparency" (English translation from German original NZZ 15.3.2012).

[42] "And we media professionals must remain uncomfortable – according to the motto: Whoever is instrumentalized clandestinely in the Federal Parliament and gets caught as an uninformed letter carrier, has only himself to blame" (English translation from German original NZZ 7.5.2015).

[43] "Vice Chancellor Achille Casanova, who as government spokesman is the supreme guardian of the flow of information in the Federal Parliament, spoke of a confidence-building measure. Making politics more transparent would serve democracy. Against this background, citizens are to be given the same opportunities as media representatives or lobbyists: every person is to be granted the right to access official documents without having to prove a special interest" (English translation from German original NZZ 2.4.2000).

5.2.1.2 Contra Arguments Transparency Regulation

All 92 negative statements on the topic of lobbying and transparency can be reduced to 10 core arguments against stricter regulation of lobbying and outside influence on parliamentarians (Figure 28). These arguments are presented in small chapters and embedded in the research context.

Contra Arguments Transparency (90 Arguments)
Regulation (20)
Militia System (18)
Competition (13)
Proposal Rejected (13)
Privacy (8)
SPAG Problems (7)
Center-Right (6)
Federal Council (3)
Intransparent PR Agency (1)
People (1)

Figure 28: Contra Arguments Transparency

Regulation (20)

The biggest obstacle to creating greater transparency in lobbying is the question of what rules should apply if a transparency initiative comes into force? The main argument of the opponents is that there cannot be complete transparency in the political system and that it can only be enforced if a disproportionately large control effort is made to verify complete and correct disclosure. Thus, an annual financial check for parties, politicians and candidates would be a by-product of their well-intentioned commitment to the common good[44]. The accreditation system for lobbyists is also criticized because of the proposed regulatory method. Many parliamentarians doubt effective implementation, question criteria for permanent or temporary access[45], or doubt the impact and enforcement of quotas that can

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[44] "The government council also sees practical problems with implementation. For example, a disproportionately large control effort and expensive mechanisms would be necessary to enforce full disclosure of financial interests. In addition to candidates, elected officeholders would also have to undergo an annual financial check" (English translation from German original NZZ 9.9.2014).

[45] "The opponents of the proposal, who want to retain the current "goddess system" (each parliamentarian is issued two admission cards) regardless of whether they are given to acquaintances, relatives or lobbyists), argue, among other things, that it would be difficult to implement central accreditation. How and according to what criteria should decisions be made about temporary or permanent access to the lobby hall? (English translation from German original" NZZ 22.1.2014).

be granted to lobbyists[46]. Overall, therefore, an added value through regulation is discounted[47].

Militia System (18)

Militia work is understood to be a secondary occupation that is performed in the interest of the community without or at most for a modest compensation. This applies to organizations such as the fire department or expert commissions as well as to parliamentarians in the Federal Parliament who have a regular occupation in addition. This leads to synergies between politics and business and promotes the mutual trust and understanding on which a successful state is based[48]. The sideline nature of politics reduces financial dependence, which leads to the politician politicking more independently than if they were dependent on re-election[49]. On the other hand, a militia politician represents not only party-political interests but also other interests that can be traced back to their primary profession, which turns parliament into a large, non-transparent lobbying organization[50]. This leads to the fact that certain political decisions can no longer be explained a felt network with a Helvetic air[51]. In the eyes of parliamentarians, the advantages of the militia system obviously outweigh the disadvantages, and they resist any transparency efforts. If the lack of transparency is

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[46] "A system in which a limited number of lobbyists would only receive temporary access permits is, in the view of the SPK majority, half-baked and too complicated. "Who would set these quotas?" asked Föhn. "Would it just be the quickest ones that get in?" (English translation from German original NZZ 17.3.2017).

[47] "From a liberal point of view, the Aargauer Zeitung therefore sees "not the slightest added value" in additional legislation. (English translation from German original NZZ 17.3.2017) ".

[48] "By militia work we mean everything that is done by Swiss citizens at all levels of government on a part-time basis and for at most modest remuneration in the interest of the community, whether in parliaments and executives or in the innumerable state-related bodies such as school boards, audit committees, fire departments, corporate councils or expert commissions. The strengths of this system are obvious. For example, it promotes the important interlinking of civil society and the state. Those who spend too much time under the parliamentary dome, for example, fall into a kind of bubble that over time begins to distort their perception of reality outside the dome. Responsibility at work, contacts at the workplace, or participation in a club give politicians a sense of groundedness by constantly instilling them with the reality of life. Conversely, everyday dialogue in the professional environment also creates understanding for politics. Both promote trust, and trust is the basis of every successful state" (English translation from German original NZZ 4.11.2019).

[49] "It is also important that non-re-election does not pose an existential threat to the genuine militia parliamentarian. This makes him more internally independent and less susceptible to pure opportunism. In the case of the professional politician, the understandable concentration on re-election will always consciously or unconsciously come into conflict with his orientation towards the common good" (English translation from German original NZZ 4.11.2019).

[50] "Another problem is the representation of interests. It is clear that in addition to party-political interests, other interests shaped by the main profession also flow into politics via militia politicians. Thus, a militia parliament is always to a certain extent a lobbyist organization. This has often been criticized in recent times. But the advantages of dovetailing politics with constantly updated life experience far outweigh its disadvantages. But they come at a price: You have to know where someone stands, what mandates are involved, where the sympathies lie. This can be taken into account when assessing the work of parliamentarians. But this also makes the tension between the forces in parliament visible, where the various interests have to balance each other out through diversity. Then you know very quickly who also takes higher-level interests into account and to what extent" (English translation from German original NZZ 4.11.2019).

[51] "Let's not fool ourselves. There are no independent parliamentarians in the federal councils. From left to right, tangible interests are represented. Reto Wehrli, a retiring member of the National Council of the Christian Democratic Party (CVP), recently summed up the battle of the lobbyists in the National Council and the Council of States as follows: "Certain political decisions and developments can no longer be explained without a felt network with a Helvetic air." That is the price of our militia system" (English translation from German original NZZ 14.10.2011).

abolished, there is apparently the threat of state funding of political parties, as it would no longer be possible to find donors willing to publicly support parties[52]. Or, no more voluntary candidates could be found, should a disclosure requirement for politicians be enforced[53].

Competition (13)

Lobbyists do not have a good reputation in the Federal Parliament. This is partly due to parliamentarians, who make it difficult for lobbyists to gain any legitimacy in the Federal Parliament. Thus, the list of reasons why lobbyists cannot get regulated access to the Federal Parliament is exceptionally long (and would therefore go beyond the scope of this overview if listed individually). Some politicians argue that the work of the lobbyist is overestimated[54]. Others emphasize that regulation does not bring the desired effect. Many parliamentarians are apparently bothered by the number of lobbyists in the Federal Parliament and would prefer to deny them access altogether[55]. But this "red herring" to prevent regulation of the lobbying industry in the Federal House has a lot to do with power[56]. Assuming that parliamentarians are the biggest lobbyists[57], it is obvious that parliamentarians do not want any additional competition in the Federal Parliament. This is not only about favors from lobbyists to get an access badge from a parliamentarian. It is above all about the fact that parliamentarians themselves prefer to be hired directly by interest groups[58]. And about

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[52] "DP spokesman Christian Weber believes that more transparency would amount to state party financing in the medium term. He is less concerned that his party would be less attractive to voters if the sources of funding had to be disclosed. On the other hand, a large proportion of donations would stay away, Weber is sure" (English translation from German original NZZ 24.10.2007).

[53] "The demands from the left go much too far for the bourgeoisie. They fear that the already difficult search for candidates for municipal and cantonal offices will be made even more difficult" (English translation from German original NZZ 9.9.2014).

[54] "Rudolf Joder (SVP., Bern) supports the deletion motion of his group colleague Weyeneth. The importance of lobbyists should not be overestimated. For the SVP, there is no need for action here" (English translation from German original NZZ 3.10.2001).

[55] "Reduce the presence of lobbyists" (English translation from German original NZZ 30.10.2016).

[56] "In this topsy-turvy world, in which lobbyists demand more transparency and parliamentarians deny it, it is about power. Power over access to the Federal Parliament, which the members of the National Council and the Council of States do not want to be deprived of. There is often talk of fears that too many and unprofessional lobbyists would come into the house. But this point could be clarified within the framework of an independent and clearly defined admission system and of an independent and clearly defined licensing system. But that's just it: This would require parliamentarians to give up their power. Then the stakeholders would no longer be supplicants" (English translation from German original NZZ 17.6.2019).

[57] "Because the biggest lobbyists in the Federal Parliament are the parliamentarians themselves. Thus, the report counts a total of well over 2,000 companies and organizations that are linked to a member of parliament" (English translation from German original NZZ 17.6.2019).

[58] "The deeper reason behind the resistance to more transparency is probably the fear of unwelcome competition. Many members of the National Council and Council of States prefer to be hired by interest groups themselves. They also know that the first step toward transparency often leads to the second. Perhaps the next step would be to demand that parliamentarians disclose not only their offices and memberships, but also their paid mandates" (English translation from German original NZZ 15.3.2012).

whether a lobbying "business model" should be legitimized at the expense of certain benefits for parliamentarians[59].

Proposal Rejected (13)

This category represents the number of articles reporting that a committee or the plenum of the National Council or Council of States rejected a bill for more transparency. In total, all 22 motions were rejected in their original form[60]. This directly reflects how difficult transparency bills have it in parliament, despite all the positive statements from parliamentarians. The most recent vote in the observation period on June 19, 2019, resulted in the National Council not even acting on the bill[61].

Privacy (8)

The demand for transparency of the mandates of parliamentarians is often invalidated by the fact that it is a private matter for politicians and that there is therefore a legitimate interest in data protection[62]. Some opponents call this appeal for more transparency "neither necessary nor practical" and believe that "publication of earnings would primarily encourage voyeurism"[63]. Parliamentarians react similarly regarding the distribution of access cards to the Federal Parliament. This is a highly stylized problem, in which the parliamentarians' own responsibility for who they let into the Federal Palace should suffice[64].

SPAG Problems (7)

The transparency efforts of SPAG show not only the positive effects but also the limits of society. By no means are all stakeholders part of society[65]. In addition, several lobbyists

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[59] "The lobbyists want to use it to cement their own business model," he says. Lobbyists would only gain officially recognized status by changing the system. "The industry thrives on the fact that the badge to the federal house is being inflated" (English translation from German original NZZ 17.6.2019).

[60] "Graf Litscher, Caroni, Berberat, Reimann all did not stand a chance with their proposals" (English translation from German original NZZ 17.6.2019).

[61] "103 votes to 72, the National Council decided not to act on the bill, although more transparency was demanded" (English translation from German original NZZ 19.6.2019).

[62] "CVP spokeswoman Marianne Binder not only believes that reasonable transparency regulations are hardly feasible, but also points out that there is a legitimate interest in data protection, at least for private individuals" (English translation from German original NZZ 24.10.2007).

[63] "neither necessary nor practicable. A publication of the income would primarily encourage voyeurism, Humbel said" (English translation from German original NZZ 2.7.2016).

[64] "SVP National Councilor Gregor Rutz, for example, speaks of a "highly stylized problem". The self-responsibility of parliamentarians as to whom they let into the Federal Parliament is sufficient as a check" (English translation from German original NZZ 17.6.2019).

[65] "A number of agencies, however, never joined SPAG" (English translation from German original NZZ 14.6.2016).

resigned from the association when transparency rules were tightened in 2014 and became incompatible with attorney-client privilege for some lobbyists. [66],[67]

Center-Right (6)

While it is often argued that politicians from all parties can be found to be in favor of stricter transparency provisions in parliament[68], the center-right majority votes against such provisions, thus thwarting any reforms[69]. Recently, however, there seems to be a slight shift in thinking (→ Chapter 5.2.1.1 *Pro Arguments Transparency Regulation*), so that center-right factions no longer voted unanimously against transparency provisions[70] and agreed on a counterproposal for the national transparency initiative[71].

Federal Council (3)

The Federal Council initially expressed a negative stance regarding intransparency in lobbying. In 2014, the Federal Council decided in a statement not to respond to the GRECO's demand for a regulation of party financing. The executive argued that a nationwide regulation would not be compatible with the federal structure of the country and the peculiarities of the militia system[72]. Five years later, the Federal Council changed its mind and agreed to the indirect counterproposal that Parliament drafted in response to the national transparency initiative, indicating that a transparency regulation has a chance with the people (→ Chapter 5.2.1.1 *Pro Arguments Transparency Regulation*)[73].

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[66]"This does not seem to be feasible for everyone. As a comparison of the publicly accessible SPAG membership lists before and after the AGM shows, several lobbyists have left the association in the meantime. SPAG President Fredy Müller confirmed the resignations upon request" (English translation from German original NZZ 17.5.2014).

[67] "Because SPAG's new transparency rules are incompatible with attorney-client privilege, I can no longer participate in SPAG" (English translation from German original NZZ 17.5.2014).

[68] "On behalf of the SVP, Christoph Blocher is signaling support, on behalf of the CVP Christophe Darbellay. SP Group leader Andy Tschümperlin and the former president of the Greens, Ueli Leuenberger, are also on board. Caroni has also successfully lobbied in the liberal parliamentary group. President Philipp Müller and parliamentary group leader Gabi Huber are among the 63 National Council members who have signed the initiative" (English translation from German original NZZ 10.5.2012).

[69] "The government, the conservative parties and business associations have no intention of increasing transparency in the political arena. The delegates' meetings of the SVP, FDP and CVP unanimously rejected the popular initiative without much discussion" (English translation from German original NZZ 9.9.2014).

[70] "The fact that the Free Democrats are divided is shown by the fact that 11 of the 23 group members present in the Council voted against the proposal. There were also some dissenters from the SVP and the center group, the majority of which are against any additional transparency" (English translation from German original NZZ 3.12.2019).

[71] "The Council of States on Monday said yes by 29 votes to 13 with 2 abstentions to a regulation that would make donations to parties and campaigns public. The Council of States thus approved an indirect counter-proposal to the transparency initiative, which was debated for the first time in parliament on Monday" (English translation from German original NZZ 17.12.2019).

[72] "Nevertheless, the Federal Council decided in 2014 not to respond to the GRECO's demands. A nationwide regulation would not be compatible with the federal structure of the country and the peculiarities of the militia system, it argued". (English translation from German original NZZ 10.10.2017).

[73] "The national government, represented by Justice Minister Karin Keller Sutter (FDP), also came out in favor of the counter-proposal prepared by the State Policy Committee of the Council of States. Thus, the Federal Council has changed its mind: Because in August 2018, it

Intransparent PR-Agency (1)

A citizen's comment exonerates National Councilor Christa Markwalder (FDP) and puts the blame for the scandal on the non-transparent PR agency Burson-Marsteller, which apparently concealed the true source of the interpellation from her[74].

People (1)

The federal popular initiative "for disclosure of political income" failed due to an insufficient number of signatures. In 2012, the people did not classify the issue as important enough for it to be put to a referendum[75].

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still clearly rejected a counterproposal. It is possible that the two new members of the government, Keller-Sutter and Viola Amherd (CVP), are the reason for the change of direction. Another reason for supporting the counter-proposal is probably that the popular initiative has a chance in the ballot box" (English translation from German original NZZ 19.12.2019).

[74] "Every day, unions, associations, PR agencies and the administration write proposals on various topics for parliamentarians from the left to the right. The incident is particularly embarrassing for the PR agency, which apparently does not adhere to the highly praised transparency. Christa Markwalder does not deserve this media scolding" (English translation from German original NZZ 9.5.2015).

[75] "Supporters of greater transparency were dampened when the federal popular initiative "For the disclosure of politicians' income (transparency initiative)" failed in December 2012 due to a lack of sufficient signatures. SVP National Councilor Lukas Reimann was among the frontline campaigners at the time, not to the delight of his party" (English translation from German original NZZ 9.5.2015).

5.2.1.3 Neutral Arguments Transparency Regulation

In addition to the positive and negative arguments, 88 statements were rated as neutral (Figure 29). Most of these statements are objective descriptions, sober conclusions or facts that could not be classified in any category. In contrast to the positive and negative arguments, these neutral categories are presented only very briefly in an overview since they play no further role in the analysis.

Neutral Arguments Transparency (88 Arguments)
Regulation (29)
Power (20)
Others (16)
Militia System (13)
Transparency (10)

Figure 29: Neutral Arguments Transparency

Regulation (29)

Many articles inevitably explain the current regulation regarding lobbying and transparency. For example, it is explained which persons gain access to the Federal Parliament[76], how, and based on which law. In addition, care is taken to present lobbying as neutral and realistic as possible and to emphasize that representation of interests is by no means illegal, but that trade unions, business associations, environmental organizations, think tanks, non-profit institutions and multinational corporations influence the political process just as much as foreign organizations, as happened in the scandal surrounding Christa Markwalder (FDP)[77].

Power (20)

Like the regulation category, the power relations in and around parliament are perceived by journalists and explained in a realistic manner. It is pointed out, for example, that a parliamentarian is in a very powerful position with the current regulation, since he or she can, for example, regulate access to the Federal Parliament independently and arbitrarily with the

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[76] "Even more intransparent is the allocation of daily passes. All parliamentarians can grant access to the Federal Palace to two persons per session day in addition to the guest passes, who do not even have to state their function. The cantons and the federal administration also have a strong lobby. Each Secretariat of a department and the Federal Chancellery are entitled to ten permanent access passes. Lobbyists can also be found among former parliamentarians. They receive, if they apply, an access pass for their lifetime. According to the parliamentary services there are currently around 400 such badges in circulation" (English translation from German original NZZ 4.3.2014).

[77] "She is by no means the only parliamentarian under the dome of the Federal Parliament who allows herself to be harnessed by lobbyists. Mind you, what goes on behind the scenes in federal politics is not forbidden. Lobbying is as much part of the political trade as the pulpit is part of the church. Everyone gets involved: Unions and trade associations, environmental organizations and think tanks, non-profit institutions and multinational corporations, homeland protectors and Kazakhs" (English translation from German original NZZ 7.5.2015).

badge system[78]. In addition, people who have a badge from a parliamentarian are not bound by any house rules and there is no possibility of sanctions[79].

Others (16)

This is the collection vessel for all categories that could not be assigned. For example, we find Josef Bürge (CVP), the mayor of Baden, a larger town in the Canton of Aargau, who was annoyed about unclean communication regarding a motion that would have required more transparency from executive representatives[80]. Furthermore, there are statements on the national interest (which cannot be determined[81]), on development aid[82] or on other topics. This is because the coded articles also contain sections that only touched on the topic marginally or digressed into the topic but were still considered relevant overall.

Militia System (13)

As in the previous categories, the militia system and its importance for Switzerland is described. Thus, the resulting strong interdependence of state and economy is explained. In this context, its advantages and limitations are also discussed without making a final judgment as to whether it would make sense to regulate lobbying or not. In many reports, there is talk of not being able to have the "nickel and dime" – by which is meant a completely transparent militia system[83].

Transparency (10)

The transparency category contains many aspects of actual transparency. For example, the administration became more transparent in the early years of the new millennium[84], the

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[78] "The current access system for lobbyists to the Federal House is prone to corruption and creates problematic dependencies" (English translation from German original NZZ 20.6.2019).

[79] "Thanks to their Federal House badge, they can carry their interests into parliament at their whim – without rules of conduct, without control, without the possibility of sanctions" (English translation from German original NZZ 4.3.2014).

[80] "It does not show political decency to inform the media first and only afterwards the addressee about an inquiry, Bürge said. The city council had received the letter only after an article to that effect had appeared in the "Tages-Anzeiger" ten days earlier". (English translation from German original NZZ 1.3.2001).

[81] "There is no predetermined national interest! There is no theoretical, a priori ascertainable point in a political space that could be presented as the country's interest" (English translation from German original NZZ 1.3.2001).

[82] "Development aid promotes corrupt, incompetent governments, it prevents reforms and damages democracy" (English translation from German original NZZ 23.3.2016).

[83] "The proximity to individual interest groups is due to the militia principle. There are only two possibilities: Either parliamentarians resign all ties of interest after their election, like a federal councilor. Or they remain militia parliamentarians and retain their ties of interest. You can't have the nickel and the dime" (English translation from German original NZZ 27.8.2015).

[84] "Vice Director at the Federal Office of Justice, admitted at the media briefing that the restrictive legal terms are formulated vaguely. However, the framework law is primarily intended to provide an impetus. The decisive factor will be how internal administrative practice develops. Casanova's comment that an intellectual paradigm shift was needed at the administrative level was aimed in the same direction" (English translation from German original NZZ 2.4.2000).

advent of the Internet made some processes more transparent[85] and there was also talk about making a meeting topic more transparent because of its complexity[86]. Since none of the topics were found to have valence with respect to the research topic, all these arguments were classified as neutral, even if they were about the topic of transparency itself.

5.2.1.4 The development of arguments about lobbying and transparency between 2000 and 2019

To examine the arguments and their development over time, all arguments were listed in a timeline of the observation period (2000-2019) (Figure 30). It can be seen, analogous to Figure 26, that the arguments increased from the first half (2000-2009) to the second half of the observation period (2010-2019), both on the positive side and on the negative side.

Pro Arguments Transparency Regulation

The pro arguments can be divided into two groups. First, those that occur constantly throughout the entire observation period and second, those that occur occasionally.

To the first group, seen in both the first and second part of the observation period, belongs the argument *Democracy*, which occurs sporadically (2001/2010/2012/2014/2015/2018) with low intensity. The *Image Lobbyist* is also discussed in 2001 and occurs again in 2013-2015 with high intensity. The *Perception of Transparency* occurs almost constantly from 2001, 2007, 2010, 2012, and 2015-2019, indicating that a change in the transparency debate was already expected in the early years of the observation period. The claim that *Members of Parliamentarians are not Transparent* had its initial peak in the years of lobbying scandals (2001/2015), when it was argued 13 (2001) respectively 16 times (2015). In other years, however, the argument does not disappear, but remains a main source of argumentation in total. The *Lobbying Register* is the most frequent argument but occurs only once in the first part of the observation period. From 2012 onward, the discourse around a *Lobbying Register* develops into the dominant topic.

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[85] "The internet is the tool that should be used much more actively with regard to the principle of public access. Among other things, the explanatory report on the Federal Law on Civil Procedure mentions a central register of official documents, which should be made available both on the internet and in the administration's internal IT-network" (English translation from German original NZZ 2.4.2010).

[86] "Transparency, for its part, also depends on the extent to which a political object is technically transparent". (English translation from German original NZZ 14.10.2011).

The other arguments are added during the discourse only sporadically. The *Transparent Administration* is never reported on again after 2000. The *Role of the Media* is mentioned selectively in 2012 and 2016. The role of the *Left-Wing Parties* comes up only later in the discourse, in 2014 and 2019. *International Pressure* does not build until around 2014. *The Risk of Corruption* argument builds with some intensity starting in 2011. And the demand for transparent *Party Funding* first appears in reporting in 2007 and regularly from 2011 onward.

In general, it can be said that the most important arguments emerge early in the discourse but have different peaks. The *Lobbying Register* becomes very dominant from 2012 on. The fact that *Members of Parliamentarians are not Transparent* is the main topic, especially in the two years dominated by lobbying scandals (2001, 2015). And the demand for transparent *Party Funding* gains importance from 2007 on, but mostly remains stuck in the background of more important issues. Overall, the question of whether the arguments have remained the same over time must be answered negatively. The issue surrounding the *Lobbying Register* is dominant only in the second part of the observation period. The lack of transparency from *Members of Parliament* is addressed in the first part, but not followed up thereafter. All other topics come up from time to time, but they have more of an accompanying character than being a topic themselves.

Contra Arguments Transparency Regulation

As with the pro arguments, the contra arguments can be divided into two groups. First, those that occur constantly throughout the entire observation period, and second, those that occur occasionally.

The dominant arguments *Regulation* (21 arguments), *Militia System* (18), *Competition* (14), *Proposal Rejected* (13), *Privacy* (8) and *Center Right* (6) occur both in the first half of the observation period and in the second half. What is particularly fascinating is that the argument *Regulation* dominates consistently in many years. The *Militia System* argument also occurs in a total of nine years (and is absent only in the five of the years). The situation is similar with the argument *Competition*, which occurs in seven years. It is also clear in how many years parliamentary *Proposals* regarding more transparency were rejected (2002/2013/2014/2015/2016/2017/2019).

It is noticeable that especially the arguments which occur less frequently tend to occur in the second half of the observation period. These include the *People* argument (2014), the *Non-Transparent PR Agency* (2015), the *Federal Council* (2017-2019), and the *SPAG Problems* (2014/2016).

Overall, it can be summed up that the most important counterarguments for more transparency in lobbying appear consistently throughout the observation period. Although less than half as many counterarguments as pro-arguments are articulated in the observation period, there are years in which the opponents gain the upper hand or are evenly matched (2002/2006/2007/2017). Overall, the question of whether the arguments have remained the same over time can be answered positively.

Answering the sub-hypotheses

Overall, it can be said that the most important arguments in favor of more transparency in lobbying have a much higher coverage than the counterarguments but are less constant. Among those in favor, the *Lobbying Register* becomes an issue in 2012. *Parliamentarians*' lack of transparency is criticized in lobbying scandals (2001/2015). And *Party Funding* remains rather a background noise at low intensity in comparison. Against this, a constant resistance is forming, with similarly high reporting values over the years: The question of regulation, the *Militia System* and *Competition* are the main arguments that are regularly used as soon as the existing system is attacked. The sub-hypothesis H2.1 (*The pro and contra arguments of the actors have not changed between 2000 and 2019*) is therefore only accepted for counterarguments. The pro arguments show a different distribution depending on the year and phase and are less constant.

Argument	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Transparent Administration (2)	2																			
Role Media (2)												1			1					
Left-Wing Parties (2)														1						1
International Pressure (6)														1				1	2	2
Democracy (7)		2									1		1	1	1				1	
Risk of Corruption (10)											4	1			2					3
Image Lobbyist (13)		3												1	4	5				
Perception of Transparency (15)		1						2			1		1			4	1	1	2	2
Party Funding (16)								1				3	2	1	2	1		1	3	2
MP not Transparent (41)		13	1									3			1	16	4		2	1
Lobbying Register (68)		1										4	6		16	13	13	4	1	10
	2	20	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	2	10	10	8	28	41	18	7	11	21
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
	1	10	5	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	2	5	3	16	8	11	7	2	16
Regulation (20)	1	3					1	1					1	2	3			3		5
Militia System (18)		3	3					1				2	1	1	1	2				4
Competition (13)		3	1										2		2		3			2
Proposal Rejected (13)			1										1		3	1	3	2		2
Privacy (8)								1								3	2	1		1
SPAG Problems (7)															4		3			
Center-Right (6)		1												2	1				1	1
Federal Council (3)																		1	1	1
Intransparent PR-Agency (1)																1				
People (1)															1					

Figure 30: Overview of the Arguments and their Development in the Period of the Discourse

5.2.2 Between 2000 and 2019, more Proponents have spoken out in favor of more Transparency in Lobbying than Opponents defending the status-quo.

In the total of 360 coded statements about lobbying and transparency, there are 182 positive, supporting statements and 90 negative, refusing statements regarding more transparency in lobbying in Switzerland (88 statements are classified as neutral and not further developed in this work). Depending on the actor, the results look different. However, since there are more than twice as many positive than negative statements in the sample, it is not surprising that almost all actors support the desire for more transparency in lobbying in Switzerland (Figure 31). No opponents are found among *Mass Media* (21:0), *Clubs* (6:0) and *Business Corporations* (2:0). More opponents can be found among *Political Parties* (77:68), *Associations* (35:2), *PR/PA Agencies* (11:7), *Academic Organizations* (12:1) and *Citizens* (8:1). The largest group by far to speak out, the *Political Parties*, is almost evenly balanced with 77 speakers in favor of more transparency and 68 against. The *Government* is the only group with a negative balance. There are 11 negative arguments against 9 positive ones. In this chapter, we will examine all actors according to who spoke (number of actors) and which actors use which arguments in the discourse we derived in the previous chapter (→ Chapter 5.2.1 *The pro and contra Arguments of the Actors have not changed between 2000 and 2019*). Only the actor *Corporation* is treated separately, as it is the answer to the third sub-hypothesis of the chapter (→ Chapter 5.2.3 *Between 2000 and 2019, Economic Actors express their support for transparent Regulations*).

Figure 31: Positive vs. negative argumentation per actor about Lobbying and Transparency

5.2.2.1 The list and argumentation of each actor about lobbying and transparency

Actors are examined in the following order: *Political Party*, *Association*, *Mass Media*, *Government*, *PR/PA Agency*, *Academic Organization*, *Citizen*, *Club*, *Foundation*.

5.2.2.1.1 Political Party

The *Political Parties* are by far the most vocal with 145 (53.3%) out of 272 positive or negative statements being attributable to parliamentarians. The positive share (77 statements) outweighs the negative (68 statements). Both the group of parliamentarians in favor of regulating lobbying and the group of opponents include representatives of all major parties (Figure 32). Overall, the number of players on the positive side predominates, with 31 different parliamentarians speaking out. For the opponents, there are 24 parliamentarians. The most vocal are Andrea Caroni (11), Didier Berberat (5) and Nadine Masshardt (4), who are also launching several initiatives in parliament (→ Chapter 2.3.3. *Lobbying in the Public Debate of Switzerland*). As already explained in Chapter 5.2.1 *The pro and contra arguments of the Actors have not changed between 2000 and 2019*, there is a left-wing majority (PDA, SP, Green Party) for more transparency and a center-right majority (CVP, FDP, BDP, SVP) for the status quo, although supporters and opponents come from almost all parties.

Name of Party	Positive	Negative
PDA	Josef Zisyadis (1)	
SP	Didier Bererat (5)	Boris Banga (1)
	Nadine Masshardt (4)	
	Andy Tschümperli (2)	
	Angelo Barrile (1)	
	Edith Graf-Litscher (1)	
	Jürg Caflisch (1)	
	Pascal Bruderer (1)	
	Pierre-Yves Maillard (1)	
	Regine Aeppli (1)	
	Roger Nordmann (1)	
	Ruth-Gaby Vermot (1)	
	Sascha Antenen (1)	
	Stéphane Rossini (1)	
	Vreni Hubmann (1)	
Green Party	Cécile Bühlmann (1)	Louis Schelbert (1)
	Balthasar Glättli (1)	
	Ueli Leuenberger (1)	
GLP	Kathrin Bertschy (1)	Kathrin Bertschy (1)
	Tiana Moser (1)	Verena Diener (1)
CVP	Christophe Darbellay (1)	Franz Wicki (1)

	Philipp Stähelin (1)	Gerhard Pfister (1)
		Marco Romano (1)
		Peter Hess (1)
		Ruth Humbel (2)
		Toni Eberhard (1)
FDP	Andrea Caroni (11)	Ruedi Noser (2)
	Doris Fiala (1)	Christian Weber (1)
	Felix Gutzwiler (1)	Erika Foster (1)
	Gabi Huber (1)	Jacques-Simon Egli (1)
		Karl Tschuppert (1)
		Kurt Fluri (1)
		Matthias Jauslin (1)
		Phillipp Müller (1)
		Rolf Büttiker (1)
BDP		Martin Landolt (1)
SVP	Lukas Reimann (5)	Gregor Rutz (1)
	Christoph Blocher (1)	Peter Föhn (1)
	Peter Keller (1)	Roland Eberle (2)
	Ullrich Schlüer (1)	Rudolf Joder (1)
Independent	Thomas Minder (2)	
Others	National Council/Council of States/Commission (23)	National Council/Council of States/Commission (41)

Figure 32: List of Parliamentarians who speak in favor of or against more Transparency in Lobbying in Switzerland

In Figure 33 we can see the dominant topics of the proponents and opponents in parliament. Dominant arguments for the supporters are the *Lobbying Register* (29), which mainly appears from 2012, and their own *intransparency* in lobbying mandates (23), which is increasingly addressed during the lobbying scandals (2001/2015). These are also the topics for which most of the initiatives are launched in the subject area (→ Chapter 2.3.3 *Lobbying in the Public Debate of Switzerland*). Scattered throughout are the topics *Party Financing* (8), *Perception of Transparency* (5), *Image Lobbyist* (4), *Left-Wing Parties* (2), *Democracy* (2), *Risk of Corruption* (1). Among the opponents, the four topics *Regulation* (17), *Proposal Rejected* (13), *Competition* (12), *Militia System* (11), and *Privacy* (8) dominate, and are voiced constantly during the intensive years of discourse. Further, *Center-Right* (6) and *People* (1) occur. In total, the parliamentarians gather 68 (73.9%) counterarguments on themselves out of a total of 92 in the whole sample.

Argument	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Transparent Administration (0)																				
Role Media (0)																				
Left-Wing Parties (2)																1				1
International pressure (0)																				
Democracy (2)		1													1					
Risk of Corruption (1)												1								
Image Lobbyist (4)		1														3				
Perception of Transparency (5)								1				1				2		1		
Party Funding (8)								1							2	1		1	1	2
MP not Transparent (26)		8	1									3			1	10	2			1
Lobbying Register (29)		1											3	2	4	6	5	4	1	3
Total	0	11	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	4	4	2	8	23	7	5	3	7
Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Total	0	8	5	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	1	5	1	11	7	8	6	1	11
Regulation (17)		3					1	1					1	1	3			3		4
Militia system (11)		1	3					1				1	1		1	2				1
Competition (12)		3	1										2		1		3			2
Proposal Rejected (13)			1										1		3	1	3	2		2
Privacy (8)								1							3	2	1			1
SPAG Problems (0)																				
Center-Right (6)		1													2	1			1	1
Federal Council (0)																				
Intransparent PR-Agency (0)																				
People (1)															1					

Figure 33: Overview of the Arguments of Parliamentarians and their Development in the Period of the Discourse

5.2.2.1.2 Association

SPAG is the most important association participating in the discourse (Figure 34). The association advocates the introduction of a *Lobbying Register* in the Federal Parliament and already publishes a register of its members on its homepage.

	Positive	Negative
	SPAG (34)	SPAG (2)
	Aktion freie Meinungsbildung (1)	

Figure 34: List of Associations who speak in favor of or against more Transparency in Lobbying in Switzerland

From 2013, SPAG actively participates in the discussion about such a register and supports the parliamentarians' initiatives (Figure 35). In addition, it criticizes the badge bazaar, which leads to the statement Members of Parliament (are) not Transparent. The Lobbying Register should also improve the image of the lobbyist. In addition to the 34 positive statements from SPAG, there is a report from "Aktion freie Meinungsbildung" (action free opinion) in 2001, which also advocates more transparency and disclosure. Surprisingly, the two negative arguments also come from SPAG (2014, 2016) These can be justified by the fact that several lobbyists have

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left the association following a tightening of the transparency regulation. This was also interpreted as a "weakening" of the association and transparency efforts, as SPAG cannot convince its own profession of the need for more transparency.

Argument	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Transparent Administration (0)																				
Role Media (0)																				
Left-Wing Parties (0)																				
International Pressure (0)																				
Democracy (0)																				
Risk of Corruption (0)																				
Image Lobbyist (6)		2													4					
Perception of Transparency (1)		1																		
Party Funding (0)																				
MP not Transparent (2)																	1		1	
Lobbying Register (26)														2	8	5	7			4
Total	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	12	5	8	0	1	4
Total (lower)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
Regulation (0)																				
Militia System (0)																				
Competition (0)																				
Proposal Rejected (0)																				
Privacy (0)																				
SPAG Problems (2)															1		1			
Center-Right (0)																				
Federal Council (0)																				
Intransparent PR-Agency (0)																				
People (0)																				

Figure 35: Overview of the Arguments of Associations and their Development in the Period of the Discourse

5.2.2.1.3 Mass media

The mass medium Neue Zürcher Zeitung is clearly one of the transparency advocates. The nine journalists (Figure 36) who have studied the matter in depth call for more transparency in 21 statements in the period from 2001 to 2019 (Figure 37).

	Positive	Negative
	René Zeller (6)	
	Markus Häfliger (4)	
	Markus Senti (3)	
	Lukas Mäder (2)	
	Simon Hehli (2)	
	Christina Neuhaus (1)	
	Daniel Gerny (1)	
	Katharina Fontana (1)	
	Thomas Sägesser (1)	

Figure 36: List of Journalists who speak in favor of or against more Transparency in Lobbying in Switzerland

The most prominent argument is the perception of *Transparency* (5), which is supposed to indicate a change in the transparency discussion. The fact that *Members of Parliament are not Transparent* (4) is addressed in the scandal years of 2001 and 2015. Other arguments directly from the journalist's pen are the *Risk of Corruption* (3), the *Lobbying Register* (3), the *Image Lobbyist* (2), the *Role of the Media* (2), *Democracy* (1) and *Party Funding* (1). No counterarguments were found in the sample.

Argument	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Transparent Administration (0)																				
Role Media (2)													1			1				
Left-Wing Parties (0)																				
International Pressure (0)																				
Democracy (1)													1							
Risk of Corruption (3)													1		2					
Image Lobbyist (2)																2				
Perception of Transparency (5)																2		1	1	1
Party Funding (1)												1								
MP not Transparent (4)		2														2				
Lobbying Register (3)														1		1				1
Total	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	1	2	8	0	1	1	2
Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regulation (0)																				
Militia System (0)																				
Competition (0)																				
Proposal Rejected (0)																				
Privacy (0)																				
SPAG Problems (0)																				
Center-Right (0)																				
Federal Council (0)																				
Intransparent PR-Agency (0)																				
People (0)																				

Figure 37: List of Journalists who speak in favor of or against more Transparency in Lobbying in Switzerland

5.2.2.1.4 Government

The collective term *Government* covers not only the executive branch but also the judiciary and, in an international context, international cooperation bodies. Overall, the opponents of more transparency in lobbying in Switzerland predominate (Figure 38). Former Federal Councilor Kaspar Villiger (4 arguments) justifies his stance with the incompatibility of the militia system, whose advantages outweigh the disadvantages of transparency. The Federal Council is mentioned three times (in the recent past) that it rejects transparent party financing in Switzerland. And Joseph Brügge, mayor of Baden, argues in favor of the militia system, which enables synergies from business and politics.

	Positive	Negative
	GRECO (5)	Kaspar Villiger (4)
	OSCE (2)	Federal Council (3)
	Jaqueline Fehr (1)	Joseph Bürge (2)
	Achille Casanova (1)	Hans Huber (1)
		Luzius Mader (1)

Figure 38: List of Governments/Governing organizations who speak in favor of or against more Transparency in Lobbying in Switzerland

In the overview (Figure 39) the *Militia System* (7) is also the most frequently cited reason for rejecting the transparency petition. On the side of the proponents, it is the international organizations GRECO and OSCE that draw Switzerland's attention above all to the abuses in party financing and the resulting risk of corruption. At the national level, Jaqueline Fehr (SP), member of the Zurich governing council, is in favor of more transparency, as is Achille Casanova (former Federal Council Speaker), who is promoting more transparency in the administration.

Argument	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Transparent Administration (1)	1																			
Role Media (0)																				
Left-Wing Parties (0)																				
International Pressure (4)															1			1		2
Democracy (1)															1					
Risk of Corruption (2)												2								
Image Lobbyist (0)																				
Perception of Transparency (0)																				
Party Funding (1)																			1	
MP not Transparent (0)																				
Lobbying Register (0)																				
Total	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	1	1	2
Total	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	5
Regulation (1)	1																			
Militia System (7)		2												1						4
Competition (0)																				
Proposal Rejected (0)																				
Privacy (0)																				
SPAG Problems (0)																				
Center-Right (0)																				
Federal Council (3)																		1	1	1
Intransparent PR-Agency (0)																				
People (0)																				

Figure 39: Overview of the Arguments of the Government/Governing rganizations and their Development in the Period of the Discourse

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5.2.2.1.5 PR/PA Agency

In total, five lobbyists or representatives of *PR/PA Agencies* (11 statements in total) are in favor of more transparency in lobbying and six representatives of the profession are against it (Figure 40). It is interesting to note that we have three actors who express both positive and negative views on stricter regulation in lobbying. Victor Schmid supports Didier Berberat's proposal (*Lobbying Register*), but also points out that many public affairs agencies are not members of SPAG, thus weakening their influence. Andreas Hugi, founding member of the agency furrerhugi, comments on the topic (2011) that total financial transparency would lead to state party financing and to the abolition of the well-functioning militia system. Five years later (2016), his business partner Lorenz Furrer expresses a positive opinion on the subject and emphasizes that transparency on the part of the agency is a matter of course. Finally, an unidentified lobbyist explains that it would be unthinkable for him to name his clients publicly because they have a trust relationship like a lawyer has to their clients (confidentiality). However, he agrees with the proponents of transparency regulation that a reform of access to the Federal House should be sought.

	Positive	Negative
	Unknown lobbyist (4)	Victor Schmid (2)
	Thomas Borer (3)	Andreas Hugi (1)
	Victor Schmid (2)	Bettina Mutter (1)
	Christian Bertscher (1)	Markus Wyser (1)
	Lorenz Furrer (1)	Stefan Wyer (1)
		Unknown lobbyist (1)

Figure 40: List of Lobbyists or PR/PA agencies who speak in favor of or against more Transparency in Lobbying in Switzerland

The pro and contra arguments of the lobbyist are diverse, while the concentration for contra-arguments is a slightly stronger (SPAG-Problems) (Figure 41).

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Transparent Administration (0)																				
Role Media (0)																				
Left-Wing Parties (0)																				
International Pressure (1)																			1	
Democracy (1)																			1	
Risk of Corruption (2)																				2
Image Lobbyist (0)																				
Perception of Transparency (2)																	1			1
Party Funding (0)																				
MP not Transparent (2)																1			1	
Lobbying Register (3)													1				1			1
Sum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	0	3	4
Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Sum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	0	2	0	0	0
Regulation (0)																				
Militia System (1)												1								
Competition (1)															1					
Proposal Rejected (0)																				
Privacy (0)																				
SPAG Problems (5)															3		2			
Center-Right (0)																				
Federal Council (0)																				
Intransparent PR-Agency (0)																				
People (0)																				

Figure 41: Overview of the Arguments of the PR/PA agencies and their Development in the Period of the Discourse

5.2.2.1.6 Academic Organization

Academic Organizations are in favor of a more transparent lobbying regulation in Switzerland. In total 13 statements from eight different actors over a large part of the observation period from 2000 to 2018 prove this impression (Figure 42). The most frequent demand is for an official *Lobbying Register* (5 arguments) as proposed by SPAG. In addition, positive arguments regarding *Democracy* (1), *Image Lobbyist* (1), *Member of Parliament not transparent* (1), *Party Funding* (1), *Perception of Transparency* (1), and *Transparent Administration* (1) are evident. The only academic opponent for more transparency in lobbying regulation is law professor Felix Uhlmann. He questions if a meaningful regulation is even possible.

	Positive	Negative
	Sabine Etter (4)	Felix Uhlmann (1)
	Fritz Sager & Rahel Willener (2)	
	Georg Lutz (2)	
	Daniel Dettling (1)	
	Martina Caroni (1)	
	Roland Holder & Ulrich Matter (1)	
	Thomas Gees (1)	

Figure 42: List of Academic Representatives who speak in favor of or against more Transparency in Lobbying in Switzerland

5.2.2.1.7 Citizen

With one exception, *Citizens* are in favor of more transparency (8:1) (Figure 43). Main arguments among the eight actors are *Members of Parliament not Transparent* (4), *Democracy* (1), *Lobbying Register* (1), *Perception of Transparency* (1), *Regulation* (1). Elias Maier, the only opponent for more transparency in lobbying blames PR agencies and demands more transparency from lobbyists instead of parliamentarians.

	Positive	Negative
	Claudio Kuster (1)	Elias Maier (1)
	David Weidmann (1)	
	Evelyn Teitler (1)	
	Hans Kaspar Hugentobler (1)	
	Moritz Wandeler (1)	
	People (1)	
	Walter Grob (1)	
	Werner Zürcher (1)	

Figure 43: List of Citizens who speak in favor of or against more Transparency in Lobbying in Switzerland

5.2.2.1.8 Club

Transparency International is the only *Club* to comment on the topic (Figure 44). In total, there are six positive statements in the sample in the period from 2011 to 2019, concerning *Party Funding* (2), the *Risk of Corruption* (2), the *Lobbying Register* (1) or *International Pressure on Switzerland* (1). There are no negative statements.

	Positive	Negative
	Transparency International (6)	

Figure 44: List of Club members who speak in favor of or against more Transparency in Lobbying in Switzerland

5.2.2.1.9 Foundation

Jürg Hurter is the only member of a *Foundation*, the Pro Area Foundation, who allowed himself to be quoted (Figure 45). In his opinion, politicians deliberately mislead the people by not declaring mandates. He expressed himself in the wake of the Peter Hess scandal, who did not declare a mandate of a big tobacco company. Jürg Hurter was interviewed in this context.

	Positive	Negative
	Jürg Hurter – Stiftung Pro Area (1)	

Figure 45: List of Foundations who speak in favor of or against more Transparency in Lobbying in Switzerland

5.2.2.2 A conclusion about all actors that have spoken out in favor of more transparency

In terms of numbers, parliamentarians are the most present actors in the study. The arguments in favor slightly outnumber those against (77:68). In addition, it is evident that both supporters and opponents of more transparent lobbying regulation can be found in all major political parties. In terms of numbers, however, left-wing parties are more in favor of regulation than right-wing parties. Of the other stakeholder groups surveyed, the proponents outweigh the opponents, in some cases by a large margin. There are no opponents among the *Mass Media*, *Clubs* and *Foundations*. Some negative statements can be found among the actors *Association*, *Academic Organization* or *Citizens*. Only two actors are rather balanced. Among *PR/PA Agencies*, some lobbyists are against stricter transparency laws. The Federal Council and former representatives of the national government see stricter regulation as imcompatible with the political culture in Switzerland and thus oppose international bodies calling for more transparency in Switzerland's political financing. Overall, hypothesis H2.2 (*Between 2000 and 2019, more proponents have spoken out in favor of more transparency in lobbying than opponents defending the status-quo*) can be accepted. In total 67 different individuals or institutions argue in favor of transparency regulation and 38 different individuals or institutions argue against it between 2000 and 2019.

5.2.3 Between 2000 and 2019, Economic Actors express their support for transparent Regulations

In theory, it is assumed that *Economic Actors* will advocate for more transparency because investors want to know which parties are supported (Gernet, 2011). In this work, only two positive arguments could be located (Figure 46). In 2012, Mobiliar, Credit Suisse and Raiffeisen stated in response to a request from the Neue Zürcher Zeitung that they intend to disclose the figures on the financing of political parties, voting campaigns and election campaigns in the future (Figure 47). This is mainly thanks to international pressure from the organizations Transparency International and GRECO.

	Positive	Negative
	Mobiliar, Credit Suisse, Raiffeisen (2)	

Figure 46: List of Corporations who speak in favor of or against more Transparency in Lobbying in Switzerland

Transparent administration (0)
Role Media (0)
Left wing parties (0)
International pressure (0)
Democracy (0)
Risk of Corruption (0)
Image Lobbyist (0)
Perception of transparency (0)
Party funding (2) — 2
MP not transparent (0)
Lobbyingregister (0)

0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Regulation (0)
Militia system (0)
Competition (0)
Proposal rejected (0)
Privacy (0)
SPAG problems (0)
Center-Right (0)
Federal Council (0)
Intransparent PR-agency (0)
People (0)

Figure 47: Overview of the Arguments of Corporations and their Development in the Period of the Discourse

Overall, hypothesis 2.3 cannot be confirmed. First, only three companies comment jointly. Second, they only comment on their own behalf and leave the political discussion about more transparency in lobbying untouched. Third, the statement only concerns the year 2012. In the

remaining years, the potentially politically influential players remain quiet as donors and do not participate in the discourse.

5.2.4 Summary and Answering Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis H2, *between 2000 and 2019, the demands for more transparency in lobbying have increased*, can be accepted because the proponents outnumber the opponents in terms of argumentation and number of people/organizations who support more transparency in lobbying regulation over the evaluated time.

In H2.1, *the pro and contra arguments of the actors have not changed between 2000 and 2019*, the three core arguments of the proponents are *Lobbying Register*, *Members of Parliament not Transparent* and *Party Funding*. The three core arguments of the opponents are first, the ambiguity of a possible *Regulation* of lobbying, second, the *Militia System* and third, the *Competition* with lobbyists. It should be noted that the arguments in favor of stricter lobbying regulation are less constant over the observation period. *Party Funding* has been an issue since 2007. The *Lobbying Register* has been increasingly demanded since 2012. And stricter *Regulation for Parliamentarians* is demanded especially after a lobbying scandal (2001/2015). In contrast, the core arguments of the opponents *Regulation*, *Militia System* and *Competition* are constant over time. Therefore, this hypothesis can only be partly accepted.

In H2.2, *between 2000 and 2019, more proponents have spoken out in favor of more transparency in lobbying than opponents defending the status-quo*, 180 statements of supporters and 92 of opponents are collected. This is also reflected in numbers of different people who comment on the topic: In total, 67 different people or organizations are in favor of more transparent regulation of lobbying and 38 people and organizations are against it. The most frequent speakers are politicians (members of the National Council and the Council of States) who, overall, are rather positive about transparency regulation (77:68), but who encounter great political resistance. This suggests that a large majority of parliamentarians who do not speak out on the issue are among the opponents of the idea. However, after our analysis the demand seems to find greater support especially among left-wing parties, although supporters can be found in all major parties. In addition, the idea finds particularly

strong support among the professional association (*Lobbying Register* as main argument), the media (*Perception of Transparency* as main argument) and academics (*Lobbying Register* as main argument). Only the government as an actor expresses its overall opposition to stricter regulation, as it sees this as incompatible with the political culture (*Militia System*) in Switzerland. Overall, the hypothesis is accepted.

Finally, in H2.3, *between 2000 and 2019, economic actors express their support for transparent regulations*, it becomes clear that economic actors do not play a role in the discourse on lobby transparency. The hypothesis is not accepted.

6 Discussion

The aim of this work is the analysis of the development of the public debate about public affairs and transparency in the political sphere of Switzerland between 2000 and 2019. In this chapter, the obtained results of this work are critically reflected on, further developed and confronted with the literature of the subject area. Analogous to the hypotheses examined, we split the discussion into two parts. First, we discuss the results of the first hypothesis, which assumes that serious reports on lobbying and transparency in Switzerland have increased between 2000 and 2019 (→ Chapter 6.1 *Reporting on Lobbying and Transparency has increased*). We then discuss the results of the second hypothesis, which predicted that the pressure for more transparency in lobbying in Switzerland will increase in the same time period (→ Chapter 6.2 *The Argumentation of the Proponents and the Opponents in the Analysis*). The discussion is then summarized in a chapter with the goal of answering the overarching research question (→ Chapter 6.3 *When the People must regulate Parliamentarians because it resists change*). Furthermore, based on the knowledge gained from this work for the period between 2000 and 2019, we venture to forecast the next developments. (→ Chapter 6.4 *Outlook*). Subsequently, the results of the work are critically classified and compared with the existing literature (→ Chapter 6.5 *Contribution*). It must be noted that the data in this study should be treated with a certain degree of caution. This work cannot provide an all-encompassing picture of what happened, as it is subject to certain limitations (→ Chapter 6.6 *Limitations*). In the closing chapter we try to provide researchers with a base for future work in this discipline (→ Chapter 6.7 *Future Research*).

6.1 Reporting on Lobbying and Transparency has increased

The results of the first hypotheses, *between 2000 and 2019, serious reports about lobbying and transparency has augmented*, are evident. Reporting on lobbying and transparency has increased, the reports are gaining in importance in the newspaper studied and they are mainly produced by internal editorial work.

This trend of more reporting on lobbyists has been predicted by the existing literature in several respects. Several macro trends ensure that the former association state of Switzerland, as described e.g. by Kriesi (1980), has disentangled and that companies and interest groups must seek access to politics on their own initiative, as the political field in Switzerland has changed. According to Sciarini (2015b), *Europeanization* ensures that domestic political forces become weaker and political power shifts to the executive and the parliamentary process, as they decide on European policy. This excludes extra-parliamentary forces and leads to the fact that associations and interest groups, which are considered in the domestic political process through the consultation procedure, must seek the direct way to the parliament. Public affairs consultants fill this gap, either as contract lobbyists or as communication experts, to master the increased expectations of the media (*Mediatization*) or the professionalized election campaign (*Polarization*) with the parties and entrepreneurs. We can agree with the authors Hoffmann, Steiner & Jarren (2007) that public affairs consultants are a product of the growing *Professionalization* of the political business. With their service, they build bridges across two cracks that have developed: On the one hand, they mediate between politics and business as lobbyists (*Europeanization*), and on the other hand, they mediate between society and politics as communication consultants (*Mediatization*). Moreover, they could also be regarded as at least complicit in the increasing *Polarization of the Swiss political landscape*, since their professional (and Americanized) communication methods may have enabled an increasing *Polarization* of the political landscape in the first place.

These theses are reflected in the observation period as follows: First, the bilateral agreements with the EU (1999/2004) led to increased exchange with the EU (*Europeanization*). Second, the potential of digital media (Facebook from 2004, Twitter from 2006) unfolded and permanently changed the media landscape (*Mediatization*) (Schade & Künzler, 2010). And third, in 2003 Christoph Blocher won the second seat on the Federal Council for the SVP, which has been the strongest force under the dome of the Federal Parliament since the turn of the millennium (*Polarization*). *Professionalization* is not directly linked to events like other macrotrends but is mentioned several times during the observation period. The effects of these trends are only apparent over the course of the observation period from 2000 to 2019, as they apparently took a little time to manifest the resulting lobbying problem. To be sure, the first articles appear as early as 2001 (Peter Hess lobbying scandal). However, continuous

reporting has only taken place since 2010. The first motion demanding a lobbying register for the Federal Parliament was submitted in 2009 by Lukas Reimann (SVP). As of 2013, SPAG has been calling in the media for a lobbying register to regulate access to the Federal Parliament for interest representatives. This can possibly be explained by the fact that during this period the number of lobbyists in the Federal Parliament increased and crossed a critical threshold that changed the perception of interest representatives. Presumably, an increase in lobbyists meant that parliamentarians were contacted more often, and their workload increased as a result (*Professionalization*). This assumption is supported by a statement from Matthias Aebischer (SP), who demanded in a parliamentary initiative that parliamentarians should be allowed to hire a personal employee to cope with the increasingly complex parliamentary work (Häfliger, 2015).

This complication of political reality leads – as mentioned above – to an increase in the importance of public affairs officers. This can also be seen in the public affairs landscape in Switzerland (→ Chapter 2.2.3 *Public Affairs Landscape in Switzerland*). For example, Nicolussi's (2014a) analysis shows that the majority of all badge holders are lobbyists. In addition, Nicolussi's own analysis of lobbyists' clients makes it clear that there are almost as many lobbyists from communications agencies as there are from associations, and that associations and interest groups together have become the largest client group of communications specialists. These data show that the lobbyist – whether an employee of an agency, or an employee of a large company – has become an important figure in the political process. Many companies (like Swisscom) no longer rely on the actions of the umbrella organizations but influence the political process independently to gain competitive advantages over their competitors (Markwalder, 2005).

Most reports on the topic of lobbying and transparency can be traced back to events. Most articles are about parliamentary initiatives and their results. In many cases, this is followed by an indignant opinion piece by an NZZ journalist criticizing the parliamentary inability to enact effective transparency rules. The greatest resonance is triggered by a lobbying scandal. In the NZZ coverage, there are only two lobbying scandals in the observation period that trigger a big wave of coverage: Peter Hess (2001) and Christa Markwalder (2015) (→ Chapter 2.3.3. *Lobbying in the public debate in Switzerland*). The coverage of Christa Markwalder is

significantly higher than that of Peter Hess. A total of 16 articles (58 arguments) can be traced back to Markwalder's lobbying scandal, compared to only 10 articles (39 arguments) for Peter Hess. The context of the two scandals is interesting. While the Hess scandal remained practically without consequences (registering details of all mandates in the parliamentary office instead of just relevant ones), during the Markwalder-scandal 7 different (unsuccessful) motions were submitted which addressed the core issues (lobbying register, mandates of parliamentarians, party financing). In contrast to 2001, reporting did not level off, but stagnated at a relatively high level and with a high density of arguments per article. This can possibly be explained by the fact that the public's interest in the issue increased considerably after the Markwalder-scandal and that NZZ's internal journalists followed the issue closely from then on. Thus, for example, in 2019, when the last remaining proposal of the Markwalder-scandal was rejected by the parliament, two articles on the front page followed in a short time, which drew attention to this grievance. After all, political promises made after the Markwalders-scandal were not kept by parliamentarians (→ Chapter 6.7 *Future Research*). This increased interest of the general population and journalists in the problem suggests that events will also be closely followed in the future (→ Chapter 6.4 *Outlook*). Nevertheless, lobbying scandals, apart from a high level of reporting and a large echo in the population, have had no influence on the regulation of lobbying transparency in Switzerland so far. This is surprising in two aspects: firstly, because similar scandals in other countries (e.g. Austria) have led to strict lobbying regulations (Köppl, 2017). Secondly, the question arises why the NZZ did not report on the other lobbying scandals that fall within the observation period? This might have further increased the pressure on parliamentarians to enforce lobbying regulation under public scrutiny (it should be noted that the NZZ may have reported on them, but the articles were not in the sample due to the filter function) (→ Chapter 6.6 *Limitations*). It may take another lobbying event in Switzerland to further intensify the debate on regulation, as the politicians themselves are not capable of limiting their own rights to do so (→ Chapter 7.4 *Outlook*).

6.2 The Argumentation of the Proponents and the Opponents in the Analysis

The results of the second hypotheses, *between 2000 and 2019 the demands for more transparency in lobbying have increased*, can be accepted, as the number of supporters in the reporting clearly exceeds the number of opponents. In addition, more arguments from supporters are published in almost every year, which indicates that the demand for more transparency is constant over the years.

The analysis reveals that it is mainly parliamentarians who are cited about the topic in the reporting articles. This is not surprising, since most articles report on parliamentary business. What is salient is that – although there are supporters for more transparency in lobbying from all major parties – left-wing parties (SP, Green Party) are in the majority in favor of regulation and center-right parties (CVP, FDP, SVP) argue for the status quo. Ironically, the GLP, a center-left party, has exactly two proponents and two opponents. Presumably, that is about where the political boundary between proponents and opponents lies overall. Since the center-right parties dominate in parliament, it is also not surprising that historically every proposal has been rejected and rule changes have only taken affect in small bites. So far, the center-right parties could not yet be won over to lobbying regulation. This also explains why – despite a total of 15 statements that might have perceived a change in the transparency issue (e.g. the statement by Andrea Caroni (FDP) in 2015 after the Markwalder scandal that he had the feeling that the political majorities were shifting) – a political slide towards transparency regulation has so far failed to materialize. This raises the question of why, even among parliamentarians, the number of supporters (just) exceeds the number of opponents, but then still no change takes place? Three hypotheses are proposed in this regard: First, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung does not report objectively on the topic because they themselves are biased and therefore tend to interview transparency supporters (actor *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* with 21 positive statements to not a single negative statement). Second, parliamentarians who speak in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung are not representative of the whole parliament. It is possible that proponents tend to speak up while the majority remains silent and votes for the status-quo (→ Chapter 6.6 *Limitations*). Third, the statements and voting behavior of politicians on the topic of transparency and lobbying differ (→ Chapter 6.7 *Future Research*). But for what

reason do the members of the National Council and the Council of States play with hidden cards? Possibly because parliamentarians will lose privileges if they concede to additional regulations, but do not want to admit this publicly. As Baeriswyl (2005) puts it, parliamentarians are the biggest lobbyists. This position pays off in two ways in today's reality. First, parliamentarians' function as gatekeepers to the federal parliament, as they can each distribute two tickets (The Parliament law Act Art. 69). This relationship creates dependencies and, according to an unknown lobbyist, increases the risk of corruption (Mäder, 2019). Second, parliamentarians take advantages of The Parliamentary law Art. 11 which allows parliamentarians to accept well paid mandates without any sanctions for not declaring them. This is confirmed by several lobbying scandals where it became known that parliamentarians earn a great deal of money with their mandates (→ Chapter 2.3.3 *Lobbying in the Public Debate of Switzerland*). Both aspects could change with regulation, as lobbyists would gain easier access to the Federal Parliament (without any help of parliamentarians) and thus be able to represent their interests more easily. The consequence would possibly be that organizations might no longer be dependent on offering a mandate to a parliamentarian and could instead switch to a lobbyist to represent their interests (which might be a cheaper option to influence the decision-making process). Therefore, the power of parliamentarians would thus possibly be weakened by regulation. Parliamentarians do not want to allow this competition. For this reason, it is not surprising that the (negatively tainted) image of lobbyists is a recurring topic in Switzerland (Gallati, 2005). The lobbyists have still not been able to shed this image, as a recent newspaper article in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung shows (Mäder, 2019). This led to the fact that in the Markwalder-scandal, it was no longer just the parliamentarian who was in the spotlight, but the non-transparent PR agency, as one citizen indignantly put it (Maier, 2015). Despite SPAG's efforts to portray the lobbyist as a transparent but discreet player in the democratic process, the lobbyist has not yet shed its negative image, which continues to allow politicians to blame potential lobbying scandals on the lobbyists and divert attention from their own interests.

At first glance, the biggest hurdle to regulated party financing, disclosure of parliamentarians' ties to interests and regulation of the public affairs landscape by means of a lobbying register for the Federal Parliament (three core arguments of the proponents) appears to be Switzerland's political culture. The militia system, the close interaction between politics and

society, is considered one of the supporting elements of Swiss cohesion (Freitag, Bundi, & Witzig, 2019). After Linder (2012), the militia system provides for possible conflicts of interest, as the elected politician continues to work in their chosen profession. The Federal Council therefore rejects the regulation of party financing as demanded by international organizations, as it would not be compatible with the tradition of the militia system and federalism (Neuhaus, 2017). Parliamentarians argue that a mandatory disclosure of mandates while maintaining the militia system would violate privacy too much (since, for example, income would have to be made transparent) and could only be implemented with a bureaucratic and financially high effort. Moreover, politicians doubt the effect a lobbying register would have, as lobbyists' influence could be exerted elsewhere. At second glance, however, it seems to be the interests of parliamentarians that prevent a progressive regulation adapted to the times, because the arguments conceal the fact that the current system makes it possible for politicians in their position to profit from self-interest. This explains not only why politicians resist more transparency on their own behalf, but also why they are reluctant to implement an adopted transparency initiative, as it is currently the case in the cantons of Schwyz and Fribourg (Britsko, 2020). This development could mean that, to implement lobbying transparency, not only a successful popular initiative is needed, but possibly a judge's decision, so that the initiative is implemented in the spirit of the people and possibly analogous to the lobbying regulation for democracies proposed by Bitonti (2017), which includes accountable, transparent, open and fair criteria. What is further noticeable in the analysis is that companies, who possibly support parties with financial contributions, do not appear in the discourse – contrary to the assumption of Gernet (2011). As donors, companies could certainly exert pressure on politicians to be transparent for the good of democracy.

6.3 When the People must regulate Parliamentarians because it resists change

The overarching research question is *how did the public debate in Switzerland about lobbying and transparency evolve from 2000 to 2019*? We aim to answer this in this section.

The public debate has augmented in the observation period between 2000 and 2019. This can be attributed to the macro trends of *Europeanization*, *Mediatization*, *Professionalization* and *Polarization of Political Party System in Switzerland*, which influenced the political landscape during the observation period and led to the role of the lobbyist gaining in importance. This can be deduced from the reporting on lobbying and transparency, which – except for a lobbying scandal in 2001 – has steadily increased since 2010 and has been published in more important sections of the newspaper. In contrast to other countries, the lobbying scandals in Switzerland have led to only marginal changes in lobbying regulation.

The core concerns of the advocates for more transparency in lobbying are, first, a regulation of party financing, second, the complete disclosure of parliamentarians' interest ties, and third, the installation of a lobbying register that regulates lobbyists' access to the Federal Parliament. These demands emerged independently of each other during the discourse and were advocated by various actors. None of these requests were met by the national parliament during the observation period. This is because a majority in parliament consisting of center-right parties opposes regulation and, with few exceptions, has prevented regulation from passing. This result is therefore surprising, since a large majority of all stakeholders surveyed in the report are in favor of more transparency. Counterarguments cited include the incompatibility of regulation with Switzerland's political culture, namely the militia system, which provides for close interaction between society and politics. This leads – according to the opponents – to a regulation problem, whereby a transparency regulation can only be implemented with a disproportionately large bureaucratic and financial effort.

At first glance, this justification by the opponents of transparency seems plausible. It is in the spirit of the militia system that elected politicians continue to work at their chosen profession, although conflicts of interest may arise (Linder, 2012). However, one could argue that parliamentarians use this argumentation as a diversionary tactic to protect their own interests. As can be seen from the analysis, parliamentarians benefit from the current non-transparent regulation, which is not in the spirit of democracy (Bitonti, 2017), by controlling access to the federal parliament and potentially hiring out themselves as lobbyists, since as elected representatives, they have direct access to the decision-making system. This conflict of interest between transparency and their own benefits means that Parliament was not

capable of regulating itself during the observation period. There also remains a demand for transparency from economic actors who fund the financially weak parties at present (Gernet, 2011). Experience from cantonal transparency initiatives shows that not only a popular initiative is needed to regulate parliamentarians, but that the legal route may also have to be taken to ensure that the parliament implements the transparency initiative in the interests of democracy.

The answer to the research question: the public debate about lobbying and transparency has intensified during the observation period and public pressure on politicians has increased especially after lobbying scandals. However, this has so far remained without any significant consequences. The question of whether and how transparency in the sense of democracy will be enforced at the national level in the future remains open.

6.4 Outlook

The data indicate that the Neue Zürcher Zeitung will continue to report on lobbying and transparency in the future, as interest in the topic has been aroused on the part of both the journalist and the readership. Thus, a further five articles on the subject appeared in 2020.

If we consider our dataset as a guide, lobbying scandals have triggered the greatest response in terms of reporting and parliamentary initiatives. So, it could be that a next lobbying scandal will further increase the pressure for lobbying regulation. However, it remains questionable whether public pressure will be sufficient for parliamentarians to vote in favor of strict regulation, as this has already failed to happen in the past. The data show that counterarguments and resistance remained constant even after lobbying scandals, and after initial approval immediately after the lobbying scandal, all parliamentary motions were rejected.

The findings of this work suggest that if parliamentarians do not provide more transparency, people will take the issue into their own hands. In 2020, Schaffhausen, another German-speaking canton of Switzerland, joined the list of cantons that have adopted a transparency initiative (Britsko, 2020), bringing to three the number of German-speaking Swiss cantons that

have adopted a transparency initiative since 2018. The vote on the national transparency initiative is expected next. This requires parties and committees to make their finances transparent. Parties would be required to disclose their accounts as well as donations over CHF 10'000. Individuals and committees spending more than CHF 100'000 on a campaign would also be required to declare these donations. The figures would be made public before an election and a vote (Transparenzinitiative, 2021). Parliament has not yet managed to draft a counterproposal that would persuade the initiators to withdraw the initiative. However, in March 2021, the National Council was able to agree on a counterproposal in which parties would have to disclose individual donations of CHF 15'000 or more and a campaign budget of CHF 50'000. This must now be confirmed by the Council of States (Rhyn, 2021).

The two other core concerns, the lobbying register and the disclosure of parliamentarians' mandates, are not affected by this initiative. Thus, it remains to be assumed that, first and foremost, reporting on this lack of transparency will continue and possibly – since parliamentarians will likely refuse to adjust the regulation in the future by themselves, as in the observation period – the people will exercise their democratic rights in the name of transparency.

6.5 Contribution

This work *The development of the public debate about public affairs and transparency in the political sphere of Switzerland* between *2000 and 2019* builds on the existing Swiss public affairs literature (Tschäni, 1983; Baeriswyl, 2005; Hoffmann, Steiner, & Jarren, 2007; Mattle, 2009; Willener, 2013; Daum, Pöhner, & Peer, 2014; Etter, 2014; Schilliger & Seele, 2014; Hürlimann, 2015) and provides, for the first time, scholarly insights into the discourse on public affairs and transparency in Switzerland in the first two decades of the 21st century. It also provides an updated overview of the public affairs landscape in Switzerland based on data from Lobbywatch (2020), SPAG (2020) and Nicolussi (2014a, 2014b), which after comparison with other scholars (Markwalder, 2005; Hoffmann, Steiner, & Jarren, 2007; Longchamp, 2011; Daum, Pöhner, & Peer, 2014; Schilliger & Seele, 2014) seem to be plausible.

This work ventures into a new topic area and is the very first work to attempt to prove that the problem of the public affairs landscape being unregulated is increasingly evident in public reporting. It succeeds in doing so by demonstrating that (media) coverage has increased over the years. In addition, this work provides for the first time the core arguments of those in favor of regulation and those opposed to it. It crystallizes from the dataset the different actors and how they express themselves. Thanks to a listing of the arguments over a 20-year time span, it succeeds in placing the issues in a time frame, witnessing the change in discourse, and understanding key events and their effects. In addition, the listing of arguments exposes parliamentarians who, while the majority in the reporting were in favor of regulation, in actual fact oppose major regulation in the plenary.

Furthermore, this work follows on a theoretical base in particular from earlier work by Othmar Baeriswyl (2005) and Jochen Hoffmann, Adrian Steiner, and Otfried Jarren (2007), which critically examined the role of public affairs consultants and national politicians in the political sphere of Switzerland. These views were further developed with the help of the concepts of Pascal Sciarini, Manuel Fischer, and Denise Traber (2015). In their book "Political Decision-Making in Switzerland" they prove that several macro trends (*Europeanization*, *Professionalization*, *Mediatization* and *Polarization of Political Party System in Switzerland*) are responsible for the change in Swiss politics. Since the public affairs landscape is understood in this thesis as a subset of the political system, these macro trends also lead to changes in the public affairs landscape. Based on these macro trends we could theoretically derive the role of (the) public affairs officer. We can agree with the authors Hoffmann, Steiner & Jarren (2007) that public affairs consultants are a product of the growing *Professionalization* of the political business. With their service, they build bridges across two cracks that have developed: On the one hand, they mediate between politics and business as lobbyists (*Europeanization*), and on the other hand, they mediate between society and politics as communication consultants (*Mediatization*). Moreover, they could also be regarded as at minimum complicit in the increasing *Polarization of the Swiss political landscape*, since their professional (and *Americanized*) communication methods may have enabled this in the first place.

In theory, there are two different ways of looking on the public affairs profession (Bitonti 2017; Hoffmann, Steiner & Jarren 2007): First, the critical view, where lobbying is not democratically legitimized since certain actors gain disproportionate influence on the decision-making process. Second, the legitimized view, where lobbying as a direct interaction with the decision-making process is accepted. Data of this work show, that swiss citizens rather choose the first view in the observation period. Peter Hess' statement "I'm not a lobbyist and I have nothing to hide" is wrong (since he is a politician, and he has to hide something) but reflects the controversial image of the public affairs officer in Switzerland. In several articles, politicians get away after a lobbying scandal with the argumentation that the public affairs officer must behave better (Contra Argument *Intransparent PR-Agency*). Therefore, SPAG tries to enhance the image of the industry by installing a lobbying register and declaring the industries transparency (Pro Argument *Image Lobbyist*). With this action, the industry tries to escape the dirty corner (Mäder, 2019) which makes clear that in Switzerland the profession of a public affairs officer – in the observation period – is viewed critically. Otherwise, there would be no need to polish the image of the public affairs officer.

As we can see by virtue of this work the biggest association of public affairs officers in Switzerland (SPAG) is in favor of updating the current regulation to legitimize the work of their members. On January 7, 2021, 250 public affairs officers were listed on SPAGs own register, which has been online since 2013. On this website all members voluntarily disclose their employer and mandates. This register is in the sense of democracy since it includes all the four criteria of Alberto Bitonti's ideal lobbying regulation for democracies. It is *accountable* since all members are listed and identified. Everybody must be *transparent*, otherwise the public affairs officer is sanctioned by the board of SPAG. And it is *open* and *fair* since everybody has the possibility for an inscription and must play according to the same rules. This work shows that this self-regulation of SPAG is unfortunately not successful. Although SPAG has had a lobbying register since 2013, the situation has not changed. Therefore, we follow Bitonti and Harris (2017) who claim that lobby regulation should start with those who are being lobbied and not only with lobbyists themselves. Consequently, we (partly) disagree with Etter (2014) who proposed in her master's thesis an accreditation system for public affairs officers to gain access to the Federal Palace. It might legitimize the work of the public affairs officer as it does for journalists (who have such a register), but it still offers politicians (the ones who are being

lobbied) with opportunities to act intransparently. For an ideal lobbying regulation in Switzerland rules for both public affairs officers (the lobbyists) and politicians (the lobbied) must be in place. We therefore suggest an adaption of Parliamentary law Art. 11 and Parliamentary law Art. 69 Para.2 (→ Chapter 7.7 *Future Research*).

What stands out further is the fact that companies do not take an active position to regulate the non-transparent public affairs landscape. This does not correspond to the assumption of Hilmar Gernet (2011), who in his book "(Un-)heimliches Geld: Parteienfinanzierung in der Schweiz" ((Un-)Canny Money: Party Financing in Switzerland) assumes that companies will tend to disclose the money flows to parties due to pressure from their investors. In a joint statement, three companies (Mobiliar, Credit Suisse, Raiffeisen) advocate more transparency. However, their statement from 2012 remains the only one. Companies would have great potential to ensure a transparent lobbying landscape. On the one hand, companies finance the parties (party financing), and on the other hand, they could publish the money flows paid to parliamentarians to act as mandate holders. This work shows that this is not the case yet but is now heavily discussed in parliament since a popular initiative is launched (→ Chapter 6.4 *Outlook*).

6.6 Limitations

This work is limited in many ways. The limitations of the method, the codebook and the coders, the chosen newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung and the chosen keywords are presented in succession.

First, this work is limited overall through the chosen method, a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung. The historical design of this method only allows to analyze what a journalist wrote in their article. The circumstances of how the article was created remain blurred and a severe amount of information gets lost. We only can interpret the statements, not the whole interview the journalist had with an actor. And in the journalists creation of the article, we are dependent on their interpretation and their decision of which politician or actor is chosen to be interviewed (we remember that we only have statements from 55 different parliamentarians over a period of two decades. The national

parliament has 246 members in a legislature period of four years). It is possible that the article would have been completely different had another journalist with similar knowledge wrote it. Other research methods, such as expert interviews or focus groups with representative actors (politicians, public affairs officer), or participatory research would have given a deeper insight into the object of investigation. Compared to these possibilities a content analysis remains rather superficial.

Further along, the coders of this work are in a certain way a limitation. The creation of a codebook and the action of coding an article remains a construction of an individual that might have resulted in a different outcome with different coders (and a different creator of the codebook) because it is so subjective. This point is limited to the fact, that thanks to two co-coders an attempt at objectivity is made (intercoder-reliability $r_H=0.82$). However, it might be possible that different coders would have resulted in different outcomes.

In the context of this work, it seemed most useful to discuss the discourse of transparency and lobbying in Switzerland's highest quality newspaper, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (fög, 2020). However, this limits the results of this work for three reasons. First, it is quite possible that the results would have been more well-founded and comprehensive if other large Swiss daily newspapers had been evaluated. The Neue Zürcher Zeitung is in terms of numbers only the 8th most read newspaper in Switzerland (Statista, 2021). Newspapers such as 20 Minuten or Tages-Anzeiger reach a much greater readership so the discussion of several analyzed newspapers would have been more representative. Second, other newspapers like Blick or Tages-Anzeiger have different political positions (Longchamp, 2013) and therefore might have another clientele, so the reporting compared to Neue Zürcher Zeitung would have been more diverse. Third, newspapers from the Italian and French regions of Switzerland would have been interesting to analyze as well, since transparency rules have already been passed in some of their cantons. In Italian-speaking Switzerland (Ticino) and French-speaking Switzerland (Geneva, Neuchâtel), a total of three cantons have regulated party funding at cantonal level since 1998 (Ticino), 1999 (Geneva) and 2014 (Neuchâtel). It is possible that the reporting in these regions would have been different than in German-speaking Switzerland, which has only known a law on party financing in Schwyz and Fribourg since 2018 and Schaffhausen since 2020 (Britsko, 2020) – and after several rejections in cantonal referenda (Ambrus, 2018;

Leuzinger, 2019). For these three reasons (number of readers, political position, German-speaking region) this analysis is only partly representative of the overall discourse about lobbying and transparency in Switzerland.

A final limitation is the search for articles in databases. To search and filter articles for the creation of a sample, the decision was made to search for two keywords (lobb* and transparency). The search resulted in 128 articles. It remains possible that not all articles that could have be considered relevant for the sample were found, simply because they did not contain these two keywords. It is further possible, that both databases used, Swissdox and NZZ Archive, did not have all relevant articles in them, or that they did not function correctly due to technical issues when the search was run.

6.7 Future Research

This work offers several opportunities for future research in the field of public affairs in Switzerland, which can be derived from the opening chapters. Especially certain limitations like choice of method, creation of codebook, selected newspaper and election of keywords present possibilities to gain deeper knowledge and extend the presented work. This work also provides future researchers with more questions around the topic.

First, it could be interesting to use a different method to examine the research question *how did the public debate in Switzerland about lobbying and transparency evolve from 2000 and 2019*. It could be interesting to use focus groups, interviews or participatory research to gather data directly from involved actors such as politicians or public affairs officers. Thus, it would be possible to get personal insights from different actors and not be limited to statements in newspaper articles where the author of this work was not directly involved.

The codebook of this work can be understood as a basis for further research. It is possible that relevant information was lost and that better trained co-coders would provide an even better result with cleaner data to work with.

One potential point for future research is the selection of newspapers. The Neue Zürcher Zeitung is limited to a specific political bias, is only the 8th most read newspaper (Statista,

2021) and only reaches the German-speaking part of Switzerland. To really examine *the development of the public debate about public affairs and transparency in the political sphere of Switzerland between 2000 and 2019* it is suggested to choose more newspapers, with a diverse range of political opinions and some newspapers from the Italian and French parts of Switzerland to cover the whole discourse. It could be equally interesting to examine the discourse on lobbying and transparency in the individual cantons or individual language regions. The cantons of Ticino, Geneva, and Neuchâtel have had party financing laws in place for several years. It is possible that the Italian and French-speaking parts of Switzerland report differently on the issue than the German-speaking cantons, which have only recently adopted a transparency initiative in three cantons. It would be interesting to see in these examples how the discourse has changed historically leading up to the adoption, which actors have spoken out, and whether the resulting insight is consistent with the data in this work. It could even be possible that other newspapers reported on the topic earlier than 2000, so this parameter can also be expanded.

It is also suggested to rethink the keywords of this work (lobb* and transparency). It is possible that with words such as *party funding*, *mandates*, *militia system*, *public affairs* or *lobbying register*, a deeper range of articles can be found.

This work is limited to its time period. It will be interesting to follow the further discourse of this topic, especially if events such as a parliamentary initiative, an initiative of the people or another lobbying scandal occurs. It would be interesting to see if actors position themselves differently, if arguments shift in their prioritization, or perhaps even if new lines of argument emerge. Of particular interest could be the consequences of the national transparency initiative (→ Chapter 6.4 *Outlook*).

Further research is unlimited. This work provides research questions which can only be answered with a different work. First, it might be interesting to dive deeper into the history of the cantons who already have a transparency regulation. It could be interesting to examine what factors where needed to install it and to transport these factors to a possible scenario of how a transparency regulation could be installed at the national level. Second, this work suggests that politicians should be regulated to reach full transparency in the public affairs landscape of Switzerland (→ Chapter 6.5 *Contribution*). What would such a regulation look

like in the sense of democracy as Bitonti (2017)? How should the current regulation be adapted (Parliamentary law Art. 11 and Parliamentary law Art. 69 Para.2)? How could Sabine Etter's (2014) proposal be advanced? Third, it could be interesting to investigate the contradiction that a majority of politicians speak in favor of more transparency in lobbying regulation but when it comes to a vote those same politicians vote against it. Do newspapers interview the wrong politicians for their articles? Do they only speak publicly in favor of such regulation because it is in common with what people want to hear? Or is it a conflict of interest – as suggested in this work – that politicians want to profit from well-paid mandates and control access to the Federal Palace without telling the people the truth? How can parliamentarians ethically represent this position since they are elected to serve their country?

7 Conclusion

The aim of the work is to describe the development of the public debate about public affairs and transparency in the political sphere of Switzerland between 2000 and 2019 (RQ: *How did the public debate in Switzerland about lobbying and transparency evolve from 2000 to 2019?*). This research question was investigated with the help of a content analysis of the NZZ, which included both quantitative and qualitative elements.

The results stemming from the quantitative elements are evident. The coverage of lobbying and transparency increased significantly, especially between 2010 and 2019. In addition, it was found that articles appeared in the more important sections of the newspaper and were almost always written by in-house journalists. These observations are consistent with the literature review, which sees the lobbyist/public affairs officer as a product of several macro trends (*Europeanization*, *Professionalization*, *Mediatization*, and *Polarization* of the Swiss party system), leading to a greater demand for public affairs officer (Sciarini, 2015b). Scandals, such as those of Peter Hess (CVP) in 2001 or Christa Markwalder (FDP) in 2015 lead to greater coverage than parliamentary initiatives. Despite several scandals, the regulation of the public affairs landscape in Switzerland changes only minimally. To explain this contradiction, a look at the qualitative results of this work is necessary.

The results of the qualitative elements show that in the reporting, the number of supporters of transparent lobbying regulation clearly exceed the number of opponents who prefer the status quo. Actors such as the *Association*, the *Mass Media*, *Academic Organization*, *Citizen*, *Club*, *Corporation* and *Foundation* are in favor of transparent lobbying regulation in (in part) large majorities. Only the *Government* actor is against regulation. The representatives of the *PR/PA agencies* are, for the most part, undecided and only a narrow majority supports lobbying regulation, which is surprising since the professional association of lobbyists, the Swiss Public Affairs Society (SPAG), is in favor of regulation. The most frequent speakers in the discourse are parliamentarians, the majority of whom (77:68) are in favor of lobbying regulation. The analysis shows, however, that although there are sympathizers for lobbying regulation in all major parties, the concern finds a majority especially among left-wing parties.

Since a center-right majority is against lobbying regulation, it is no longer surprising that regulation in the public affairs landscape has changed only minimally in the period under observation. Contrary to initial assumptions, the companies that sometimes fund the parties do not play a significant role in the question of whether lobbying regulation should be made more transparent.

Overall, the proponents argue more diversely than the opponents to regulate the public affairs landscape. Proponents call for regulation of access to the Federal Parliament, the disclosure of mandates for members of the National Council and the Council of States, and transparent party financing. They justify these core concerns on the grounds of a reduced risk of corruption and in the interests of democracy. This position is also held by international organizations such as Transparency International, the GRECO and the OSCE. Opponents of regulation of the public affairs landscape argue that it would be incompatible with the peculiarities of the Swiss political system (militia system/federalism), since the militia system explicitly provides for the representation of interests (Fasel, 2005). In addition, regulation is described as too difficult to implement, bureaucratic and costly, violating the privacy of parliamentarians.

Another argument against additional regulation is competition from the lobbyists themselves. Apparently, parliamentarians fear for their privileges if they agree to regulation. The current lack of transparency allows parliamentarians to accept mandates and represent them under the dome of the Federal Palace. In addition, parliamentarians can regulate who gains access to the Federal Palace by granting two permanent passes. Under these circumstances, it is perhaps understandable that parliamentarians do not want to lose these privileges and therefore oppose stricter regulation. Consequently, stricter legislation towards more transparency in public affairs did not in the observation period of 2000 and 2019. Self-regulation of the public affairs industry (SPAG), which meets the criteria of Bitonti (2017) (accountability, transparency, fairness, openness), must not only be introduced at the national level merely to gain entry to the Federal Palace, the regulation of politicians should also be based on these criteria.

Since it is not possible for parliamentarians to regulate themselves, it remains the task of Switzerland's highest political authority, the people, to ensure transparent conditions in the Swiss public affairs landscape. Corresponding tendencies are already visible in the cantons. In

recent years, three popular initiatives have been adopted in Schwyz, Fribourg and Schaffhausen. At the national level, a transparency initiative may come before the people if parliament fails to agree on an acceptable counterproposal. However, it remains to be seen how parliament will implement the will of the people. In the canton of Schwyz, the initiators have filed a complaint with the Federal Supreme Court because parliament does not seem to be implementing the initiative properly (Britsko, 2020). Therefore, it is not only important that Swiss citizens exercise their right to vote, but also that they keep a close eye on elected politicians and exercise their political rights in the event of possible misconduct.

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Annex

The codebook is divided in formal, content and evaluating category after Rössler (2010)

Variable	Operationalization	Theoretical basis
Formal Category		
V0_Coder	Xxx (Name of coder)	Rössler (2010)
V1_Date	yyyy.mm.date (year/month/date)	
V2_Page	XX (number of page)	
V3_Title	XX (title of article)	
V4_Subtitle	XX (subtitle of article)	
V5_Lenght	XXX (number of words)	
V6_Author	XXX (name of author)	
V7_Rubric (r_H=0.8788) *	01_Anlagefonds 02_Beilage 03_Feuilleton 04_Finanzen 05_Forschung 06_Fotografie 07_Gesellschaft 08_International / Ausland 09_Medien 10_Meinung / Briefe an die NZZ 11_Mobil/Mobilität 12_NZZ Domizil 13_NZZ Executive 14_Panorama 15_Podcast 16_Reflexe 17_Reisen 18_Schweiz / Inland 19_Service 20_Sport 21_Technologie 22_Titelseite 23_Veranstaltungen 24_Video/Visuals 25_Wetter 26_Wirtschaft 27_Wissenschaft 28_Wochenende 29_Zürich 30_Leserbriefe 31_NZZ Campus 99_Unknown	Neue Zürcher Zeitung (2020)
V8_Type (r_H=0.9393) *	1_Agency Message *(very brief, factual short message with an agency abbreviation)* 2_Report/Leading Article *(longer article on the subject with additional information)* 3_Comments/Glossary/Reader's Letter *(opinion of the author, opinions expressed by readers)* 4_Interview *(questioning or discussion)*	Lichtsteiner (2005)

	5_Reportage/Feature *(long and detailed report with personal experiences of the authors and reports from eyewitnesses)*	

*Content Category****

V11_Name_1	XX (Name & Surname of Actor 1)	Oehmer (2012);
V12_Representative_1	XX (Name organization actor is representing)	Donges & Jarren (2010)
V13_Organization_1 (r_H=0.73076) *	01_Party *(e.g. GLP, Legislative)* 02_Association *(e.g. economie Suisse)* 03_Social movement / Citizens' initiative 04_Foundation *(e.g. Jacobs Foundation)* 05_Club *(e.g. Transparency International)* 06_Corporations under public law *(e.g. church)* 07_Business Enterprise *(e.g. UBS)* 08_Mass Medium *(e.g. Neue Zürcher Zeitung)* 09_Government (Executive, Judicative) 10_Academic Organization *(Universität Zürich)* 11_Citizen 12_PR/PA_Agency (Lobbyist) 99_Others	
V14_Status_1 (r_H=0.78205) *	01_local *(towns, cities, e.g. Zurich Trade Association)* 02_regional *(cantons, regions, also intercantonal e.g. Central Switzerland)* 03_national *(Switzerland)* 04_international with Swiss Relation *(EU/international); at least two countries are covered; Bundesrat)* 05_international without direct Swiss Relation *(EU Parliament)* 99_not visible	Oehmer (2012)

*** if there are multiple actors they will be coded separately. Second actor: V21_Name_2, V22_Representative_2; V23_Organization_2; V24_Status_2; third actor: V31_Name_3, V32_Representative_3 ect…*

*Evaluating category***, ****, *****

V101_Citation_1	"xx"Citation of Argument from Article	Rössler (2010)
V102_Summary_1	XX (Summary of argument of Actor in one sentence)	
V103_Valence_1 (r_H=0.6515) *	01_neutral 02_negative 03_positive	

****if there are multiple arguments per actor they will be coded ongoing V111_Citation_2, V112_Summary_2, V113_Valence_2*
*****if there are multiple actors they will be coded ongoing V201_Citation_2, V202_Argument_2; V203_Valence_2*
*****example fourth actor second argument citation will be V421*

Comment Coder

V998_Relevance_Coder (r_H=0.94) *	XXX (Relevant article; yes/no)	
V999_Summary_Coder	XXX (Short summary of content)	

*Holsti's intercoder reliability coefficient (r_H)